

**MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INSPECTION PANEL
REVIEW OF THE PERU LIMA TRANSPORT PROJECT (IBRD LOAN 7209-PE
AND GEF TF NO. 052856)**

Management has reviewed the Request for Inspection of the Peru Lima Transport Project (IBRD Loan 7209-PE and GEF TF No. 052856), received by the Inspection Panel on October 1, 2009 and registered on October 14, 2009 (RQ09/09). Management has prepared the following response.

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Map

Map 1.	IBRD No. 37332 – Peru: Barranco District, Lima
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BP	Bank Procedures
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CIP	Board of Engineers of Peru (Colegio de Ingenieros del Perú)
CNG	Compressed Natural Gas
CONAM	National Environmental Council
COSAC	High-capacity Segregated (bus) Corridor
CPPR	Country Portfolio Performance Review
DGASA	General Directorship for Social and Environmental Affairs (Dirección General de Asuntos Socio-Ambientales, located at MTC)
DGPM	National Directorate for Multiannual Programming (Dirección General de Programación Multianual)
DMTU	Municipal Directorate for Urban Transport (Dirección Municipal de Transporte Urbano)
DNEP	National Directorate for Public Debt (Dirección Nacional de Endeudamiento Público)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMAPE	Municipal Toll Road Management Company of the MML (Empresa Municipal Administradora de Peajes de Lima)
EMILIMA	Municipal Real Estate Enterprise of Lima (Empresa Municipal Inmobiliaria de Lima)
EMP	Environmental Management Plan
FONAM	National Environment Fund (Fondo Nacional Ambiental)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GPS	Global Positioning System
GTU	Urban Traffic Unit of the MML (Gerencia de Transporte Urbano)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INC	National Institute of Culture (Instituto Nacional de Cultura)
IPN	Inspection Panel
ISDS	Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet
ISR	Implementation Status Report
MDB	Municipality of Barranco (Municipalidad de Barranco)
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
Metropolitano	BRT project implemented by Protransporte with World Bank and IDB financing
MINAM	Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente)
MINT	Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior)
MML	Municipality of Metropolitan Lima
MTC	Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones)
OM	Operational Manual
OMS	Operational Manual Statement

OP	Operational Policy
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PPP	Public Private Partnership
Protransporte	Protransporte Metropolitan Institute of Lima (Instituto Metropolitano Protransporte de Lima)
QAT	Regional Safeguard Quality Assurance Team
QSA	Quality of Supervision Assessment
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment
SEDAPAL	Drinking Water and Sewerage Service of Lima (Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima)
TF	Trust Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. **On October 14, 2009, the Inspection Panel registered a Request for Inspection, IPN Request RQ09/09 (hereafter referred to as “the Request”), concerning the Peru Lima Transport Project.** The Project was approved on December 9, 2003, with an original closing date of June 30, 2009, which was extended by 12 months to June 30, 2010.

THE PROJECT

2. **The Project, known as “Metropolitano,” aims to increase the availability of public transportation in the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (MML) through the implementation of a bus rapid transit system (BRT), serving the mobility needs particularly of the poor, thereby enhancing the economic productivity and quality of life of the population.** Primary responsibility for Project implementation lies with Pro-transporte, an entity established in 2002 under the jurisdiction of the MML, the Borrower.

3. **The Project builds on extensive experience that the Bank and its clients have gained about the design and implementation of BRT, now considered best practice for mass transit systems.** In 1995, Quito developed a successful BRT in the heart of its colonial district, listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Mexico City also implemented a BRT to complement its metro system. Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT, which commenced operations in 2000, became an instant success. TransMilenio, in particular, shaped the design of Metropolitano, which was chosen among other mass transit options as the best technical and most cost effective solution to Lima’s transport needs.

4. **Several sources of financing were agreed for the Project, which had an overall estimated cost of US\$ 141.88 million.** Financing was structured as follows: MML would finance US\$ 43.95 million, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, Loan 7209-PE) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) would finance US\$ 45 million each, and the Global Environment Facility (GEF, TF No. 052856) would finance US\$ 7.93 million.

5. **In addition, a total of US\$80-100 million was expected from the private sector. This sum has now been exceeded, reaching about \$200 million,** which is being used primarily to purchase the new articulated buses, with the balance devoted to funding the fare collection and GPS equipment.

THE REQUEST

6. **The Request for Inspection was submitted by residents of the District of Barranco in the city of Lima, Peru (the “Requesters”). Management understands the Requesters’ main claims to be that the Project has:** (a) significantly worsened traffic conditions in the District of Barranco; (b) had negative environmental and socio-cultural effects on the District that have not been adequately mitigated; (c) failed to inform and consult the affected communities appropriately; (d) caused irreparable harm to the architectural heritage of the District; (e) not been well prepared; and (f) not been adequately supervised. Management understands that, while not opposing the BRT itself, the

Requesters would have preferred the selection of an alternative design that would not have diverted vehicular traffic through their neighborhood.

7. **The Panel has stated that the Requesters' claims indicate that the Bank may not have complied with the following operational policies:** (a) OP 4.01, Environmental Assessment; (b) OP 4.11, Physical Cultural Resources; (c) OP 13.05, Project Supervision; and (d) OMS 2.20, Project Appraisal.

PROJECT CONTEXT

8. **Transport conditions in Lima have worsened significantly in recent years, making an efficient mass rapid transit system indispensable.** In the 1990s, the car fleet increased by 195 percent and government statistics suggest an additional 37 percent increase between 2000 and 2009, a reflection of accelerating economic growth during the decade. Congestion is endemic even though most trips are on public transport. Current public transport consists of close to 30,000 vehicles, mostly for less than 20 passengers, with a typical vehicle age of close to 18 years. Lima is now the largest metropolis in Latin America and one of the largest worldwide without either a metro or BRT. Its air quality is among the worst in Latin America.

9. **The District of Barranco, designated an historic patrimony by the National Institute of Culture (INC), is small and highly congested.** Easily accessible by a major expressway, it has seen a sharp increase in traffic volumes, in part due to the growth of Lima's car fleet. Barranco's west side, which is the most historic area of the District, is a popular entertainment destination, attracting a high number of cars. Also, the residents of the west side, which is relatively wealthy, travel primarily by car. Construction of high-rises without adequate parking combines with these factors to worsen congestion. Residents of Barranco's less wealthy and mainly residential east side depend largely on existing public transport.

10. **The Metropolitano has indeed contributed to congestion in Barranco during construction.** Avenida Bolognesi, already a major public transport artery that runs through the District, was selected over other possible routes as the designated busway corridor because of its cost effectiveness and to avoid expropriation and resettlement in the historic area and elsewhere. Construction of the corridor, however, required detouring all traffic, including bus routes, to other streets, notably on the west side, thereby increasing congestion. The new busway is now constructed, but the stations are not, so BRT is not yet operational, although the MML, responding to community complaints, has allowed most bus routes temporarily back onto Av. Bolognesi. New traffic lights, intended to reduce congestion, were not timed appropriately, exacerbating rather than easing the situation.

11. **Once operational, however, the Metropolitano should produce significant transport improvements in Barranco, as well as elsewhere in Lima.** Given the locus of demand, about half of the system's buses will return north before entering Barranco. The new buses traversing Barranco using the dedicated busway (the old, deregulated buses will no longer be allowed in the busway and are to be scrapped) will carry most pas-

sengers that are using the currently available public or private options. With the new traffic patterns and northbound vehicular traffic permitted on Av. Bolognesi, congestion on parallel streets should ease. A new, appropriately timed, traffic light system should also contribute to improved flow. Southbound vehicular traffic traversing Barranco will, however, continue to be rerouted from Av. Bolognesi.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

12. **Management believes that the Bank has made significant efforts to fulfill the requirements of the relevant operational policies during all phases of the Project cycle, from preparation and appraisal to implementation and supervision, but concludes that these efforts have not fully complied with those policies.** Management acknowledges weaknesses in compliance with OP 4.01 and 13.05 and OMS 2.20. As summarized below, the weaknesses pertain primarily to aspects of consultation and disclosure.

13. **The Bank has worked with Protransporte to resolve technical problems and address beneficiary concerns as they have emerged during implementation of this complex Project, but Management concludes that additional measures are required.** Towards this end, Management's Action Plan, summarized in paragraph 20 below, includes measures to strengthen traffic and environmental management, improve consultations and communications, and enhance development outcomes.

14. ***Traffic Management.* Management considers that the Bank has met the requirements of OP 4.01 with respect to the design of traffic management measures. Management acknowledges that OP 4.01's requirement to mitigate residual adverse impacts has not been fully met.** Project design and BRT alignment in Barranco during preparation and appraisal were based on a thorough analysis to identify the alignment that would be the most cost effective and have the fewest adverse impacts. Detailed studies were subsequently carried out to recommend mitigation measures. Management acknowledges, however, that OP 4.01's requirement to mitigate unanticipated adverse impacts that have emerged during implementation has not been fully met, particularly because congestion remains higher than anticipated as a result of delays in Project implementation and poorly timed traffic signals. Additionally, informed stakeholder consultations were not always implemented satisfactorily and consequently some groups lacked proper understanding of the Project scope.

15. ***Environmental Assessment Process.* Management concludes that the Bank met the requirements of OP 4.01 during preparation and appraisal in carrying out the requisite studies of alternatives and other matters, but acknowledges that disclosure of relevant studies and plans did not always meet the policy's requirements.** Further, institutional capacity for environmental and social management was insufficiently developed at approval. The Bank endeavored to support building the necessary capacity during implementation, particularly for social management. The Project included a social mitigation and community participation component. The Bank encouraged the Borrower to establish a Project Social Management Unit to implement the social mitigation program. The Bank advised Protransporte on its communication strategy and hired

expert consultants to help it strengthen its EMP. Management acknowledges, however, that these activities did not fully achieve their objectives. Furthermore, key documents such as the final Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) were disclosed in-country for only part of the time and the Bank failed to disclose this document at the Infoshop.

16. ***Consultation Process.*** Management agrees that the Project has not met fully the requirements of policies and procedures related to consultation and grievance mechanisms. Extensive consultations with various stakeholder groups were carried out during Project preparation and appraisal and have continued during implementation. Management acknowledges, however, that the quality and consistency of the consultation process has been uneven. In particular, although complete consensus among stakeholders with divergent interests can never be achieved, more systematic attention should have been given to communicating with affected groups about Project design, gathering and considering their concerns, and advising them how their concerns could be addressed. Also, more attention was paid to key stakeholders such as bus owners and bus drivers than to other stakeholders.

17. ***Physical Cultural Resources.*** Management considers that the Bank has met the requirements of OP 4.11 on Physical Cultural Resources. Compliance with local law and institutions, which is a key principle of this OP, has been ensured. In accordance with Peruvian law, the INC has been directly involved in and provided oversight of the Project. Also, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and EIA contained a complete analysis of the Project areas as required by the policy, including the Barranco District, and special actions have been taken to minimize impact on historical sites and cultural resources in line with the recommendations of both the SEA and EIA.

18. ***Appraisal Process.*** Management concludes that the Bank broadly complied with OMS 2.20. During preparation and appraisal, the Bank properly analyzed its technical, economic, financial and commercial aspects in compliance with OMS 2.20. However, when approved, the Project was not yet fully ready for implementation. For example, there were delays in finalizing bidding documents consistent with the Bank and the IDB procurement guidelines; also, implementation and coordination capacity, particularly in the areas of environmental and social management, needed significant strengthening. Approval was granted nonetheless on the shared assumption that a number of outstanding issues would be resolved quickly and that implementation of the works could begin shortly after Project approval. With hindsight, it is clear that this assumption was overly optimistic. For example, it took two years to work out a common procurement framework with the IDB.

19. ***Supervision.*** Management believes that supervision has partially met the requirements of OP 13.05. Management notes that as Project implementation advanced, Bank staff made progressive efforts to meet the standards set by OP 13.05. In the initial years of project implementation, supervision teams focused on the complex institutional and procurement issues of the Project. Therefore, missions often did not include environmental and social specialists, a situation addressed as of late 2007. Nevertheless, a 2006 review by the Bank's internal Quality Assurance Group (QAG) rated the supervision of environmental and social aspects as satisfactory, but considered other aspects to

be less than fully satisfactory as the Bank should have been more forceful in trying to address implementation delays during the 2004-2006 period. The frequency and intensity of missions increased as a result of the QAG recommendations. Management considers that as Project implementation has unfolded and technical, stakeholder, and other implementation issues have surfaced, the Bank has intensified supervision and been proactive, thus meeting the policy requirements.

MANAGEMENT ACTION PLAN

20. **Management concludes that, with the exceptions acknowledged above, the Bank has broadly complied with the relevant operational policies. Management, however, shares the Requesters' concerns about the increased traffic congestion caused by the construction delays. In the course of intensifying supervision since late 2008, the Bank has already begun to take or is planning a number of actions to address implementation problems, including those mentioned by the Requesters, and to enhance the Project's development outcomes further.** These actions should improve the quality of life and mobility of residents of the MML, including Barranco, during the final Project implementation process as well as in the longer term. These actions include:

- *Traffic Management:* Finance through trust funds a traffic management study encompassing such aspects as the management of road closures and detours, the synchronization of traffic signals, and the operation of intersections to improve traffic flow and enhance road safety in various districts of Lima, including Barranco. The results of the study will be coordinated with implementation of the traffic signal system of the Metropolitano. (Expected initiation by February 2010 and completion by June 2010.)
- *Environmental Management:* Continue active supervision by experienced Bank staff of environmental and social aspects of the Project to ensure that communication between the MML and local residents improves. (Under way and continuous until completion of works by March 2010.) The Bank will also follow up with Protransporte to ensure the completion of the required ex post environmental audit once works are completed. (Expected conclusion September 2010.)
- *Consultations and Communications Strategy:* Support dialogue and consultation in Barranco between Protransporte, stakeholders, and authorities of Barranco by: (a) hiring an expert on facilitation, conflict resolution, and mediation; (b) setting up the operation of the roundtable agreed upon in June 2009; and (c) establishing an improved, formalized system of mediation and grievance redress in the Project. (Consultant already hired. Dialogue is planned between November 2009 and June 30, 2010.) The Bank will also continue technical advice to Protransporte in the area of communications, and ensure proper oversight, support and quality of local consultations, including record keeping, to help the agency manage issues that could develop in the future with other stakeholder groups, such as existing bus operators. (Dialogue initiated in early 2008 and completion expected June 30, 2010.)

- *Supervision:* In addition, the Bank will monitor final works in Barranco to ensure that they are concluded satisfactorily and that stations are constructed per designs approved by the INC. (Under way and continuous until works are completed by March 2010.)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. **On October 14, 2009, the Inspection Panel registered a Request for Inspection, IPN Request RQ09/09 (hereafter referred to as “the Request”), concerning the Peru Lima Transport Project** financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the Bank) (IBRD Loan 7209-PE) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF TF No. 052856).

2. **The Project aims to assist the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (MML) in enhancing the economic productivity and quality of life of the population within the Lima Metropolitan area through improved mobility and accessibility.** The Project was approved on December 9, 2003, with an original closing date of June 30, 2009, which was extended by 12 months to June 30, 2010. The Project addresses Lima’s public transportation needs through the implementation of a mass transit system. Primary responsibility for Project implementation lies with Protransporte, an entity under the jurisdiction of the MML, the Borrower. The Project is co-financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

3. **The present document contains the following sections:** Section II presents a summary of Management’s understanding of the Request for Inspection; Section III provides context and background information on the Project; Section IV describes the content of the Project and the status of Project implementation; Section V presents Management’s response to the Request for Inspection; and Section VI presents an Action Plan aimed at addressing the concerns of the Requesters. Several annexes are included: Annex 1 presents the Requesters’ claims, together with Management’s detailed responses, in table format; Annex 2 provides a detailed description of the IBRD and GEF Projects; Annex 3 presents a chronology of Bank and Project engagement with the key stakeholders, including the Requesters; Annex 4 provides a timeline of environmental assessment work for the Project; Annex 5 provides detailed information of supervision missions and team composition; Annex 6 contains information distributed to the public by Protransporte; and Annex 7 is a chronology of the Requesters’ communications with local authorities.

II. THE REQUEST

4. **The Request for Inspection was submitted by a group of residents of the District of Barranco in the city of Lima, Peru** (hereafter referred to as the “Requesters”). Attached to the Request is a list of letters the Requesters addressed to national authorities and the World Bank to raise their concerns, and a CD-ROM with videos, press articles, and other background material related to the Request.

5. **Management understands the Requesters’ main claims as stating that:** (a) the Project significantly worsened traffic conditions in the District of Barranco; (b) the Project’s negative impacts on the environment and socio-cultural dynamics of the District were not adequately mitigated; (c) affected communities were neither well informed nor consulted; (d) the Project caused irreparable harm to the architectural heritage of the District; (e) the Project was not well prepared; and (f) Project supervision was inadequate.

6. **The Request contains claims that the Panel has indicated may constitute non-compliance by the Bank of various provisions of its policies and procedures, including the following:**

OP/BP 4.01, Environmental Assessment;

OP/BP 4.11, Physical Cultural Resources;

OP/BP 13.05, Project Supervision; and

OMS 2.20, Project Appraisal.

III. CONTEXT AND PROJECT BACKGROUND

Project Implementation Area

7. **The Project is being implemented in Lima, the capital of Peru.** Lima has more than 7.6 million inhabitants,¹ who live in a relatively low density environment (110 inhabitants per hectare) when compared to other Latin American cities. Thus, travel distances are greater than average, particularly for the poor who tend to live at the periphery of the city but work in its center.

8. **The city of Lima has two levels of Government.** The MML is governed by a mayor and a legislative body. With regard to transport, the MML is responsible for the construction, maintenance and operation of the major avenues and access roads, for licensing bus routes, and for the construction and operation of other trunk infrastructure. Within the MML there are 43 Municipal Districts, which have their own elected mayors and legislative bodies. Districts have local responsibilities such as managing local streets, collecting garbage, and maintaining parks.

Traffic in Lima and Overall Project Vision

9. **Transport conditions in Lima have worsened significantly in recent years.** In the 1990s, the vehicle fleet increased by 195 percent,² in large part due to legislation adopted earlier in the decade to allow the importation of used vehicles. Government statistics suggest that from 2000 to 2008 the vehicle fleet increased by 32 percent, and is likely to have increased by 37 percent from 2000 to the end of 2009.³ This reflects accelerating economic growth during the decade. Congestion is endemic even though 82.5 percent of all trips are by public transport. Controversial legislation in 1991 and 1992 deregulated public transportation, and contributed to a large, lightly regulated system of public transportation and subsequent traffic congestion. Current public transport consists of close to 30,000 units, mostly for less than 20 passengers, with a typical vehicle age of close to 18 years. Air quality is among the worst in Latin America, despite Lima's location by the coast.

¹ The Provincial Municipality of Callao, which is contiguous with Lima, has about one million inhabitants, bringing the total metropolitan population to nearly 9 million.

² Source: Gerencia de Transporte Urbano, Municipalidad de Lima Metropolitana.

³ Source: MTC- Statistics Office. Parque Vehicular Estimado 2000-2009.

10. **Lima's size and overall characteristics make an efficient mass rapid transit system indispensable.** Lima is now the largest metropolis in Latin America without either a metro or a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), and one of the largest worldwide without mass transit. In the late 1980s the Peruvian Government initiated the construction of a heavy rail line (Tren Eléctrico), but this project has not been completed and it is still not operational.

11. **The Project supports development of a mass rapid transit system – within the fiscal constraints of the MML and the economic constraints of the country – by building a first BRT line.** Key objectives of the Project are to enhance the economic productivity and quality of life within the metropolitan area, with a particular focus on the mobility needs of the low-income population, and to reduce the ever increasing pollution caused by the large number of cars and oversupply of old buses and taxis.

12. **The first line of the Metropolitano (as the Project is known) is a high-performance BRT on segregated busways,⁴ with modern articulated buses using compressed natural gas (CNG), special stations and terminals, a modern fare collection system and control of the vehicles using global positioning (GPS).** This line runs from north to south parallel to the coast, with a length of 28.6 kilometers. As in any BRT, passengers will pay upon entering a station and board the buses from the platform, hence allowing all passengers to use the service easily, including people with physical disabilities. The line will have 35 stations and two transfer terminals, where passengers will transfer from feeder buses to the trunk line. The line is expected to carry in excess of 600,000 passengers on a typical weekday, which will make it one of the most heavily used in the world.

13. **The Metropolitano builds on extensive international experience.** In 1995 Quito opened the first line of its BRT system, which entered the colonial sector of the city, a UNESCO World Heritage site, as is the center of Lima. In 2000, Bogotá (then the other large city without mass transit in the region) opened its TransMilenio BRT system, which became an immediate success. Similarly, Mexico City has adopted a BRT system to complement its metro system, significantly increasing mobility. The BRT approach is now widely regarded as best practice for mass transit development, especially if there are insufficient resources for building a full-fledged metro system. The MML, with financing and technical support from the World Bank and the IDB, decided to move ahead with the Metropolitano, patterned, in most technical aspects, after the TransMilenio.

The Situation of Barranco

14. **Barranco is a small District that sits adjacent to the ocean in the southern part of the city (see Map 1), between the Districts of Miraflores (relatively wealthy) and Chorrillos (relatively low-income).** Barranco itself has some wealthy sectors on its west side, close to the coast, where old houses are being replaced by high-rises. The west side also has the most valuable historic area, as well as many bars and restaurants. Its population travels primarily by car. The east side of Barranco, not as wealthy, is mainly residential and its population largely de-

⁴ The term busways refers to lanes segregated to all other traffic and on which only buses can circulate.

pend on public transport. Barranco was declared a historic patrimony due to its colonial-style houses by the National Institute of Culture (INC) in December 1972.

15. **The Metropolitano runs through Barranco on Av. Bolognesi, a four lane avenue heavily used by public and private vehicles that has been adapted for BRT use.** This alignment was chosen for the Metropolitano because the avenue was already a major public transport corridor that linked Barranco and Chorrillos to the expressway (Av. Paseo de la Republica, also called Via Expresa) that connects Barranco with the center of Lima (Plaza Grau). The Metropolitano also uses the already existing busways on the expressway, which were retrofitted to allow extra space so that buses can pass other buses servicing the stations. Given the relative narrowness of the corridor on Av. Bolognesi and the desire to avoid expropriation and resettlement in an historic area, the Project feasibility analysis indicated that only two lanes for the busways of the Metropolitano would fit in the avenue, together with the northbound lanes for cars.⁵ The southbound car lanes have been permanently rerouted through the west side of the District. At the same time, the design eliminated the passing lane for buses at the stations. This adaptation was possible because demand is higher north of Barranco and more than half of the buses will turn around before entering the District.

16. **Barranco has suffered from increasing traffic congestion in recent years for reasons that are in large part unrelated to the Metropolitano.** With the rapid increase in the size of the car fleet in Lima, Barranco, which lies at the end of the Via Expresa and is therefore easily accessible by car, saw sharp increases in traffic volumes. In addition, large numbers of commercial and high rise buildings have been developed there, further increasing traffic density in the District.

17. **While under construction, the Project exacerbated problems in Barranco.** The main reasons are as follows:

- (a) During construction of the busways (August 2007 to August 2008) Av. Bolognesi was entirely closed to traffic. Car and bus traffic was rerouted onto streets such as Av. San Martin, Av. Grau, and Av. Lima, increasing congestion in the area (see Map 1).
- (b) Once the construction of the busways on Av. Bolognesi was finished, the MML decided to maintain the detours (see footnote 5 and paragraph 35 below).
- (c) The MML installed traffic signals on the west side of Barranco to reduce congestion and to respond to residents' complaints. Unfortunately, the traffic signals were not timed appropriately, worsening rather than improving traffic conditions.

⁵ See "Estudio del Tránsito del Área Sur de Lima" dated May 11, 2005, which found that the northbound car traffic needed to remain on Av. Bolognesi, while the southbound could be rerouted given the relative importance of each traffic flow.



Photo 1. Av. Bolognesi, Barranco District, busway and northbound lanes

18. **The Metropolitano is expected to improve the transport conditions in Barranco once it becomes operational mainly because:**

- (a) It will replace a myriad of small buses with an efficient and reliable bus service.
- (b) Car traffic will not be interrupted by the frequent stopping of buses to pick up and drop off passengers, because the new buses are confined to the busway.
- (c) A modern traffic signal system and improved traffic management will be implemented.
- (d) The Project is also expected to generate positive environmental impacts through less air pollution, especially particulates, and fewer occurrences of pulmonary disease among Lima residents, especially children and senior citizens.

IV. THE PROJECT

Project Objectives

19. **The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to assist the MML in enhancing economic productivity and quality of life within the Lima Metropolitan area through improving mobility and accessibility for the metropolitan population, especially in the peri-urban poor neighborhoods, by establishing an efficient, reliable, cleaner and safer mass rapid transit system. The specific PDO as written in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) are to:**

- Implement the new mass rapid transit system on the basis of a Public Private Partnership (PPP) with bus corridor/feeder routes operations and fare collection system;
- Improve access within low income areas through facilitating the use of low cost transport alternatives, such as bicycles and walking;
- Strengthen the local institutional capacity to regulate and manage the metropolitan transport system on a sustainable basis; and
- Reduce the negative environmental impact of motorized transport in Lima.

Project Financing

20. **Several sources of financing were agreed for the Project, which had an overall estimated cost of US\$ 141.88 million.** Financing was structured as follows: MML would finance US\$ 43.95 million, IBRD and IDB would finance US\$ 45 million each and GEF would finance US\$ 7.93 million.

21. **In addition, financing was expected from the private sector** to purchase the new articulated buses, to buy back and scrap the old polluting buses through the scrapping program, and to supply and operate the electronic fare system and control center. A total of US\$ 80-100 million were expected from the private sector.

Project Components

22. **As detailed in the PAD, the IBRD Project comprises six components summarized below** (a more detailed description can be found in Annex 2):

- Component 1: Mobility and Environmental Improvements (US\$ 99.92 million total; US\$ 37.94 million IBRD). This component finances infrastructure works to implement 28.6 kilometers of busways along existing road corridors, as well as complementary measures aimed at enhancing road safety as well as environmental benefits of the Project.
- Component 2: Social Mitigation and Community Participation (US\$ 5.75 million; US\$ 1.63 million IBRD). This component includes consultation and communication activities, and mitigation efforts to assist current bus operators and owners whose economic activities may be curtailed as a result of the new system.
- Component 3: Institutional Strengthening (US\$ 4.77 million; US\$ 1.5 million IBRD). This component supports the entities responsible for developing a public transport policy, carrying out the required physical works and regulating the provision of mass rapid transit services.
- Component 4: Studies and Construction Supervision (US\$ 8.58 million; US\$ 3.48 million IBRD). This component finances the supervision of the physical works described above, the preparation of final engineering designs to expand the busway network beyond the 28.6 kilometers funded by the Project, as well as social impact assessments of the new system.

- Component 5: Program Administration (US\$ 6.53 million, entirely financed with counterpart funds). This component finances the operational expenses of the institutions responsible for administering the Project and for implementing the busway operations.
- Component 6: Grade Separation of Plaza Grau (US\$ 10 million; entirely financed with counterpart funds). This component finances the re-construction of the Plaza Grau, one of Lima's busiest intersections and a key node of the busways to be financed under the Project.

23. **In addition, a linked GEF Project (US\$ 7.93 million) seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions** by promoting the retirement of obsolete and polluting buses and by improving bicycle facilities (a more detailed description can be found in Annex 2).

Implementation Arrangements

24. **Primary responsibility for Project implementation rests with the MML (the Borrower), through Protransporte**, as defined in section 3.01 (a) of the Loan Agreement. Protransporte is responsible for the day-to-day administration of Project activities and it also provides, when needed, additional funds, facilities, services and other resources required for the Project. Protransporte also manages the IDB co-financing loan. The GEF component is managed under the National Environment Fund (Fondo Nacional Ambiental, FONAM), which maintains ongoing coordination with Protransporte.

25. **Project oversight is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)**, as the Government of Peru provided a sovereign guarantee to back the obligations of the MML vis-à-vis the World Bank and the IDB. Specifically, there are two directorates in MEF that oversee this Project, the National Directorate for Multiannual Programming (Dirección General de Programación Multianual, DGPM), which oversees technical aspects including Project appraisal and supervision, and the National Directorate for Public Debt (Dirección Nacional de Endeudamiento Público, DNEP), which oversees financial aspects linked to the debt component of this Project. In addition to the day-to-day oversight, Country Portfolio Performance Reviews (CPPRs) organized jointly by DNEP, DGPM, and the Bank are carried out three times a year in Peru. This Project is systematically reviewed as part of the CPPR exercise.

Project Milestones

26. **The Project milestones are summarized in the Table below:**

Project Concept Document Decision Meeting	February 20, 2003
Decision Meeting	June 19, 2003
Board Approval	December 9, 2003
Signing	June 2, 2004
Project Effectiveness	December 15, 2004
Mid Term Review	March 2008
Closing Date, original	June 30, 2009
Closing Date (extended at mid-term review)	June 30, 2010

Project Status

27. **To date, the Project has disbursed US\$ 36.7 million, 81.6 percent of the total loan amount.** The Project has financed mainly the construction of the segregated busways. The following table shows the main dates pertaining to the construction of the busways, stations, and terminals. Barranco District is located in South Corridor Segment II.

Facility	Construction Start Date	Construction End Date	Progress To Date
South Corridor I	April 2007	January 2008	100%
South Corridor II	August 2007	August 2008	100%
Center Corridor I	July 2008	July 2009	100%
Center Corridor II	July 2008	July 2009	100%
North Corridor	November 2008	December 2009	90%
Stations South	July 2009	December 2009	60%
Stations Barranco	Awaiting INC final authorization	March 2010	0%
Stations North	October 2009	March 2010	20%
Terminal South	August 2009	March 2010	40%
Terminal North	September 2009	March 2010	5%
Bus Depots North	November 2009	March 2010	5%
Bus Depots South	August 2009	December 2009	70%

Note: Stations, terminals and bus depots are being built with MML's own funds, and are not directly financed by the Bank.

28. **Project implementation is well advanced, but there are still a number of actions needed to complete the Project.** Busway construction is almost fully completed. Construction of the bus stations has started, but with significant delays. After two designs of the stations were rejected by the MML, Protransporte finalized them only in mid-2008. A change in the agency in charge of contracting meant that construction began only in August 2009. The INC is still in the process of issuing final approval to the design of some stations, including one in Barranco. Given these delays, Protransporte has reported that operation of the Metropolitano will start in April 2010. Bus concessionaires will have the Project's buses ready by the beginning of 2010, in time for the expected opening day. The fare collection and control center will also be ready around this date. The MML is seeking funding to assist in the implementation of the scrapping program for the old buses that will no longer operate when the Metropolitano is fully functional. Protransporte has contracted firms to develop the details of the social mitigation program for the bus operators displaced by the new system, part of which is financed by the Project. A mass communications plan is being prepared to inform the city's residents about the new Metropolitano services.

29. **By September 2008, the total estimated Project costs had increased to US\$ 272 million,** because of worldwide increases in the cost of construction materials, high demand for construction services in Peru given the country's fast economic growth, and the loss of value of the dollar vis-à-vis the Peruvian Sol. The MML has financed the difference between the estimated final Project costs and the IBRD, IDB and GEF funding with its own resources for an amount of US\$ 182 million. The works that the MML will finance entirely from its own re-

sources include: all the stations along the alignment, the two transfer terminals, one at each end of the line, and the bus depots and repair facilities. The private sector contributed close to US\$ 200 million to the Project for buses, the control center, and the fare collection system, well above the original expectation.

30. **The Peruvian authorities have expressed an interest in extending the BRT system in the future.** As a first step, the MML has identified the need to extend the BRT route by an additional 11 kilometers in the northern area of Lima, where some of the poorest population lives. In order to finance this additional segment, discussions are underway about the possibility of additional financing from both Banks, for US\$ 45 million each. A final decision has not yet been made in this respect.

V. MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE

31. **Management's response to the Requesters' claims, which are summarized in paragraph 5 above, is presented below.** The Requesters' claims, accompanied by Management's detailed responses, are provided in Annex 1. Additional information is provided in Annexes 2-7.

Traffic Management

32. **Management considers that the Bank has met the requirements of OP 4.01 with respect to the design of traffic management measures. Management acknowledges that OP 4.01's requirement to mitigate residual adverse impacts has not been fully met.** Alignments and designs were determined based on a thorough analysis of alternatives, and met OP 4.01's requirement to identify and choose the alternatives that cause the least adverse impact, in particular on poor and vulnerable populations. However, the Project has advanced more slowly than expected (it is still not operational) and some measures designed to mitigate temporary increases in congestion, such as the installation of traffic signals, were poorly implemented. Hence, the residual adverse impacts of the construction phase have lasted longer than planned. In addition, informed consultation with concerned groups was not always implemented satisfactorily and as a result some groups lacked proper understanding of the Project scope.

33. **Management agrees with the Requesters that the Project has partially contributed to traffic congestion in Barranco during construction.** As pointed out above, traffic congestion has increased in Barranco for a number of other reasons unrelated to the Metropolitano: the car fleet more than tripled in Lima since the 1990s and, in addition, the development of commercial and high rise buildings in Barranco resulted in a further increase of traffic density in the District. Increases in congestion surpassed projections as a result of higher than expected growth rates. However, the Project also contributed to the problem. Av. Bolognesi, a main avenue which carried a large proportion of the traffic load in the District, was closed during the construction of the local segments of Metropolitano busways. This increased congestion in the local streets that were used as detours for all public and private traffic during the construction period. In addition, Project construction took longer than expected and temporary street closures and detours have lasted for a longer period than initially envisaged.

34. **Management notes that various options were considered for traffic management in the Project design and examined in the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and**

the chosen alignment was studied in depth in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). As part of preparation of the EIA, an analysis of 11 alternative alignments was carried out in 2002. In addition, a detailed traffic study was carried out in 2004-2005 before construction started.⁶ The comprehensive study compared four different design alternatives for the southern segment and chose the best one, which was deemed to have the least possible long- and short-term impacts. The EIA concluded that, with proper traffic engineering, the permanent detours would not cause major problems in Barranco. Other options would have required the resettlement of hundreds of people and the destruction of part of the historic area of the District. Furthermore, the engineering designs contained a detailed Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and refined traffic management plans.⁷

35. Most of the Metropolitano-related works in Barranco have now been completed, but the Metropolitano is not yet operational and the traffic patterns are still not optimal. Construction of the Metropolitano busways in Av. Bolognesi started in August of 2007 and ended one year later. Construction of all the Metropolitano stations has been delayed, however, with Metropolitano operations set to begin in April 2010 as mentioned above. Now that construction of the busways is complete, private traffic in the northbound direction is again running on Av. Bolognesi, but in the southbound direction the detours through the residential area will be permanent. Protransporte felt initially that it was unwise to let conventional buses use the new busway because of the likely difficulties of removing them later on, once the Metropolitano starts to operate. Barranco residents became vocal about the congestion and requested that traffic signals be installed to improve further traffic flows. The MML responded by installing 10 traffic signals in the District, using its own resources. Unfortunately, many of them were not timed appropriately. Months later, by March 2009, in response to more complaints from Barranco residents, Protransporte agreed to shift about 25 of the 46 bus routes passing through Barranco back to the busways on Av. Bolognesi.

36. The Bank monitored this situation as it evolved; having noted that traffic was not moving as desired in Barranco, the March 2009 supervision mission included a traffic management specialist. The consultant concluded that: (a) the original traffic management plan, included in the 2005 study, was of high quality; (b) the recently installed traffic signals were not properly timed, thus generating bottlenecks and long lines, and overall increased traffic congestion; (c) public works unrelated to the Metropolitano, in particular unannounced repairs by utility companies, aggravated the congestion; and (d) lack of adequate parking led to the informal use of streets and even sidewalks for parking, which is particularly a problem on narrow streets.

37. The consultant's report recommended improving traffic signal timing, placing traffic signs, and accelerating implementation of the Project in order to ensure that the Metropolitano operates as planned and that final traffic patterns are in place. The Bank shared

⁶ See "Estudio del Tránsito del Área Sur de Lima," dated May 11, 2005. This 264 page report studies traffic patterns and potential impacts of the Project in the southern segment of the corridor. In particular, pages 72–88 describe four alternative traffic scenarios in the District of Barranco, and the section thereafter simulates and compares the alternatives to choose the best one.

⁷ See Vera y Moreno S.A. 2006. "Elaboración de Expedientes Técnicos para la Construcción del Corredor Sur, Tramo II. Informe Final." Anexo VII, Plan de Desvíos. See also the EMP contained in the document "Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, Elaboración de Expedientes Técnicos para la Construcción del Corredor Sur."

the report with Protransporte for follow up. The Bank observed that progress on the recommendations had been very slow, in part due to lack of capacity at the Urban Traffic Unit (Gerencia de Transporte Urbano, GTU), the agency in charge of traffic signals, to carry out the detailed engineering needed. Protransporte argued that given the high-quality engineering study done for the traffic signals that are part of the Metropolitano corridor, the situation in Barranco will be solved once the Project is operational. To try to accelerate the solution in Barranco and to address the engineering weakness at GTU, however, the Bank is seeking trust fund resources to carry out a more detailed and specific traffic engineering study for Barranco that would yield recommendations that could be implemented before the Project is operational. In the interim, the December supervision mission will assess again the evolving situation in the streets of Barranco and offer new recommendations.

38. **Management notes that most of the negative impacts caused by the Project are temporary.** Until the works are completed and the Project is fully operational, it is not known whether there will be permanent negative impacts. The Project will reduce the number of traditional buses in Barranco, a new efficient and reliable bus service will be in operation, and new traffic patterns will be in place. Management will continue its supervision and monitoring, and will support the Borrower in mitigating any residual adverse impacts.

Environmental Assessment Process

39. **Management concludes that the Bank met the requirements of OP 4.01 during preparation and appraisal in carrying out the requisite studies of alternatives and other matters, but acknowledges that disclosure of relevant studies and plans did not always meet the policy's requirements.** Also, the institutional capacity for environmental and social management was insufficiently developed at the time of Project approval. The Bank's efforts to promote institutional strengthening did not fully achieve their objectives. The Bank team could have intervened more forcefully in that regard, and could have deployed Bank environmental and social specialists more systematically during the early stages of Project implementation. Since late 2007, the supervision team has included Bank social and environmental specialists.

40. **During Project preparation, the Bank recognized the complexity of the proposed operation and a number of environmental analyses, covering all the environmental and social issues related to the Project, were carried out.** These analyses included: (a) an SEA for the Project; (b) a corridor-specific EIA which included a preliminary EMP; and (c) environmental guidelines for bus scrapping. Consistent with standard practice at the time for this type of project, the Project was placed in Category "B" for purposes of Environmental Assessment. The categorization remained unchanged following the findings of the SEA and the EIA, which indicated that negative environmental impacts were expected to be localized and mostly of a temporary nature (during construction), and involuntary resettlement would be limited to the relocation of a street flower market.

41. **The SEA takes a broad regional approach to the Lima Urban Transport Program while the EIA studied the specific environmental impacts of construction and operation of the first bus corridor financed under the current operation.** The SEA and Project-level EIA acknowledge the complexity of the Project and provide a comprehensive analysis of

the potential positive and negative environmental and social impacts, including those related to changes in traffic patterns and congestion in some areas adjacent to the BRT corridors.

42. **Both the SEA and EIA were received and reviewed by the Bank prior to Project appraisal. The Regional Safeguard Quality Assurance Team (QAT) reviewed the relevant Project documents, including the SEA and EIA, and cleared the Project for appraisal,** provided that the Project team: (a) incorporate actions to continue the stakeholder dialogue started under the SEA process; (b) broaden the EMP to include SEA recommendations on policy changes; and (c) make explicit in the PAD which components would finance the strengthening of institutional capacity for carrying out environmental activities in conjunction with the Project. The Project documents were subsequently cleared by QAT prior to negotiations.

43. **During implementation, Protransporte prepared the requisite studies and management plans to be used as a basis for the construction phase.** As part of supervision, the Bank hired specialized consultants, one to review the EMP for Sections I and II of the South Corridor and to conduct a field visit to the site, and another one to review the traffic management plan. Their recommendations were incorporated in the Bank's efforts through supervision and implementation support, discussed in more detail in the items on supervision below.

44. **Efforts were made to consult widely on the environmental analyses mentioned above, but Management notes that these were not always fully satisfactory in terms of prior information, disclosure, and follow up engagement with concerned stakeholders.** Local consultations on the SEA and draft EIA were carried out. Several focus groups were established during the consultations of the SEA and these were particularly important fora for identifying and addressing concerns. In particular, bus operators and transit users were key participants. The draft EIA was distributed and posted online for consultation in February and March 2003 (see next section on consultation for more details). The final EIA, dated May 2003, was then posted online by Protransporte for approximately one more year. However, the EIA was later removed from the website for reasons not known to the Bank and only an earlier version remained online. Furthermore, the English language Executive Summary of the EIA was disclosed in the Infoshop prior to Project appraisal but the EIA and SEA were not. Management acknowledges that the Bank should have also disclosed the full EIA and the SEA in Spanish through the Infoshop at that time. This disclosure would have provided Project stakeholders with additional sources of detailed information. In July 2009, upon the Bank's recommendation, Protransporte again uploaded the EIA on its website. The Bank provided the Infoshop with the full copy of the EIA the same month. The SEA has been posted for most of the period 2003-2009 on Protransporte's website.

45. **The Bank's efforts to promote the institutional strengthening needed to ensure successful implementation of all planned environmental and social mitigation measures did not fully achieve their objectives.** From the early stages of Project implementation, the Bank emphasized the complexity of the Project and the importance of institutional strengthening. By August 2006 the Bank was stressing the need for the Borrower to set up the Project Social Management Unit to oversee the implementation of the social mitigation program for the bus operators who would be displaced by the new system. Management acknowledges, however, that the Bank team could have intervened more forcefully in that regard, and could have deployed Bank environmental and social specialists more systematically during the early stages of Project im-

plementation. Since late 2007, the supervision team has included Bank social and environmental specialists, and the team in the field was strengthened in March 2009 with one additional social and one environmental specialist who are assigned to the Bank office in Lima. These specialists work closely with their counterparts in Protransporte.

46. **The Bank met the requirements of OP 4.01 in terms of obtaining from Protransporte an EIA (including a preliminary EMP) as part of the Project appraisal process in a timely manner.** Thereafter, again as per the requirements of Bank policy during supervision, the Bank obtained from Protransporte updated corridor-segment specific EMPs, before actual works were started, as final infrastructure designs were being completed. Some of these did not meet Bank standards.

47. **Whether or not the environmental approval process failed to comply with national law would ultimately be a matter for the Peruvian legal system to decide if a case were formally brought.** OP 4.01 requires that the environmental assessment work undertaken in connection with a Bank-financed project "take into account ... national legislation" (see OP 4.01, para. 3). The Project met this requirement.

48. **The Bank was aware that the Peruvian legal framework for approval of EIAs was unclear during the period when the Project was being appraised.**⁸ Recognizing the ambiguities in national legislation, the Bank's conclusion was that Project preparation was sound and that local processes had been proper. An internal 2002 Protransporte "Rapid Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Environmental Framework at National and Municipal Levels" concluded that MML would have the authority, while recognizing the inherent conflicts within national law on this subject. The 2003 EIA for the Project explicitly took into account these features of national law, concluding that the lack of regulations under Law 27446 created a legal vacuum for the processing of project EIAs. In 2003, the MEF analyzed all aspects of the Project, including institutional arrangements, and concluded that it was sound.⁹

49. **The ambiguity in the legal framework continued during Project implementation.** Discussions among Protransporte, MML and the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications (MTC) continued for several years regarding who should approve the subsequent more refined corridor segment-specific EMPs, which were developed as infrastructure designs crystallized. The legal uncertainty persisted at the time works commenced in 2007, which explains how works started without a formal, explicit approval of their underlying EMPs. MTC was fully aware of the contents of the EIA, SEA and EMPs, and requested an environmental audit once the works were finished. Management recognizes that, independently of whether local law was com-

⁸ Law 27446 of April 2001, cited by the Requesters, assigned the responsibility for such approvals to the "competent authority," namely the relevant national sectoral ministry, i.e., MTC (Law Article 18.2). However, because its provisions could not be fully implemented until such law was supplemented by accompanying regulations, Law 27446 contained a transitional clause (Law Sole Transitional Provision) requiring that such responsibility be assigned according to then-current corresponding sectoral rules until the regulations were in place (which did not occur until September 2009, approximately six years after the Project's appraisal). Law 27446 did not specify what those then-current corresponding sectoral rules were. Furthermore, Law 27446 indicated that works could not commence until an environmental certification was issued by said "competent authority," but this provision explicitly did not apply until the then-missing regulations were in place (Law Article 3).

⁹ See MEF Oficio 910-2003-EF/68.01 of June 4, 2003.

plied with or not, the Bank's obligation to comply with its own related operational policy provisions persists.

Consultation Process

50. **Management agrees that the Project has not met fully the requirements of policies and procedures related to consultation and grievance mechanisms.** Management believes that the quality and consistency of the consultation process has been uneven. More systematic attention should have been paid to communicating prior information to affected groups, gathering and considering their inputs, and providing them feedback. However, Management notes that consistent efforts have been made as part of supervision to address these weaknesses, see paragraph 53, and the Bank continues to engage with Project authorities to strengthen these aspects.

51. **Public consultations and outreach to the public have been carried out throughout the life of the Project (see Annex 2 for a detailed account).** Some of the main steps taken in that respect are listed below:

- (a) As part of the preparation process, in January 2002, the Bank publicly disclosed the Project Concept Note for what was known as the Peru-Limabus Project (which later became known as the Metropolitano). At the same time, the Municipality of Lima began publicly presenting the proposed urban transport system: an exhibit of prototype buses and stations received 300,000 visitors.¹⁰
- (b) At the same time the SEA was being prepared in early 2002, a Beneficiary Assessment was carried out, which included opinion surveys among poor and very poor population groups living in the northeast and south areas of the city.¹¹
- (c) During the preparation of the EIA in 2002, Protransporte discussed the Project details with the representatives of: (i) the municipalities in the Project's area of influence including Barranco, Independencia, Los Olivos and San Martin de Porres; (ii) the Ministries of Transport and Communications and Housing; (iii) the Institutes of Natural Resources, National Culture, and National Statistics; and (iv) the National Environmental Council (CONAM).¹²
- (d) The EIA opened for public consultations in February 2003. On February 9th and 10th notices were posted in local newspapers (El Comercio and El Peruano) calling for comments on the EIA. Documents were available for consultation on Protransporte's website from February 10 to March 28, 2003. The site received 240 hits to download the EIA and 45 CDs with electronic copies of the document were distributed.

¹⁰ See Bank Aide Memoire of August 2002.

¹¹ See "Valoración de los Beneficiarios del Proyecto de Transporte Público Urbano de Lima," Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, DESCO, Lima, July 2002.

¹² See Final EIA p. 407

- (e) Recognizing the complexity of Project activities and the potential for unforeseen impacts, the Project, approved by the Bank's Board in December 2003, included a component on social mitigation and community participation precisely to promote continued consultations during implementation and be able to address pending issues.
- (f) As part of ongoing Project activities, between 2004 and 2005, further consultation meetings and focus groups were conducted for the preparation of a baseline study and social diagnosis. Barranco was specifically the subject of one of the focus groups established for this purpose although the focus of this activity was on bus users and operators rather than on the impact that construction works could have on residents.
- (g) As part of the traffic management study of 2004-2005 to consider in detail the permanent detours in Barranco that were required because of the Project design in the District, the Municipality of Barranco submitted its own alternative. The consultants analyzed this alternative and compared it against three others. The recommended alternative was a partial blend of all four alternatives deemed to be the most effective.¹³
- (h) Protransporte consulted with the mayors of the districts where the works would take place and asked them to carry out further consultations with each mayor's constituency.
- (i) During construction of the Av. Bolognesi busways in 2007-2008, Protransporte provided timely information to the community regarding planned works and traffic detours and also placed proper signaling in affected areas.

52. **With regard to consultations with affected communities as part of implementation, construction contractors are required to receive and act on grievances arising during the construction process. Management notes that this practice may have resulted in lack of systematic engagement between Protransporte and local stakeholders, and that Protransporte's oversight of the process has been unclear.** This weakness is also reflected in the mechanisms for filing complaints and seeking redress for grievance, which are also the responsibility of the construction contractors. Following standard practice, Protransporte assigns the contractor and the supervisor responsibilities for receiving complaints from affected residents. However, residents did not have clear information about the mechanisms available for grievance redress. Management is of the view that a more structured, transparent and centrally coordinated approach is needed. In 2009, Protransporte started developing such a system by which the community can file its complaints, including opening an outreach office in Barranco in April 2009.¹⁴ However, this mechanism has yet to fully implement a clear procedure for addressing complaints and providing feedback. The Bank will support Protransporte in making this mechanism robust and accessible to local residents and transport users. It is expected that this will involve several levels of engagement and mediation, depending on the issues that need to be addressed. At the most basic level, ongoing outreach and communication will continue to be strengthened. In cases of complaints, an independent, advisory panel may be engaged to mediate and advise. For more serious issues, the Project may facilitate access to Peru's Ombudsman system (Defensor del

¹³ See "Estudio del Tránsito del Área Sur de Lima" dated May 11, 2005.

¹⁴ Bank staff has recommended that Protransporte actively publicize the existence of this office (and similar ones in other areas).

Pueblo). Finally, clarity in how citizens can seek judicial redress if needed should be part of the overall grievance and redress process. This is incorporated in the Bank's Action Plan included in this Management Response, and will be discussed and agreed on with the Peruvian authorities. The Bank will ensure that this system is affordable and accessible, as required by Bank policy.

53. When shortcomings were identified in Protransporte's communication and public outreach activities, the Bank recommended improvements. For example:

- (a) A communication firm hired by Protransporte in 2006 to support its communication strategy was showing little progress. The Bank provided detailed recommendations in August 2007 to Protransporte on how to improve its communication strategy.
- (b) In September 2008, a group of Bank staff visited the Project sites in Barranco and recommended that Protransporte develop a clear strategy to address possible complaints by residents.
- (c) In December 2008, the neighborhood association Salvemos Barranco held a press conference at which it presented its concern about the traffic situation in the District. The Bank responded quickly, and calls were made to Protransporte to discuss the concerns and study solutions. The Bank also recommended that Protransporte engage the community through meaningful consultations, and emphasized the need for an effective communications strategy.
- (d) In late 2008 and in 2009, a number of meetings between the communications officers of Protransporte and the Bank office in Lima focused on how to improve communications with stakeholders and develop mechanisms to address concerns and grievances.
- (e) In early 2009, the Bank conditioned its no-objection to the implementation of works aimed at creating pedestrian walkways and improving public areas in Barranco on the organization of further consultations with the residents.
- (f) In June 2009, the Bank and the IDB organized a meeting between Protransporte and Barranco residents during which it was decided to establish a roundtable to discuss pending issues.

54. While more should have been done earlier, the actions taken by the Bank since 2008 contributed to positive developments in communication and public outreach activities. Protransporte has taken steps to improve its communication with the community. In October 2008, Protransporte held several meetings with a group of Barranco citizens and local authorities to inform the community, to gather complaints and provide feedback. Protransporte has addressed some complaints, including repaving streets in the area, installing additional traffic signals, improving crossings at main intersections, and opening lanes to traffic in Av. Bolognesi. Since June 2009, Protransporte and Barranco residents have met several times to try to agree on the format of the roundtable mentioned above. The contract with the communications firm was reactivated, and a noticeable increase in positive press ensued.

55. Management acknowledges that in spite of these efforts, the quality of the consultation processes has been uneven and that the substance of citizens' inputs and the extent to

which such inputs influenced decisions were not always well integrated or documented. Management notes that the complexity as well as the high visibility of the Metropolitano increases the likelihood of differences in opinion among stakeholders, and makes consultation processes particularly challenging. The Bank will continue to encourage Protransporte to strengthen its efforts to actively engage affected communities and ensure for example that the roundtable with Barranco representatives – which has not yet been become functional – gets established and becomes an effective instrument of dialogue.

56. **Whether the consultation processes carried out in the context of the Project conform to the requirements of Peruvian law is a matter for the judicial system in Peru to decide.** Management recognizes that, independently of whether local law was complied with or not, the Bank's obligation to comply with its own related operational policy provisions persists. As noted earlier, while national legislation should be taken into account, the Bank's supervision efforts have focused on compliance with Bank policies and procedures.

57. **The Bank will continue to engage with Project authorities to strengthen consultation processes and to implement a structured system for mediation and grievance redress.** As noted positively by the Requesters, the Bank actively engaged with the citizens of Barranco. The Bank has answered all communications from residents of Barranco while encouraging public authorities to engage the community in a meaningful way. In addition, the Bank is financing a facilitator who has been hired to improve the quality of the dialogue between Protransporte and the community. The Bank will also continue providing communication support to Protransporte, in particular to help manage tensions that could materialize in the future with other stakeholders (for example, the impact of the Metropolitano on numerous private bus operators will need to be carefully handled and the envisioned mitigating activities will require effective communication among other interventions).

Physical Cultural Resources

58. **Management considers that the requirements of OP 4.11 on Physical Cultural Resources have been met in this Project.** Compliance with local law and institutions, which is a key principle in this OP, has been ensured. In addition, the SEA and the EIA included a complete analysis of the Project areas as required by the OP, including the Barranco District, and special actions have been taken to minimize impact on historical sites and cultural resources in line with the recommendations included in the SEA and EIA.

59. **In accordance with Peruvian legislation, the INC has provided oversight and been directly involved in the Project.** No work with potential impacts on cultural heritage can go forward without the INC's approval in Peru. In the case of Barranco, the INC is still in the process of issuing final approval to the design of the station in the District that needs its approval (see Annex 1).

60. **As recommended in the SEA and EIA, steps have been taken to address the potential impacts of the Project on physical cultural resources in historic districts such as Barranco.** Land expropriation that might have resulted in demolishing buildings was avoided in the Project design. Bank staff also proactively engaged with the authorities to try to address traffic management issues and to improve public areas in Barranco.



Photo 2: Street in Barranco Historical Area

61. **In addition, independent of any Project-related mitigation measures, the Bank intends to support the efforts of local authorities to study possible measures to revitalize historic areas of Lima.** Trust funds are being mobilized for this purpose. Such studies will be designed to incorporate significant inputs from local residents.

Appraisal Process

62. **Management concludes that the Bank broadly met the requirements of the Bank's Policy (OMS 2.20) on Appraisal.** With regard to the conceptual, economic, financial and commercial aspects, Project preparation and appraisal fully met the requirements of OMS 2.20. However, the Project was not ready for implementation at the time of approval. For example, there were delays in finalizing bidding documents consistent with the Bank's and the IDB's procurement guidelines, with the result that the first tenders for construction of the busways were only issued in late 2006. It also became clear that implementation and coordination capacity, particularly in the areas of environmental and social management, needed significant strengthening. Management maintains that the solutions and designs chosen were the appropriate ones, and notes that divergent views and opinions among different stakeholders may be unavoidable. The assumption that a number of outstanding issues would be resolved quickly and that implementation of the works could begin shortly after Project approval turned out to be overly optimistic.

63. **Apart from the issue of implementation readiness, Management considers that all six aspects of OMS 2.20 were adequately analyzed and addressed at appraisal,** as explained below:

- (a) *Economic Aspects.* Estimated NPV amounted to US\$ 61 million, at a discount rate of 14 percent, i.e., about 43 percent of Project costs (or US\$ 81 million, using a 12 percent dis-

count rate). Taking account also of ex-post evaluations of Bogotá's TransMilenio system, there is little doubt about the economic justification of the Project.

- (b) *Technical Aspects.* A number of issues remained to be resolved after appraisal, including: (i) final decisions on where to divert general traffic; (ii) whether contract bidding would take place based on preliminary rather than final designs; and (iii) how to ensure that bidding documents would be consistent with both the Bank's and IDB's procurement guidelines. Eventually, all those issues were satisfactorily resolved, but after a longer period than originally expected, thereby delaying the start of construction works.
- (c) *Institutional Aspects.* In line with practice in other Latin American countries, a special agency (Protransporte) was created to implement and manage the BRT Project.
- (d) *Financial Aspects.* The Project was judged to be within the municipality's fiscal capacity and the financial situation of MML is indeed expected to be sufficient to repay the Bank and IDB loans.
- (e) *Commercial Aspects.* The financial viability for the bus companies was estimated to be adequate, with an estimated 26 percent internal rate of return. It appears today that the financial viability of the operations will indeed be adequate.
- (f) *Sociological Aspects.* The Project was designed to balance the needs and interests of various groups. While it may not be realistic to expect full consensus among all concerned, the Project should achieve substantial poverty alleviation as the main beneficiaries of the Metropolitano will be the generally low-income public transport users, with special emphasis on those living in the peri-urban poor neighborhoods. The appraisal also addressed the needs of existing bus drivers and ticket collectors who would lose their occupation once the Metropolitano starts operation. The social mitigation component (to assist bus operators) was, at the time of Project preparation and appraisal, considered innovative and best practice.

Supervision

64. **Management believes that the quality and consistency of supervision of the Project has partially met the requirements of OP 13.05.** Management notes that as Project implementation advanced, Bank staff made progressive efforts to meet the standards set by OP 13.05. In 2006, a Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA) rated "quality of supervision" as moderately satisfactory. More recently and particularly in the light of problems that emerged in the District of Barranco in late 2008, the Bank has been proactive and made significant efforts in trying to promote a constructive dialogue between Protransporte and the community of Barranco. The Bank team has kept Management informed of the situation through the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs); in the latest ISR, the rating for Public Involvement was downgraded from moderately satisfactory to moderately unsatisfactory.

65. **The Lima Transport Project is a highly complex endeavor, involving the following intertwined elements:** (a) significant busway and road construction in a congested urban area; (b) formulation and tendering of public-private partnership arrangements to operate the new BRT buses; (c) tendering of innovative fare collection services; (d) introduction of technologies

which are new to Lima, with articulated CNG buses, to be connected to a GPS-based control center; (e) the restructuring of conventional bus routes; (f) social mitigation for the existing bus operators who will lose their occupation once the BRT starts operation; and (g) the development of a new metropolitan transport policy.

66. **Because of its scale, the system had many impacts that needed to be supervised,** such as: (a) relocation of a semi-formal flower market; (b) avoidance of negative impacts on the Pantanos de Villa, a protected ecological zone in south Lima; (c) street and sidewalk improvements in the historical center of Lima; (d) urban space improvements (“inserción urbana”) in three zones; (e) a new traffic signal system and an air quality monitoring system along the BRT corridor; and (f) the definition of new traffic patterns in Barranco and Lima’s historical center.

67. **Given the complex nature of the Project, Bank supervision has encompassed a wide range of activities.** Supervision covered components including approval of construction designs, EMPs for works, and visual inspections of works during visits to Lima (two to three per year). Other aspects, while not financed by the Bank, are key elements for reaching the Project objectives, and thus have been subject to intensive supervision. Examples are the contracting with the private sector of the bus operations, the control center, the fare collection system as well as the construction of stations, terminals, and depots directly financed by the MML

68. **Bank supervision also had to adapt, over time, to sharply different implementation schedules.** As pointed out above, the Project suffered serious implementation delays after approval. The period 2004-2006 was characterized by very low disbursements (5.6 percent as of December 2006) and a high turnover of Protransporte’s management and staff. Then, over the period 2007-2009, the vast majority of the works were carried out and the loan’s disbursement rate increased significantly.

69. **In September 2006, the Project was subjected to a QSA that rated Project supervision as moderately satisfactory.** Supervision of all fiduciary and safeguard-related aspects was rated as satisfactory and so was “Identification and Assessment of Problems.” “Actions Taken and Follow-Up” was rated as moderately satisfactory while “Quality of Supervision Documentation” and “Management Inputs” for their part were considered moderately unsatisfactory. The comments pointed out that, for too long, the ISRs had reported satisfactory Project performance when they should have flagged the implementation problems.

70. **Supervision has been robust in addressing the problems that emerged in the District of Barranco in late 2008.** As noted in paragraphs 36 to 38 above, the Bank has supported measures to address traffic management issues that have appeared in Barranco, including the hiring of a traffic management specialist who visited Peru in March 2009 and made specific recommendations to improve the situation, as well as the mobilization of trust funds to deepen the work already carried out. As noted above, the Bank has also been particularly active in promoting improved consultation and dialogue with communities affected by the Project, especially in Barranco. In addition, as noted in paragraph 61 above, additional non-Project related trust funds are being mobilized to design urban revitalization projects aimed at enhancing the historical, architectural and cultural value of historic districts such as Barranco. In addition, as explained above, the Bank hired a facilitator to improve the quality of the dialogue between Protransporte and the community.

71. **Management appreciates the recognition of Bank staff efforts by the Requesters to address the problems in Barranco and to bring Protransporte and representatives of the District to a dialogue.**

VI. ACTION PLAN

72. **Management understands the concerns of the Requesters, particularly related to the increase in traffic volumes caused by the delays in the implementation of the Metropolitano, coupled with the poor implementation, for example, of traffic management measures and uneven communication and consultation, which have aggravated the situation.** A number of actions have been or are already under implementation that should help to mitigate temporary negative impacts of the Project and further enhance the positive outcomes.

73. **Management believes that the Bank has made intense efforts to apply its policies and procedures, but some errors were made. To address the remaining weaknesses during the final Project implementation process as well as in the longer term, the following Action Plan is presented. The main tenets of the Action Plan have been discussed with the MML.**

CURRENT AND PLANNED ACTIONS	TIMELINE
Traffic Management	
Finance through trust funds a traffic management study encompassing such aspects as the management of road closures and detours, the synchronization of traffic signals, and the operation of intersections in order to improve traffic flow and enhance road safety in various districts of Lima, including Barranco. The results of this study will be coordinated with the implementation of the traffic signal system of the Metropolitano.	To initiate as soon as TF is approved. Expected conclusion by June 2010.
Environmental Management	
Continue the active supervision of environmental and social aspects of the Project in order to ensure that communication between the MML and the local residents improves, with the continued support of experienced Bank staff.	Underway and continuous until works are completed by March 2010.
Bank follow-up on ex-post environmental audit at completion of works.	Expected conclusion September 2010.
Consultation and Communications Strategy	
Support dialogue and consultation in Barranco, between Protransporte, stakeholders and authorities of Barranco by: (a) Hiring an expert on facilitation, conflict resolution and mediation. (b) Setting up the operation of the roundtable agreed upon in June 2009 (c) Establishing an improved, formalized system of mediation and grievance redress in the Project.	Underway. Consultant already hired. Dialogue is planned between November 2009 and June 30, 2010.

CURRENT AND PLANNED ACTIONS	TIMELINE
Continue technical advice to Protransporte in the area of communications, and ensure proper oversight, support and quality of local consultations, including record keeping, with the objective of helping the agency manage the issues that could develop in the future with other stakeholder groups, such as existing bus operators.	Under way. Dialogue initiated in early 2008. Expected completion June 30, 2010.
Supervision	
Monitor final works in Barranco in order to ensure that they are concluded satisfactorily and that stations are constructed as per designs approved by the INC.	Underway and continuous until works are completed by March 2010.

Annex 1. Claims and Responses

A. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

No	Claim/Issue	Response
TM1	<p>Excessive vehicle traffic has been diverted onto residential roads.</p> <p>Living conditions have deteriorated in many areas of the district as vehicle traffic has risen on roads that were barely used before, increasing the risk of traffic accidents.</p> <p>Traffic in the district has been severely impaired, creating a chaotic and disorderly flow of public transportation and private vehicles, which of their own initiative choose to take lower-capacity alternate routes, causing traffic congestion throughout the district.</p>	<p>Management considers that Lima has suffered from increased traffic congestion in recent years for reasons that are in large part unrelated to the Metropolitano project.¹ The vehicle fleet in Lima as a whole has dramatically increased in recent years. In addition, in Barranco, population density has increased (as houses have been replaced by high rises) and many new restaurants and bars have opened that cater to people from all over the city.</p> <p>Management acknowledges that, due mostly to delays in the start of operations of the Project, and poor engineering in the timing of traffic lights, Barranco has experienced an unnecessarily long period of excessive congestion. When the Project commences operation (estimated start in April 2010), the number of old buses will be significantly decreased and congestion will be reduced.</p> <p>The Metropolitano runs through Barranco on Av. Bolognesi, a four lane avenue heavily used by public and private vehicles that has been adapted for BRT use. This alignment was chosen for the Metropolitano because the avenue was already a major public transport corridor that linked Barranco and Chorrillos to the expressway. The Metropolitano also uses the already existing busways on the expressway, which were retrofitted to allow extra space so that buses can pass other buses servicing the stations. Given the relative narrowness of the corridor on Av. Bolognesi and the desire to avoid expropriation and resettlement in an historic area, the Project feasibility analysis indicated that only two lanes for the busways of the Metropolitano would fit in the avenue. All private cars would be re-routed through streets to the east and west of Av. Bolognesi.²</p> <p>With support from the Bank, these original Project designs were modified to minimize permanent traffic detours in Barranco. During Project preparation and appraisal, the Bank indicated concern with the approach of rerouting all car traffic. A detailed 2005</p>

¹ The first line of the Metropolitano (as the Project is known) is a high-performance BRT on segregated busways, with modern articulated buses using compressed natural gas (CNG), special stations and terminals, a modern fare collection system and control of the vehicles using global positioning (GPS). This line runs from north to south parallel to the coast, with a length of 28.6 kilometers. As in any BRT, passengers will pay upon entering a station and board the buses from the platform, hence allowing all passengers to use the service easily, including people with physical disabilities. The line will have 35 stations and two transfer terminals, where passengers will transfer from feeder buses to the trunk line. The line is expected to carry in excess of 600,000 passengers on a typical weekday, which will make it one of the most heavily used in the world.

² See Final EIA dated May, 2003, p. 57.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>traffic management study modeled four alternative traffic patterns and recommended that the busway-only alignment in Av. Bolognesi be abandoned and that northbound cars continue using Av. Bolognesi in order to minimize traffic disruption. The Bank hired a specialized consultant to review these traffic management proposals before giving the no objection to the overall designs.</p> <p>During construction of the busways on Av. Bolognesi, measures were taken to mitigate the impacts of traffic disruptions. While the busways were being constructed, Av. Bolognesi was completely closed to all traffic. The EIA and the 2005 study had proposed measures to mitigate these impacts and the final engineering designs contained more detailed traffic management and EMPs. MML and Protransporte informed the community in June and July 2007 of the detours that would take place during construction, set to start in mid-August of that year. Throughout implementation, the Bank followed the evolution of the works, both through supervision and by keeping track of media coverage.</p> <p>There have been delays in the implementation and start of operation of the Project. After construction of the busways ended on Av. Bolognesi, construction of the stations was delayed: designs were deemed inadequate by the MML and had to be redone, then a decision to transfer responsibility for procurement of the remaining works from Protransporte to EMAPE³ resulted in further delays. As a result, construction of the stations in the South Corridor⁴ started only in July 2009, except in Barranco, where construction has not yet started because the INC has required a further redesign of the Metropolitano bus stations in order to fit the architectural character of the District.</p> <p>Most of the traffic detours imposed during construction of the busways remained in place for several months after construction ended. Once the busways were completed in August 2008, the northbound lanes for cars were opened, but no buses were allowed on the busways for legal reasons. Authorities were concerned that allowing the existing buses onto the Metropolitano busways, even just for a transition period, could appear to confer legal rights which would be difficult to revoke once the Metropolitano started operating with exclusive use of the busway. Thus, the existing buses were confined to the detours and continued to congest the roads during this period.</p>

³ EMAPE is the agency that manages toll roads in Lima and it has become also a construction agency for the city.

⁴ Protransporte split the first line of the Metropolitano into three corridors to facilitate engineering designs and construction contracting. These are: North, Center, and South. In addition, the Center and South Corridors have two segments each. For the South Corridor, segment 1 runs from downtown Lima to the entrance to Barranco at the end of Av. Paseo de la República and Av. Panamá. The second segment, which includes Barranco, runs from this point to the end of the line in Chorrillos.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>Bank supervision in 2008 and 2009 has focused particularly on finding ways to accelerate Project implementation and mitigate the negative impacts of the traffic detours. In October 2008, the MML started a series of works to repair the pavement of the streets used for the detours, which had been damaged by the weight of the small buses. In November and December of that year it also installed 10 new traffic signals in an effort to manage vehicle flow more efficiently and in response to complaints from residents. By mid-December 2008, the media began to report on citizen complaints about the deteriorating situation in Barranco. The Bank discussed the emerging complaints with Protransporte which was able to find a solution to the issue of legal rights for existing buses mentioned above. These buses were then allowed onto Av. Bolognesi for the rest of the transition period. The traffic situation improved with the implementation of that measure.</p> <p>The Bank has taken a number of additional steps to further mitigate current traffic issues. The Bank supervision mission of March 2009 included a traffic management specialist to assess the situation. The consultant concluded that: (a) the original traffic management plan included in the 2005 study was of high quality; (b) the traffic signals installed were not properly timed, exacerbating rather than reducing congestion; (c) other public works, in particular unannounced repairs by utility companies, were aggravating the congestion; and (d) there was a lack of adequate parking which was also increasing congestion.</p> <p>The consultant's report recommended improving traffic signal timing, placing traffic signs, and accelerating implementation of the Project in order to ensure that the Metropolitan operates as planned and that final traffic patterns are in place. The Bank shared the report with Protransporte for follow up. The Bank observed that progress on the recommendations had been very slow, in part due to lack of capacity at the Urban Traffic Unit (Gerencia de Transporte Urbano, GTU), the agency in charge of traffic signals, to carry out the detailed engineering needed. Protransporte argued that given the high-quality engineering study done for the traffic signals that are part of the Metropolitan corridor, the situation in Barranco will be solved once the Project is operational. To try to accelerate the solution in Barranco and to address the engineering weakness at GTU, however, the Bank is seeking trust fund resources to carry out a more detailed and specific traffic engineering study for Barranco that would yield recommendations that could be implemented before the Project is operational. In the interim, the December supervision mission will assess again the evolving situation in the streets of Barranco and offer new recommendations.</p> <p>The consultant's report recommended improving traffic signal timing, placing traffic signs, and accelerating implementation of the Project in order to ensure that the Metropolitan operates as planned and that final traffic patterns are in place. The Bank shared the report with Protransporte for follow up. The Bank</p>

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		observed that progress on the recommendations had been very slow, in part due to lack of capacity at the Urban Traffic Unit (Gerencia de Transporte Urbano, GTU), the agency in charge of traffic signals, to carry out the detailed engineering needed. Protransporte argued that given the high-quality engineering study done for the traffic signals that are part of the Metropolitano corridor, the situation in Barranco will be solved once the Project is operational. To try to accelerate the solution in Barranco and to address the engineering weakness at GTU, however, the Bank is seeking trust fund resources to carry out a more detailed and specific traffic engineering study for Barranco that would yield recommendations that could be implemented before the Project is operational. In the interim, the December supervision mission will assess again the evolving situation in the streets of Barranco and offer new recommendations.
TM2	A major thoroughfare through the district (Avenida Bolognesi) has been eliminated.	Management acknowledges that Av. Bolognesi has been retrofitted to serve primarily public transport. The avenue is also open to northbound travel for private cars. Only the southbound cars have been permanently rerouted. See also answer to TM1.
TM3	An inter-district vehicle distribution space known as Ovalo Balta has been eliminated. The social and economic exchange that has traditionally existed between the districts of Barranco and Surco has been blocked.	The Balta circle was eliminated by the Project and replaced by an intersection, making communication between Barranco and Surco more difficult but not blocking it. This change was made to improve the flow of the mass transit system. Left turns on the route followed by the BRT are forbidden in order to give priority to public transport operations. The Project includes the implementation of a traffic signal system designed to improve the operation of intersections. The Project has financed detailed engineering designs to ensure these signals work properly.
TM4	The system for moving traffic into the inner district has been destroyed, exacerbating the barrier effect that Avenida Bolognesi created and leading to long circuitous routes.	Management considers that the Project will reduce the barrier effect of Av. Bolognesi. The number of buses will be lower than before the Project, hence allowing for a safer crossing of the avenue for both pedestrians and cars. As noted in the previous item, a new traffic light system will be in place to improve traffic flows on Av. Bolognesi and its intersections.
TM5	Vehicular access to properties on Avenida Bolognesi has been blocked.	Management recognizes that access to some properties on Av. Bolognesi has been blocked. The EIA and the traffic study of 2005 addressed this problem. The 2005 study recommended widening the sidewalk in front of the properties left with no lanes for cars. Owners with cars can then gain access to the closest corner by driving on the sidewalk at low speeds. In Europe, similar approaches are used in pedestrian malls where cars have to enter but at very low speeds in order to park in garages that no longer enjoy direct street access. Protransporte is planning additional measures to assist owners who have lost access to their garage. In June 2009 the Bank learned that, while most of properties in this area of Av. Bolognesi will have access by car to their garages, 12 properties in the south

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		end of the avenue – where the sidewalks narrow – will lose such access. Of these 12 properties, only four still use their garages. Six people have sold their cars and have opened small businesses instead in the garage. Protransporte has plans to buy parking spaces in the vicinity and allow the four residents that still use a car to park there for free. For those who converted their garages into small businesses, Protransporte plans to provide them with technical assistance on business management.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS

No	Claim/Issue	Response
EA1	No rigorous environmental impact assessment has been done.	<p>Management's conclusion is that the requirements of the Bank's Operational Policy on Environmental Assessment, OP 4.01, have not been fully met.</p> <p>The preparation and appraisal process in terms of completing the requisite studies followed Bank policies and procedures. (Additional information on the disclosure and consultation process is referenced in the section on Consultation Process and in the paragraphs below.) The process went beyond the standard EIA requirements by also undertaking an SEA at the Bank's request. The basic engineering studies started in August 2002 and the environmental assessment process ran concurrently. The SEA takes a broad, regional approach to the Lima Urban Transport Program as a whole, while the EIA studied the specific environmental impacts of construction and implementation of the first bus corridor selected for implementation and financed under the Project. These studies were undertaken to ensure overall environmental soundness and sustainability; identify and strengthen positive environmental outcomes, and identify and avoid or mitigate potential negative impacts. They were reviewed and approved by the Bank as part of the appraisal process.</p> <p>Both the SEA and EIA analyzed options and alternatives for the siting and design of alignments and works, to avoid or reduce adverse impacts to the extent possible. During the planning and preparation period, several different alignments were considered. The SEA includes an analysis of ten alternative scenarios over a 20-year timeframe, both with and without project intervention and various combinations of different modes of public transportation. The EIA process was also based on a comprehensive analysis of 11 different alignments, including for the south part of the corridor where Barranco is located. The final EIA, dated May 2003, presents a detailed description of the proposed Project. It includes its exact route and location of stations, anticipated changes to right-of-way, and service planning recommendations. It addresses environmental and social impacts on specific sites, and describes particular impacts in the context of existing environmental, economic and social conditions. A significant part of the document is dedicated to detailed mitigation measures. The EIA contains a project-level EMP,</p>

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>requiring more detailed and site-specific EMPs to be prepared in conjunction with final engineering designs. The designs and construction plans for the five segments of the corridor were completed in 2006, with corresponding EMPs. Compliance with these mitigation plans is required for contractors and supervisors. In the case of Barranco an analysis was undertaken of four alternatives for traffic management.⁵</p> <p>Management acknowledges that the consultation and disclosure process did not fully meet Bank standards. While numerous consultation events took place and key documents were disclosed to the public, Management notes that this process was uneven and did not fully meet Bank requirements. The preparation of the SEA involved extensive consultations via focus groups with potential users and operators, as well as in-depth interviews with other stakeholders such as government agencies and academia, to understand opinions and views on public transport and possible civil society involvement during implementation of the program. This was undertaken as an ongoing process: The SEA includes a System for Environmental Management and details a plan for continued civic participation, including information dissemination to the general public and meetings with affected groups.⁶ The draft EIA, containing the more detailed studies and implementation arrangements for the Project, was disclosed in-country on February 10, 2003. Comments were received until March 28, 2003. The website where the EIA was posted received 240 hits to download the EIA, and 45 CDs were distributed with electronic copies of the document. The final EIA remained for more than one year on Protransporte's web site. It was then removed for reasons unknown to the Bank. In July 2009, the Bank requested Protransporte to post the EIA on its website again, which was done. In terms of disclosure through the Bank's Infoshop, a summary of the EIA in English was posted during the appraisal process. Management agrees that this did not meet the requirements of Bank policy. The Bank corrected the mistake by submitting the full version of the final EIA in Spanish to Infoshop in July 2009.</p>
EA2	<p>EMP. The construction phase for the work did not follow traffic management or environmental management plans or programs needed to reduce or mitigate the negative impacts thereof.</p>	<p>Protransporte prepared the requisite studies and management plans to be used as a basis for the construction phase. However, Management agrees that the implementation of the mitigation programs was not satisfactory in terms of traffic management.</p> <p>As part of supervision, the Bank hired specialized consultants, one to review the EMP for Segments I and II of the South Corridor and to conduct a field visit to the site, and another one to review the traffic management plan. Their recommendations were incorporated in the Bank's efforts through supervision and implementation support,</p>

⁵ "Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, Elaboración de Expedientes Técnicos para la Construcción del Corredor Sur."

⁶ For a more detailed discussion on the nature and quality of consultation, see the separate item on this below and in the main text.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		discussed in more detail in the items on supervision below. The Bank, which visited the Project during construction of these segments and kept track of relevant articles in Peruvian media, received no information on complaints during construction. As explained above, the delays and poorly implemented traffic management plans explain to a large degree the problems in Barranco. ⁷
EA3	The direct and indirect impacts of the works have completely undermined the way of life of the residents of Barranco, distorting and dismantling long-standing urban systems and sociocultural dynamics.	<p>Management agrees that changes in traffic patterns and slower than expected Project implementation have contributed to the congestion in Barranco, and that Barranco may in fact have been affected more than other Districts where the Project is being implemented.</p> <p>As noted elsewhere, other factors have also contributed to changes in the residents' way of life. Many of the Project-induced impacts on traffic are temporary in nature, and the most important action to resolve the problems is to ensure that the Project becomes fully operational without additional delays. The end to existing bus services currently occupying the streets of Barranco will significantly improve quality of life in the community, while improved traffic lights and timing will ensure more effective traffic flows. Recognizing the problems caused by poor traffic management, the Bank is supporting the Borrower to undertake additional studies into traffic management solutions in Barranco.⁸</p>
EA4	The negative impacts of the work are permanent, not temporary, which is reflected in the fact that, to date, the final road system has not been implemented in our district (direction of traffic, streets open to public transportation, intensity of flows, etc.)	<p>Management notes that most of the negative impacts caused by the Project are temporary. Until the works are completed and the Project is fully operational, it is not entirely possible to know whether there will be permanent negative impacts. However, the Metropolitano is expected to improve the transport conditions in Barranco once it becomes operational mainly because: (a) it will replace a myriad of small buses with an efficient and reliable bus service; (b) car traffic will not be interrupted by the frequent stopping of buses to pick up and drop off passengers, because the new buses are confined to the busway; (d) a modern traffic signal system and improved traffic management will be implemented; and (e) the Project is also expected to generate positive environmental impacts through less air pollution, especially particulates, and fewer occurrences of pulmonary disease among Lima residents, especially children and senior citizens. Management will continue to supervise and monitor temporary impacts, and support the Borrower in mitigating any residual adverse impacts.</p> <p>Once the Metropolitano project starts operating, the number of small buses on Av. Grau and San Martin will be considerably reduced (see Map 1). However, national law mandates public transport for people who need it. This means that the current difficul-</p>

⁷ Details related to traffic management are discussed in earlier items of this Annex.

⁸ See details in the section on traffic management.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>ties could become permanent if the Metropolitano does not become operational, or if stations in Barranco are not built, since the existing bus services will continue to operate.</p> <p>The main permanent change in the flow of traffic stems from the detours for southbound cars on the west side of Barranco. While the change is permanent, it is expected that this will not result in worsened conditions for Barranco. As detailed elsewhere, improved traffic management, including better coordinated traffic lights and further studies and consultations, will contribute to improved traffic flows.</p>
EA5	<p>EIA. The environmental impact assessments (EIA) must be approved by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MTC) pursuant to Law 27446 and in accordance with the procedure initiated by the Municipio of Lima for such purpose. In this connection, we must note that these assessments were not approved by the MTC because the works were initiated before the required environmental certification was obtained. Furthermore, the institution with the authority to approve the assessments was the Ministry of Transportation, not the Municipio of Lima.</p> <p>The existing assessment has not been approved by the competent authority, the Ministry of Transportation.</p>	<p>Whether or not the environmental approval process failed to comply with national law would ultimately be a matter for the Peruvian legal system to decide if a case were formally brought. OP 4.01 requires that the environmental assessment work undertaken in connection with a Bank-financed project “take into account ... national legislation” (see OP 4.01, para. 3). The Project met the requirements of Bank policies and procedures.</p> <p>The Bank was aware that the Peruvian legal framework for approval of EIAs was unclear during the period when the Project was being appraised.⁹ Recognizing the ambiguities in national legislation, the Bank’s conclusion was that Project preparation was sound and that local processes had been proper. An internal 2002 Protransporte “Rapid Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Environmental Framework at National and Municipal Levels” concluded that MML would have the authority, while recognizing the inherent conflicts within national law on this subject. The 2003 EIA for the Project explicitly took into account these features of national law, concluding that the lack of regulations under Law 27446 created a legal vacuum for the processing of project EIAs. In 2003, the MEF analyzed all aspects of the Project, including institutional arrangements, and concluded that it was sound.¹⁰</p> <p>Discussions among Protransporte, MML and MTC continued for several years regarding who should approve the subsequent more refined corridor segment-specific EMPs, which were developed as infrastructure designs crystallized. The legal uncertainty persisted at the time works commenced in 2007, which explains how works started without a formal, explicit approval of their underlying EMPs.</p>

⁹ Law 27446 of April 2001, cited by the Requesters, assigned the responsibility for such approvals to the “competent authority,” namely the relevant national sectoral ministry, i.e., MTC (Law Article 18.2). However, because its provisions could not be fully implemented until such law was supplemented by accompanying regulations, Law 27446 contained a transitional clause (Law Sole Transitional Provision) requiring that such responsibility be assigned according to then-current corresponding sectoral rules until the regulations were in place (which did not occur until September 2009, approximately six years after the Project’s appraisal). Law 27446 did not specify what those then-current corresponding sectoral rules were. Furthermore, Law 27446 indicated that works could not commence until an environmental certification was issued by said “competent authority,” but this provision explicitly did not apply until the then-missing regulations were in place (Law Article 3).

¹⁰ See MEF Oficio 910-2003-EF/68.01 of June 4, 2003.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		MTC was fully aware of the contents of the EIA, SEA and EMPs, and requested an environmental audit once the works were finished. Management recognizes that, independently of whether local law was complied with or not, the Bank's obligation to comply with its own related operational policy provisions persists.

C. CONSULTATION PROCESS

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
CP1	No public consultations were held.	<p>Management agrees that the Project has not met fully the requirements of policies and procedures related to consultation and grievance mechanisms. Management believes that the quality and consistency of the consultation process has been uneven. While this is partly a result of the complexity of the Project, Management agrees that more systematic attention should have been put on communicating prior information to affected groups, gathering and considering their inputs, and providing them feedback.</p> <p>Discussions with citizens and communities about improving public transport in Lima have taken place since the 1990s, starting with the proposed "Limabus" program. The Metropolitano as it is known today has been under discussion since the early years of the current decade. In 2002, the Mayor's office organized a public display of both the prototype buses and stations that was visited by close to 300,000 people. The NGO DESCO (Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo) prepared a Beneficiary Assessment by conducting interviews and surveys of potential beneficiaries in San Juan de Lurigancho, Barranco, Chorrillos and Atocongo. As required by OP 4.01, during Project preparation, the Borrower prepared an EIA that was publicly available for comments in February and March of 2003.</p> <p>The Project studies and plans were made available to the public, and several public meetings and events were organized. The SEA prepared in mid-2003 included a round of public consultations, focus groups and in-depth interviews. A group of stakeholders from the government, the private sector, and NGOs was interviewed during the preparation of the SEA. In the interviews, potential users were asked about their perceptions of public transport, and their vision of a future transport system. Between 2004 and 2005, as a Project requirement, a baseline study for the Metropolitano was prepared by a specialized consulting firm. The methodology to carry out this study included conducting direct household surveys between October and November of 2004. Over 3,000 interviews were completed, of which at least 250 were conducted in Barranco. Further surveys were done directly in the areas where future Metropolitano stations would be located. Data collection included information on perceptions of the existing urban transport systems versus expectations of the future transport system. In 2004-2005 a traffic assessment and management study was under-</p>

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>taken which identified the specific detours that would need to be implemented in Barranco to accommodate the changes brought about by the Metropolitano. One of the alternatives considered in the study was a proposal by the Barranco Municipality.¹¹ Systematic consultations and plans are also underway to resettle the Barranco flower market.</p> <p>While a number of consultation events were carried out, Management concurs with the Requesters that this process did not engage sufficiently with community members in Barranco. No interviews or focus groups were conducted specifically in Barranco during the early preparation phase. More generally, the consultations and their documentation have not met good practice standards.</p> <p>Responsibility for carrying out consultations with affected communities has been delegated to construction contractors. Management notes that this practice may have resulted in lack of systematic engagement between Protransporte and local stakeholders, and that Protransporte's oversight of the process has been unclear. This weakness is also reflected in the mechanisms for filing complaints and seeking redress for grievance, which are also the responsibility of the construction contractors. Following standard practice, Protransporte assigns the contractor and the supervisor responsibilities for receiving complaints from affected residents. However, residents did not have clear information about the mechanisms available for grievance redress. Management is of the view that a more structured, transparent and centrally coordinated approach is needed. In 2009, Protransporte started developing such a system by which the community can file its complaints, including opening an outreach office in Barranco in April 2009.¹² However, this mechanism has yet to fully implement a clear procedure for addressing complaints and providing feedback.</p> <p>As implementation problems and community objections became apparent in 2008, Protransporte engaged with the affected groups in Barranco to address their concerns. The negative impacts on the communities and particularly the congestion in Barranco were evident by end-year when the first complaints were registered in the press. Several meetings were subsequently organized with the Municipality of Barranco, other municipal authorities, and members of the affected groups.</p> <p>During supervision, the Bank has engaged with Project authorities to strengthen the quality of the consultation process. From the start, Bank required that a Communications Officer be part of key personnel in Protransporte. In mid-2007, the Bank emphasized to Protransporte the importance of improving its commu-</p>

¹¹ The study provides details on the proposed solution and discusses in detail the alternative proposed by the Municipality of Barranco.

¹² Bank staff has recommended that Protransporte actively publicize the existence of this office (and similar ones in other areas).

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>nication strategy, involving all stakeholders. Since the second half of 2008, the Bank has consistently and actively engaged with Protransporte regarding the issues in Barranco. Bank staff has participated in a number of meetings with different stakeholders as summarized in CP4 and Annex 3. The seriousness of the Bank's engagement with Protransporte in this respect is reflected in the fact that in April 2009, the Bank conditioned the issuance of a no objection for urban space improvement works in Barranco on Protransporte carrying out meaningful consultations on the designs in the District. Protransporte is still to submit evidence of the consultations.</p> <p>Management is of the view that a more structured, transparent and centrally coordinated approach to addressing complaints and grievances is needed. The Bank will therefore work with the Borrower to improve oversight, support and quality of local consultations, and to establish a better structured system for mediation and grievance redress. This is reflected in Management's Action Plan.</p>
CP2	The Project has not complied with the public consultation mechanisms established by Peruvian law.	<p>Whether or not the consultation process failed to comply with national law would ultimately be a matter for the Peruvian legal system to decide if a case were formally brought.</p>
CP3	.. adequate information on the status of the work [was not] communicated to the public in a timely fashion.	<p>Management concurs with the Requesters' claim that the availability and timeliness of information was not always satisfactory.</p> <p>Information has not always been available. As an example, Bank staff realized that Project information previously posted on Protransporte's website was taken down in 2007, and requested it be reposted. This was done in early 2009. Management also agrees that information regarding Project implementation delays and the need for extension of detours has not been adequately communicated to the affected groups.</p> <p>Protransporte has significantly improved the quality of its communication and outreach activities. As examples of this improved effort, Protransporte has:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hired a firm to help implement the communications outreach program (2006) - Developed a mobile informational banner, informational panels and stands, and informational brochures that have been displayed and distributed in different areas of the city - Presented the Project in informational community meetings, and circulated brochures with the construction schedule and temporary detours prior to start of works to the affected communities - Installed proper signaling of detours for construction before works began in 2007 (see Annex 6) - Conducted a special painting contest among children to raise

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>awareness of the system, among other activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Requested that the Municipality of Barranco disseminate information about the status of the Project¹³ - Included continuous information regarding the Project in the Protransporte website. <p>The Bank has consistently advised Protransporte on ways to improve communication and consultation processes, as well as on technical issues such as Project implementation. These efforts are described in more detail in the items on supervision below.</p>
CP4	<p>We [...] express our deepest indignation at the ill treatment suffered by the district of Barranco during the process of implementation of the Lima Urban Transport Project (P035740), which ignored complaints filed from the outset about failing to take into consideration the negative consequences it has had, due to poor execution, on the local residents.</p>	<p>Management acknowledges the poor communication between the Project authorities and the Requesters, and the lack of success so far in reaching solutions acceptable to the parties. Management agrees that more should have been done to engage with local communities, as discussed previously.</p> <p>Since receiving complaints from Barranco residents in the second half of 2008 Protransporte has taken a number of initiatives to address implementation delays and communication weaknesses. This has resulted in some improvements, but not yet to a fully satisfactory level.</p> <p>The Bank has continued to advise and facilitate engagement between Protransporte and local communities. A continuous dialogue between the Requesters and the Bank has been established. The Bank's engagement has been appreciated by the Requesters.¹⁴ The Bank's support and engagement in the process is discussed further below, in the section on supervision.</p>

D. PHYSICAL CULTURAL RESOURCES

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
PCR1	<p>The increase in vehicles will change the residential character of many roads, leading to the development of new business districts, which will erode the residential character of the district and the conditions that allow it to be preserved as a designated historic district.</p>	<p>Management considers that the Project has met the requirements of OP 4.11 on Physical Cultural Resources, for which compliance with local law and institutions is a key principle. As part of the screening process for the Lima Urban Transport Project two particular sites were identified to be of cultural and historical value: downtown Lima (which is also a UNESCO World Heritage Site), and the Barranco-Chorrillos Area (because of its historical significance and architectural characteristics). The INC has provided oversight and been directly involved in the Project, and no works with potential impacts on cultural heritage go forward without its approval.</p>

¹³ Oficio No. 183-2009 MML/IMPL/GG updating the Municipality of Barranco on status of bus route rationalization and requesting the Municipality of Barranco to share the information with its constituency.

¹⁴ In their Request for Inspection the Requesters confirmed that "we have received timely response to our requests (in reference to the Bank)", and "We should note that thanks to the intervention by the World Bank and the IDB, the Municipality of Lima declared its willingness to form a roundtable to address these issues."

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>The EIA and the SEA included a detailed analysis of the Project areas, including the Barranco District. Both the EIA and the SEA concluded that there were no likely permanent negative impacts to specific sites, but that given the historical nature of Barranco, special actions were recommended. Land expropriation and impacts to historical dwellings were avoided in Project design. Private vehicle traffic on the southbound lane was eliminated from the main avenue and re-routed through other streets in the District precisely to avoid the need to increase the right of way and lose existing physical cultural resources. The Project also includes an urban space improvement activity designed to preserve the historical nature specifically of the District center and existing pedestrian areas. As discussed earlier under CP1, the Bank has not yet issued its no-objection for the procurement of these works, pending further public consultations.</p> <p>Management is aware that the increase in congestion in Barranco has disproportionately affected some areas of the District. Management acknowledges that the Project is partially responsible for the temporary increase in traffic during construction and as a result of delays in start of operations.¹⁵ Traffic increase in the neighborhood is also explained by an increase in public infrastructure investments in 2008 that included unannounced repairs of public utility networks.¹⁶ Furthermore, the current zoning laws in Barranco allow for commercial development and construction of high-density residential communities, particularly along the beach front. Additionally, vehicle ownership in Lima has increased substantially during the past 10 years, contributing to increasing levels of congestion that have affected not only Barranco, but also all of the Lima metropolitan area.¹⁷ Protransporte has taken measures to reduce the impact in Barranco resulting from the detours required by the construction (see the section on Traffic Management).</p>
PCR2	<p>The direct and indirect impacts of the works have caused irreparable harm to the architectural heritage of the district, declared a Historic District by the National Institute of Culture.</p>	<p>Management believes that while the Project has resulted in direct and indirect impacts, it has not caused irreparable harm to the architectural heritage of the District. Consistent with OP 4.11, the EIA and the SEA addressed the possible impacts to physical cultural resources for both downtown Lima and Barranco, as discussed above. These studies suggested measures to protect these cultural resources, for example by requiring INC approval of Project designs.</p> <p>Bank staff has engaged on a regular basis with Protransporte to ensure that the Project activities in Barranco respect architectural heritage.¹⁸ For instance, currently, the Bank has a pend-</p>

¹⁵ A complete summary of this issue is provided in the Traffic Management section.

¹⁶ Details are included in the Traffic Management Section of this Response Matrix.

¹⁷ Statistics published by MTC show that the vehicle fleet operating in Lima-Callao Metropolitan area has increased over thirty percent in the 2000-2008 period. Estimates for 2009 indicate that there will be an additional 4.4 percent growth, which would bring the cumulative growth from 2000-2009 to over 37%.

¹⁸ In December 2007 Protransporte and the Bank agreed that the design for the BRT stations in Barranco should not interfere with the architectural heritage of the District. Protransporte has entered into a coopera-

No.	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>ing no-objection to further action on the Project subcomponent for urban space improvements in Barranco until designs are discussed and found acceptable by the different stakeholders.¹⁹</p> <p>To the best of Management's knowledge, Protransporte has complied with regulations set forth by the INC. In March 2009, the INC approved, subject to a few recommendations, the pre-design of the stations in downtown Lima and Barranco. The approval was a result of several iterations between Protransporte and INC. Final approval to begin construction on these specific stations is pending from INC.</p>
PCR3	Southbound traffic that used to run through the district has been diverted through the Barranco Historic District, designated by the National Institute of Culture as a protected area, leading to the erosion of the urban fabric.	<p>Management concurs that private vehicle southbound traffic will be permanently diverted through the District of Barranco. Management notes that this was identified in the EIA, and that the Project included activities to mitigate the impact, with particular emphasis on Barranco given its historical and cultural importance. The final designs and EIA for the BRT system in Barranco showed the need to detour traffic permanently through the District, to avoid resettlement and to conserve historical dwellings in Av. Bolognesi. The existing right-of-way allowed only for three northbound lanes (BRT and two private vehicles) and one (BRT) southbound lane. South-bound private vehicles will be permanently detoured through other streets. A comprehensive traffic management plan was commissioned and finalized, as part of the Project. The plan identified several alternatives and concluded that the implemented alternative would cause the least impact on the historical nature of Barranco.²⁰</p> <p>Bank staff are actively engaging with Protransporte to strengthen the implementation of the traffic management strategy. The Bank supervision mission in March 2009 included a traffic management consultant who recommended a series of easily implementable actions to ease the temporary impacts of the Project (see Traffic Management section above).</p>

E. APPRAISAL

No	Claim/Issue	Response
AP1	In a number of letters and communications to the Bank between February and July 2009, the neighbors of Barranco have argued that the Project was not well	Management notes that the Bank broadly met the requirements of the Bank's Policy (OMS 2.20). With regard to the conceptual, economic, financial and commercial aspects, Project preparation and appraisal fulfilled the provisions of OMS 2.20. By supporting the innovative BRT concept which will contribute to development of an urgently

tion agreement with the Peruvian Architecture School to develop preliminary designs consistent with local standards.

¹⁹ In March 2009 the Bank recommended to Protransporte that the bidding process be postponed until the activities were consulted upon with the community in Barranco and considered acceptable by them.

²⁰ Municipalidad de Lima-Protransporte. *Estudio de Tránsito del Área Sur de Lima*. TARYET. March 2005.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
	prepared. [note: this is not a direct quote from the formal request or the Panel's Notice of Registration]	<p>needed mass transit system for Lima, the Project is likely to have a catalytic effect – one of the key objectives for Bank lending mentioned in the OMS. It also has a strong poverty focus by improving public transport conditions for low-income persons.</p> <p>However, the Project was not ready for implementation at the time of approval.²¹ In retrospect the assumption that a number of outstanding issues would be resolved quickly turned out to be overly optimistic. For example, there were delays in finalizing bidding documents consistent with the Bank's and the IDB's procurement guidelines, with the result that the first tenders for construction of the busways were only issued in late 2006. It also became clear that implementation and coordination capacity, particularly in the areas of environmental and social management, needed significant strengthening.</p> <p>Risk assessment during preparation recognized problems such as lack or discontinuous Inter-institutional and intra-governmental cooperation throughout implementation. The Project Appraisal Document lists eight risks that could delay or inhibit project implementation. Three of them are related to the lack of institutional capacity of Lima's government agencies; these risks anticipated well the weaknesses of project implementation, resulting in excessive delays and poor relations with some municipal districts, such as Barranco. Two risks reflect the concern about the City Administration's commitment to the project; these risks remained an issue until about 2006, when the Mayor's transport-related priority lay with the extension of an urban rail line rather than the Metropolitano. The remaining risks address specific aspects of bus operations in Lima; the first semester of 2010, when the Metropolitano will enter operation, will show whether the concern about resistance from conventional bus operators will materialize or not.</p>

F. SUPERVISION

No	Claim/Issue	Response
SUP1	We reiterate our concern with respect to these facts [cited above], which have been reported and documented on the numerous occasions we have contacted the Bank to register our complaints.	<p>Management's view is that the Bank has been responsive and proactive in addressing the concerns of the Requesters.</p> <p>There has been a constructive dialogue between the Requesters and the Bank. The Bank has responded to all communications, which have been in the form of email, phone conversations, video conferencing, letters, and through personal interactions. Written communications and responses are filed in IRIS. Bank staff has also met with representatives of the neighborhood association Salvemos Barranco during two supervision missions.</p> <p>Management understands that community representatives in Barranco are not opposed to the principle of public transport or the</p>

²¹ An indicator of issues still remaining to be satisfactorily addressed at the time of Project approval was the high number of conditions of effectiveness.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>overall objectives of the Project. However, they would prefer traffic not to be routed through Barranco, and they want better communications and consultations. Salvemos Barranco has proposed alternative solutions: In the short term, to allow cars to share the exclusive lanes for buses in the southbound direction. In the medium term their proposal calls for building a tunnel²² for the busways and the southbound traffic. The northbound car traffic would use the surface lanes. In the long term, the group proposed continuing the Av. Paseo de la República expressway to the south, through the Municipality of Surco, to alleviate car traffic that needs to go through Barranco.</p> <p>Different proposals to address the problems of Barranco are being considered, and the Bank has financed facilitation services to enable the parties to reach an agreement. So far, the position of the authorities has been that the proposed tunnel may be too costly, and would favor car users rather than the larger number of people benefiting from public transport.</p> <p>The Bank will continue to seek the best solutions to traffic management in general and the problems in Barranco in particular. The Bank is seeking grant funding to support a more detailed traffic engineering study in the area of Barranco, as well as a comprehensive urban study to suggest urban revitalization measures with a transit oriented focus.</p>
SUP2	<p>We have received timely responses to our requests. However, all of them insist on highlighting the future benefits of the Project, without taking into account the negative impacts that have occurred, which have not even been mentioned in the EIA that your institution received as part of the requirements for issuing the corresponding loans.</p>	<p>Management agrees that responses to the letters have focused on future benefits of the Project, since the current problems in Barranco are largely temporary. The effective operation of the Metropolitano will significantly alleviate the current congestion problems.</p> <p>The EIA submitted for loan approval did address the impact on Barranco because of the permanent traffic detours. A detailed traffic study was carried out, as discussed in the sections above on Environmental Assessment and Traffic Management.</p>
SUP3	<p>We should note that thanks to the intervention by the World Bank and the IDB, the Municipio of Lima declared its willingness to form a roundtable to address these issues. However, so far it has not followed through on this intention in a clear, effective manner.</p>	<p>Management appreciates the recognition of Bank staff efforts by the Requesters. Below are some examples of supervision efforts and engagement on the part of the Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Letters from the Requesters have been answered directly, either by the Task Team Leader or the Peru Country Director. - Members of the supervision team for the Lima Urban Transport Project have met with representatives of the group for a dialogue about the Project impacts. (March 2 and 19, 2009.) - The Bank has hired an independent facilitator to liaise between Protransporte and the Requesters in order to improve the relation-

²² See Municipalidad de Lima-Protransporte, Estudio de Tránsito del Área Sur de Lima. TARYET, March 2005. Based on current conditions, this study advises against a tunnel, primarily because of cost and limited numbers of beneficiaries. However if car related traffic increases this may be reconsidered, especially if costs can be offset through tolls.

No	Claim/Issue	Response
		<p>ship and address the communities' concerns and establish the roundtable agreed to in June.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On June 11, 2009 the World Bank and the IDB met with members of Salvemos Barranco, and some of the Requesters to discuss the issues in Barranco with Protransporte and MML. - On August 11, 2009 in response to an email from one of the requesters dated July 31, 2009, task team leader confirmed delivery of documents attached to email and assigned the Senior Social Specialist in Lima office as focal point of contact with the group Salvemos Barranco. - On August 24, 2009, the Sustainable Development Sector Leader and Senior Social Specialist in the Lima office met with the Requesters to discuss good practices for the roundtable, "Mesa de Diálogo," agreed to in the June 11, 2009 meeting. - On September 2, 2009, the Bank received a letter from the Requesters thanking the Bank for its positive intervention. - On November 3, 2009, the Country Director and the Communications Officer, together with IDB representatives, met with members of Salvemos Barranco and representatives from the Municipality of Barranco to discuss the current status of the Project. <p>In spite of a number of positive efforts Management notes that additional efforts are needed. One example of this is in developing a more robust mediation and grievance redress system for the Project. This is reflected in the Action Plan included as part of this Management Response.</p> <p>The Bank team has kept Management informed of the situation through the ISRs; in the latest ISR, the rating for Public Involvement was downgraded from moderately satisfactory to moderately unsatisfactory.</p>

Annex 2. IBRD and GEF Project Descriptions

IBRD Project

Component 1: Mobility and Environmental Improvements (US\$ 99.92 million total; US\$ 37.94 million IBRD). This component aimed to: (i) build 28.6 km of segregated busways; (ii) re-pave mixed-traffic lanes adjacent to the new busways; (iii) post signs and road markings along the corridors; (iv) improve traffic signals along and in the immediate vicinity of the corridors; (v) construct bus stations and terminals; (vi) build bus depots and workshops, excluding equipment which will be financed by the bus concessionaires; (vii) implement control centers, to monitor and direct operations on the busways; (viii) pave and make other improvement of feeder roads to the two bus terminals, with an approximate length of 50 km; including, under the GEF grant, the construction of sidewalks and bicycle paths to improve access conditions to the segregated busways system; (ix) develop road safety measures along the corridors, the feeder roads, and the streets in their area of direct influence; and (x) improve pedestrian and vehicular traffic in five sensitive areas, and recovery of public space, with an emphasis on the interface between the corridors, pedestrians and busway users. Additionally, (xi) relocate a flower market in Barranco and provide assistance to informal street vendors affected by the corridor improvements, (xii) implement environmental mitigation at the end-terminal in the south which is close to the environmentally sensitive Pantanos de Villa swamps; (xiii) implement and launch operation of an improved air quality monitoring system; (xiv) develop and partially implement a road safety strategy; and (xv) develop a pilot project that would enhance the introduction in Peru of more environment-friendly vehicle scrapping methods (co-financed by the World Bank loan and the GEF grant, see component below).

Component 2: Social Mitigation and Community Participation (US\$ 5.75 million; US\$ 1.63 million IBRD). This component addressed the work with those stakeholders linked to the urban transport program and comprised four activity areas: (i) community consultation, including users and operators, to enhance awareness and ownership of the new system, including road safety education during the implementation and early phases of busway operation; (ii) mitigation of the negative impacts on current bus operators; for those who would re-enter the sector through retraining of drivers and conductors and small-scale enterprise loans to provide services linked to the new system (e.g., cleaning and routine maintenance activities); and for those who would exit the sector through retraining and outplacement programs in collaboration with existing programs of the Ministry of Labor; and (iii) technical support to operators outside the system to strengthen their managerial and professional capacities, including route planning, service provision, maintenance, road safety, knowledge of laws and regulations, etc.

Component 3: Institutional Strengthening (US\$ 4.77 million; US\$ 1.5 million IBRD). This component addressed the regulatory, monitoring, and control functions of urban public transport through: (i) the development and implementation of a public transport policy, including its regulatory and policy-setting framework, as well as its administration, operation, monitoring and control; (ii) the formal creation, technical assistance and training of Protransporte, the entity responsible for implementing the busway operations;

(iii) technical assistance and training of EMAPE, the entity responsible for implementing the physical works under the Project; (iii) technical assistance and training of DMTU and the police, focusing on public transport regulations, and its monitoring, control and enforcement; and (iv) monitoring and evaluation of the busway operation and the Project.

Component 4: Studies and Construction Supervision (US\$ 8.58 million; US\$ 3.48 million IBRD). This component included: (i) supervision of the physical works described above; (ii) economic feasibility and environmental studies as well as the preparation of final engineering designs to expand the busway network beyond the 28.6 km funded by the Project, and (iii) social impact assessments of the new system, in coordination with the urban poverty reduction strategy under preparation with Bank support. The latter formed part of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanism that would use qualitative and quantitative indicators for each of the sub-components. Techniques applied included user scorecards to measure public transport performance; beneficiary assessments using structured interviews and focus group discussions; and poverty impact assessments using household surveys and linked to qualified data from the aforementioned methods.

Component 5: Program Administration (US\$ 6.53 million, entirely financed with counterpart funds). This component included the operational expenses of the institutions responsible for administering the Project and for implementing the busway operations, i.e. Protransporte and EMAPE.

Component 6: Grade Separation of Plaza Grau (US\$ 10 million; fully financed with counterpart funds). In early 2004, MML initiated the re-construction of the Plaza Grau, one of Lima's busiest intersections and a key node of the busway to be financed under the Project. A grade separation of conflicting traffic movements was required in order to insert the busway on the northernmost end of the Paseo de la Republica, thereby reducing the car traffic lanes from three to two in each direction. This component was entirely funded by the Municipality, but was an integral part of the overall Project.

GEF Project Components

Component A. Public Transport Fleet Rationalization (US\$ 1.7million GEF) This first component aimed at rationalizing public transport services and providing opportunities to reduce the size of the fleet operating in Lima at that time (more than 55,000 buses, most of which were extremely polluting and obsolete). This component was divided into three sub-activities: (i) provide financial incentives through a Credit Guarantee Fund (and hence low-cost loans) to bus concessionaires to encourage them to retire additional obsolete and pollutant public transport vehicles; (ii) support programs aiming at mitigating the social impacts of this program in terms of employment (training programs, access to micro-credits) in coordination with the loan; (iii) support a pilot project that would enhance the introduction in Peru of more environment-friendly vehicle retirement methods and

that would build the local capacity required to make sure that the adoption of those new methods is sustainable.²³

Component B. Rehabilitate and Expand Lima-Callao Bikeway Network (US\$ 4.180 million GEF). Through this component, the Project aimed at rehabilitating and expanding the current network and resolving the existing network problems related to traffic and personal safety, low quality of the engineering design in some places, and lack of information and communication on the issue. This component included three sub-activities: (i) carry out the required physical improvements on the existing network and extend it to increase its connectivity, provide bike parking facilities and install “ciclomodulos” to improve the attractiveness of the bikeways; (ii) carry out a promotion campaign on bike use; and (iii) restart the dormant credit program called Plan Bici for bicycle acquisition, by making it more flexible and applicable to the financing of small bike-related businesses (this activity would be carried out without financial support from the GEF grant but its scope and design were defined through GEF funds under the preparation phase).

Component C. Carry out an Institutional Strengthening Program on Sustainable Transport (US\$ 1.1million.) This component aimed at incorporating climate change and environmental considerations into decision making processes, but would also strengthen the technical capacities of the municipal teams in charge of transport planning and that were stakeholders of the Project.

Component D. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, Replication Strategy and Administrative Costs (US\$ 950,000). The Project included a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation component based on qualitative and quantitative performance indicators for each of the sub-components. These indicators included public transport and bicycle user surveys and impact assessments, public transport ridership data, road safety data, general traffic counts on trunk routes and bus counts on public transport routes given in concession. A replication strategy was to be designed in the first half of the Project implementation period and carried out in the second half. Mayors and technicians of secondary Peruvian cities were to be invited to Lima for field visits and discussion with their Lima counterparts while seminars on sustainable transport were to be organized in their cities, with the participation of stakeholders of the Lima Project. This component included US\$ 87,000 for operational costs.

²³ During implementation of the GEF grant, the MML expressed doubts about the Credit Guarantee Fund and the bus scrapping scheme as originally defined. Eventually, the Government of Peru requested that this component be replaced by a study to develop an overall strategy of integrating several BRT corridors -- which in recent years had been proposed in addition to the Metropolitano -- with each other and with the proposed urban train line. A second order restructuring was processed in 2009, and activities under Component A have been redefined and now focus on “carrying out a study to integrate and rationalize the public transport system in the metropolitan area of Lima-Callao.” An international consulting firm started work in September 2009.

Annex 3. Consultation and Stakeholder Engagement

Date	Description	Participants
2002		
January	Disclosed in Infoshop: Peru- Lima Urban Transport GEF Project Brief.	
August	Client Presentation of ongoing consultations, public disclosure of Metropolitano plans, and Beneficiary Assessment with Citizen Engagement through interviews and focus groups prepared by DESCO (NGO).	World Bank (WB), MML
November	Presentation and discussion of Metropolitano preliminary designs prepared by GETINSA/TARYET including BRT alternatives with particular reference to Barranco alignment. Designs were adjusted to minimize impacts in the area.	WB, MML
2003		
February	Consultation Period for EIA begins.	
March	End of March, Consultation Period on EIA finalized (details in Annex 4).	
April	SEA under preparation with extensive discussions with affected groups to identify impacts and mitigation actions (Barranco was included as one of the affected groups).	
May	Protransporte prepared Social Mitigation Plan for displaced Bus Operators, informed by discussions with stakeholders.	
June	Project Information Document for Lima Urban Transport disclosed in WB Infoshop.	
June	WB advises Protransporte of the need to publicly disclose EIA and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP).	
June	Disclosure of Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (ISDS), Summary of EIA and RAP in WB Infoshop.	
November	Project Appraisal Document Disclosed in WB Infoshop.	
December	Lima Urban Transport Project approved by WB.	
2004		
June	Guarantee Agreement L7209-PE Conformed disclosed in WB Infoshop.	
June	Loan Agreement L7209-PE Conformed disclosed in WB Infoshop.	
July	GEF Trust Fund Grant Agreement TF052856 disclosed in Infoshop.	
October/ November	Surveys and focus groups with users and bus operators conducted for Baseline Study (including Barranco specific focus group).	
2005		
March	Baseline study for COSAC 1 (high capacity segregated bus corridor) presented includes consultation groups and one specific focus group in Barranco.	
2006		
September	Association El Paraiso (Mercado de Flores Barranco) and Protransporte agree to work on a solution for relocation. Protransporte presents plans for relocation.	Protransporte, El Paraiso Association

Date	Description	Participants
2007		
February	Protransporte discusses and negotiates with Municipal Real Estate Enterprise of Lima (EMILIMA) sale of land for relocation of flower market per Association's location request.	
July	Protransporte works throughout the month with Association to gather down payment, secure financing and negotiate land sale with EMILIMA and labor unions said to be interested in land.	
September	With support from Protransporte, Merchant Association able to secure new location for flower market and develop a plan to carry out the relocation and support members in developing better business practices.	
October	Letter from Association of merchants of the flower market in Barranco acknowledging Protransporte's support throughout the relocation process.	
2008		
March	WB and Protransporte discuss surfacing issues with EIAs and MTC.	WB, Protransporte
June	WB Communication Specialists visit Protransporte to provide technical assistance to review their communication strategy.	Protransporte, WB Communications Specialists
July	Video Conference between WB Communications Specialists and Protransporte to coordinate Communication Action Plan.	Protransporte, WB
August	Group of citizens residing in Barranco send letter with several complaints (some directly related to the Metropolitano) to the Municipality of Barranco.	
October	Meeting with Municipality of Barranco and Citizens to inform them on the Metropolitano. Protransporte received questions, complaints and comments on the Project impacts.	Protransporte, Municipality of Lima, Municipality of Barranco, Affected groups in Barranco
October	Protransporte presents to a WB supervision mission, how the implementation is advancing the Project, the social plan and the communication strategy.	Protransporte, WB
October	WB staff presents recommendations on Protransporte's communication strategy.	
October	Meeting between stakeholders to discuss repairs to streets in Barranco.	Protransporte, GTU, MML, Municipality of Barranco, SEDAPAL, Works Contractors and Supervisors
October	Protransporte receives letter from Barranco citizens with complaints about the Project and follow up on letters previously sent to Municipality of Barranco.	
November	Meeting to discuss actions taken to address the complaints of the citizens in Barranco	Protransporte, Municipality of Barranco
November	Meeting to discuss works on urban space improvements and flower market resettlement.	Protransporte, Neighbors of Av. Grau in Barranco
December	WB Communications Officer in Lima invites Protransporte to participate in Conference "Communications in Development Projects."	
December	Meeting to develop a proposal for traffic restructuring in Barranco.	Protransporte, GTU, Municipality of Barranco

Date	Description	Participants
2009		
January	Review of Protransporte's Communications Strategy Update. Discussion of issues related to Barranco and current situation.	Protransporte, WB Communications Officer
January	Discussion on complaints about Project in Barranco, and agreement on further technical discussions.	Protransporte, Municipality of Barranco
January	Technical proposal of new traffic patterns for the District of Barranco.	Protransporte, GTU, Municipality of Barranco
January	Metropolitano Informational and Q&A Session in Barranco.	Protransporte, Citizens of Barranco
January	Presentation of proposed changes in Traffic Patterns in Barranco.	Protransporte, Citizens of Barranco
February	Peaceful rally organized by Salvemos Barranco ²⁴ Movement and residents of the area.	
February	Letter from Protransporte to Barranco Municipality about Bus Route Rationalization and request for dissemination of information to constituency.	
February	Letter from Protransporte to Salvemos Barranco regarding actions taken to alleviate problems in Barranco.	
February	Discussion about actions taken to improve situation in the District.	Protransporte, Municipality of Barranco, Citizens of Barranco
February	Field Visit to evaluate private traffic alternatives in Barranco District.	Protransporte, Municipality of Barranco
March	Video-Conference: Dialogue about the impacts of the Metropolitano in the Barranco District.	WB, Protransporte, MML, Municipality of Barranco, Salvemos Barranco
March	Supervision Mission and Meeting with representatives of Salvemos Barranco to address concerns regarding the Metropolitano.	WB, Salvemos Barranco
March	Discussions on Communication Strategy with Protransporte and consulting firm.	WB, Protransporte, Mayo-Propuru
April	Final Traffic Report by WB Traffic Engineer with recommendations to improve congestion in the Barranco District.	
June	Stakeholder Meeting to discuss issues with representatives of Salvemos Barranco.	WB, Protransporte, MML, Municipality of Barranco, Salvemos Barranco
June	Confirmation of participation on "Mesa de Dialogo" with representatives of Barranco citizens.	Protransporte
July	Discussion about "Mesa de Dialogo" and next steps.	Protransporte, Salvemos Barranco
August	Reach-out and liaison discussion regarding claims of citizens in Barranco District.	WB, Protransporte
August	Discussion regarding "Mesa de Dialogo" and guidance for engagement.	WB, Salvemos Barranco
August	Confirmation of WB interest in the dialogue process between the Municipality of Lima and Salvemos Barranco, and discussion of Metropolitano Project EIA issues.	WB, Peruvian Ombudsman, Municipality of Barranco

²⁴ Salvemos Barranco is the name used by a group of residents in Barranco that have been voicing complaints about the effects of the Metropolitano in the District of Barranco. The Requester's are members of this group.

Date	Description	Participants
September	Lunch session to confirm Protransporte's interest in a facilitator to promote dialogue between Protransporte and stakeholders such as Salvemos Barranco and confirm WB's willingness to provide financial support to facilitate the contracting of such facilitator.	WB, Protransporte
September	Presentation of WBG instruments that can be used to support the development plans of subnational entities such as the MML. WBG repeats that it is ready to use the full range of the Group's instruments to keep providing support to the Metropolitano, especially to help strengthen management of relationships with stakeholders (potential WBG support to bus scrapping/capacity building process for private providers of transport services who will be displaced by Metropolitano was discussed).	WB, IFC, Protransporte, MML
September	Follow-up on Communications Strategy.	WB, Protransporte
October	Request to World Bank Inspection Panel regarding negative impacts of the Metropolitano in the Barranco District.	
November	WB Country Director meeting with Mayor and residents of Barranco.	WB, Municipality of Barranco, Residents of Barranco

** Additional Stakeholder Engagement: At this time, no documentation of further events is part of the Project file. To Management's best knowledge there have been exchanges throughout Project implementation which are not included in this table due to lack of documentation.

Annex 4. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Timeline

Activity	Observations
Summary of EIA process during Project preparation.	<p>A number of environmental analyses were done during Project preparation, including the: (a) SEA of the Urban Transport Program in Lima, completed by ECSA Engineers (Peru); (b) corridor-specific EIA covering the first investment phase of the program, completed by GETINSA (Spain); and (c) environmental guidelines for the bus scrapping, completed by SWISSCONSULT (Switzerland).</p> <p>Together, these documents cover all of the relevant environmental issues. They were submitted to the Bank for review and found to be satisfactory in terms of their treatment of the Bank environmental and social Safeguard Policies and other relevant guidelines. The documents were all publicly discussed in various fora and are available for public review.</p>
<p>Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), requested by the Bank. The Borrower hired ECSA Ingenieros to conduct the study.</p> <p>Draft received by the Bank on May 19, 2003, with revisions made based on comments provided by the Banks and Protransporte. A final draft of the SEA and related EMP was submitted to the Bank on May 23, 2003.</p>	<p>The SEA sought to orient the environmental management of the program as a whole during the planning, construction and operational phases. The SEA analyzed the socio-political, regulatory and institutional frameworks and evaluated the potential economic, social, environmental and territorial implications of the program. Based on a detailed diagnostic at both the regional and specific levels, an integrated analysis was done based on alternative scenarios. A round of public consultation was held, including focus groups and in-depth interviews. Finally, the SEA presented a Management System for Environmental Management.</p> <p>The SEA analyzed the following impacts, benefits and risks of the program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alteration of land use in both urban and rural areas; • Improvements to the competitiveness and economic efficiency of the city; • Reduction in transport costs and impacts on external economies; • Improvements in the quality of service and culture of transport; • Involuntary displacement of businesses and people; • Reduction in urban pollution; • Improvements in public perception of the urban environment; • Institutional and legal framework inadequacies; and • Strengthening of the urban transport system. <p>The SEA was consulted upon via focus groups and in-depth interviews with stakeholders. Focus groups included users of the transport routes and operators. People were interviewed from various agencies to understand opinions, perceptions and thoughts about public transport and possible civil society involvement during implementation of the program.</p>
<p>Corridor-specific EIA (EIA). The study was conducted by GETINSA-TARYET as part of the Feasibility Studies.</p> <p>Final draft received by the Bank on May 22, 2003.</p>	<p>Specific impacts related to the dedicated bus lanes were addressed through a site-specific EIA. The EIA presented an analysis of impacts related to the design of the corridor, and those caused by construction and operation. The EIA presents an Environmental Management Framework with specific programs to mitigate impacts.</p> <p><i>Environmental impacts</i></p> <p>Most of the environmental impacts identified in the EIA are due to the</p>

Activity	Observations
	<p>construction phase of the Project. These include increased levels of air, soil water and noise pollution, limitations on traffic circulation, interruptions in services, harm to existing green areas, and others. Possible impacts during operation include air, noise, soil and water contamination from the terminals and park in the maintenance areas, increased pressure on the protected area Pantanos de Villa, and increased accidents due to improper design. Environmental benefits predicted by the EIA include a rationalization of the public transport system, a decrease in travel time, and a reduction of air and noise pollution.</p> <p><i>Social impacts</i> The EIA identified the main social impacts as those related to employment and social security. The impact on displacement and/or reduction of informal commerce is discussed. Social benefits outlined in the EIA include improved comfort and security for passengers, generation of employment during construction and operation, a new culture related to transport, and a new participatory civic culture.</p> <p><i>Impacts on cultural heritage</i> The only archeological site recognized as being near to the corridor is the Pampa Cueva, located at the intersection of Avenida Tupac Amaru and Avenida Las Americas. It is also mentioned that the cultural and historical centers of both Lima and Barranco-Chorrillos affected by the Project are legally protected by INC. The EIA notes that construction would have temporary negative impacts on Barranco but anticipates that neither construction nor operation would have a permanent negative impact on any of those sites.</p> <p><i>Environmental impacts of and guidelines for bus scrapping</i> The guidelines were developed to ensure that the vehicle scrapping program is implemented in an environmentally-friendly manner, guaranteeing proper breakdown of the buses, reuse and rehabilitation of parts and final disposal. Impacts possible from the physical scrapping of the buses include ground and water contamination from improper handling and disposal of liquid and solid wastes, including parts containing hazardous materials such as heavy metals, and improper management of recycling operations.</p> <p>Main features of the EMP The Project integrates environmental aspects throughout all components. Special urban renewal projects are considered for the areas of Caqueta, the historical centers of Lima and Barranco, and support to the Pantanos de Villa project. A matrix with all the activities considered in the EMP, including the recommendations from the SEA and EIA, the budgets for implementation of the various mitigation programs, institutional responsibilities, and timing are presented in the EIA Executive Summary disclosed in the Infoshop.</p> <p>The EIA was consulted upon in various workshops during its elaboration and was made available on the website of Protransporte. More than 240 downloads of the document took place during Project preparation, and more than 45 CDs were requested and distributed to interested parties. The Guidelines for bus scrapping were discussed in</p>

Activity	Observations
	workshops in November 2002, where stakeholders from many areas were present. The Guidelines were posted on the website of FONAM (www.fonamperu.org).
Assessment of adequacy, at appraisal, of EMP and monitoring mechanisms	<p>While all activities that are part of the EMP are important to ensure the sustainability of the Project, certain key activities in the EMP had strict deadlines to ensure their implementation in a timely manner as per national law and Bank policies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • procedures for chance finds to be developed prior to opening of any bid for works; • Construction manual with environmental specifications approved by the Bank prior to opening of any bid for works (this is part of the standard bidding documents that the Bank approves); • Pantanos program designed and implementation begun prior to contract signing for southern portion of corridor; • Operators' mitigation plan approved before opening of the concession bidding process. The plan must have a timetable where all affected people are taken care of before start of operation of corridors; • Informal commerce mitigation plan approved before opening of the bidding process for the works. The plan must have a timetable where all affected people taken care of before signing of contract; and final design resettlement plan must be completed and negotiated with all affected people prior to opening of bidding process for that segment of the corridor; everyone must moved before signing the contract for works. <p>Protransporte is the key agency responsible for monitoring the implementation of the EMP. A department responsible for EMP implementation and monitoring is included in the implementing agency, with appropriate competencies. An independent auditor will supervise the implementation of the EMP, reporting directly to the Banks three times a year. The auditor monitors all aspects of the EMP. A beneficiary impact assessment, to be undertaken during implementation, will develop an integrated strategy to identify and address social impacts of the proposed Project in the areas of influence and to develop a framework to incorporate participation of various categories of stakeholders during various stages of the Project cycle.</p>
Disclosure of safeguard documents before Appraisal on June 13, 2003	A summary environmental assessment, the same as Annex 11 to the PAD plus a table with EMP and budgets, was sent to the Infoshop of the World Bank on June 13, 2003 to fulfill the disclosure requirements. Neither the full EIA nor the SEA were disclosed in Infoshop although they were reviewed by the Bank.
Clearance for Appraisal by the Regional Safeguards Unit (QAT) through memo dated June 17, 2003	Memo states that both the EIA Executive Summary and the EIA should be in Infoshop prior to Appraisal, but states that only copies of the Summary EIA and RAP had to be available locally for public review at one or more convenient locations.
Project Appraisal started on June 24, 2003, as stated in SAP	

Activity	Observations
QAT memo authorizing Negotiations on October 17, 2003	QAT established some conditions: (a) QAT clearance of Operational Manual (OM) as condition of effectiveness; (b) notes that Loan Agreement makes reference to Project implementation according to OM, but does not make specific mention of EMP, and thus requests that Loan Agreement and TF Agreement for GEF be revised to make explicit mention of EMP. Signed Minutes of Negotiations on October 24, 2003, show explicit mention of adoption by Borrower of the EMP and Social Mitigation Plan.
November 2004, Bank clearance of additional Terms of Reference for site-specific EIA/EMPs as a condition of effectiveness.	Bank hired a consultant to review Terms of Reference for site/works-specific EIAs and EMPs. Email from consultant mentioned that such Terms of Reference were a condition of effectiveness established by QAT, but this condition is not mentioned in the Appraisal Stage QAT memo. Consultant stated that Terms of Reference, after revisions, were acceptable to the Bank and met the condition of effectiveness. The consultant also noted that, during implementation, it would be very important to revise the existing EMP framework developed by Protransporte to ensure the appropriate management of environmental and social impacts.
Supervision mission on environmental and social issues, Oct 31 to Nov 2, 2005	A consultant was hired to conduct this mission, the objectives of which were: (a) field visit to North and South Corridors, and (b) agreement with various stakeholders on the proper environmental authority to review EIAs and obtain the necessary environmental permits prior to execution of works. In relation to field visits, the consultant reported, inter alia, that: (i) Protransporte already had the INC license for construction of Estación Central; (ii) in relation to the South Corridor (including Barranco), it was important to note that the narrowness of the space for works would result in negative impacts on the neighborhood during construction, and as such it would be important to coordinate well with the traffic police to develop an appropriate strategy to reduce such temporary negative impacts. In relation to environmental permits for specific works, a meeting took place during the mission involving Protransporte and DGASA/MOPT, with the following conclusions: (a) DGASA agreed it was responsible to produce such permits, and not the Municipality (this agrees with CONAM's informal opinion on the subject); (b) DGASA requested the Bank's opinion on the EIAs that it had already received and reviewed, with the objective to speed up its own approval of such studies. The environmental specialist agreed to send such information to DGASA; (c) Protransporte committed to making a presentation of all environmental studies to DGASA and to send them all final documents which had comments from the Bank, as a way to start the licensing process; and (d) once an agreement was reached on the legal responsible party that DGASA is the environmental authority for the Project, as well as the final approval of the studies, Protransporte would send to the Bank all necessary evidence for the no-objection.
Bank review and comments on site-specific EIA/EMPs for Segments I and II of South Corridor in August and October of 2005.	Review by same consultant that went on the mission described above. Some relevant comments in August 2005 were: (a) EIA should be more explicit regarding negative impacts during construction and include budget for EMP; (b) results from EIA were presented in some tables which were actually not included in the document; (c) budget for EMP needed work as specific budgets needed to be included for each component under the EMP; (d) the EMP needed to include a Strategic Communications Plan to inform the community about the Project,

Activity	Observations
	measures for traffic control during execution of works, etc; (e) much of the document was focused on diagnostics... more discussion was needed on the actual mitigation plans. In October of 2005 comments included: (i) need to correct various “copy-paste” errors, and (ii) more clear expression of who would do what, and need to fix the amounts presented for EMP budgets in both Segments I and II.
February 2007, presentation of various EAs by Protransporte to DGASA/MTC	Following the discussions that took place late in 2005 regarding the legal responsibilities for approving the Project EIA, Protransporte made a presentation to DGASA of all Project EIAs in February of 2007. At that time, the necessary regulations for Law 27446 of April 2001 had not been enacted and as such MTC still did not have the legal responsibility to approve the EIAs. MTC then accepted the information presented by Protransporte and agreed that an ex-post environmental audit should be done after works were completed to check compliance with the various Project EMPs. Regulations for the Law were finally enacted in September 2009.

Annex 5.
Supervision Missions and Team Composition

Date	Title
January 19-23, 2004	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Task Team Leader
	Urban Transport Specialist
	Urban Transport Specialist
May 17-21, 2004	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Financial Management Specialist
	IADB - Infrastructure Specialist
	IADB – Team Leader
	IADB Staff
	IADB Staff
	IADB Staff
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Procurement Specialist
	Procurement Specialist
	Task Team Leader
	Urban Transport Specialist
	Urban Transport Specialist
September 16-24, 2004	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Financial Management Specialist
	Financial Management Specialist
	IADB - Infrastructure Specialist
	IADB – Team Leader
	IADB Staff
	IADB Staff
	IADB Staff
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader
	Urban Transport Specialist
	Urban Transport Specialist
November 16-19, 2004	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader
January 27, 2005	Task Team Leader
April 25-29, 2005	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader
	Urban Transport Specialist
July 22, 2005	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Task Team Leader
October 31- November 2, 2005	Environmental Specialist
November 7-8, 2005	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader
February 6-7, 2006	IADB Staff
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader

Date	Title
August 7-9, 2006	Urban Transport Specialist
	Civil Engineer
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader
December 11-13, 2006	Urban Transport Specialist
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Junior Program Associate
	Task Team Leader
March 12-23, 2007	Urban Transport Specialist
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Financial Management Analyst - Lima
	IADB- Infrastructure Consultant
	IADB- Infrastructure Specialist
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Task Team Leader
	Senior Financial Management Specialist
	Social Specialist
	Task Team Leader
August 13-16, 2007	Urban Transport Specialist
	Communications Specialist
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Junior Program Associate
	Task Team Leader
	Urban Transport Specialist
	Urban Transport Specialist
December 3-7, 2007	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Infrastructure Specialist
	Junior Program Associate
	Social Specialist
	Task Team Leader
March 10-14, 2008	Urban Transport Specialist
	Environmental Specialist
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Financial Management Analyst - Lima
	IADB – Consultant
	IADB - Infrastructure Specialist
	IADB –Team Leader
	IADB –Consultant
	Junior Program Associate
	Senior Procurement Specialist
	Social Specialist
	Task Team Leader
April 8-9, 2008	Urban Transport Specialist
	Financial Management Analyst - Lima

Date	Title
July 21-23, 2008	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	IADB – Consultant
	Task Team Leader
August 28-29, 2008	Financial Management Specialist
September 3-12, 2008	Communications Specialist
	Junior Program Associate - Communications
	Environmental Specialist
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	Financial Management Specialist
	IADB Consultant
	IADB - Operations Analyst
	IADB - Transport Specialist
	IADB – Team Leader
	IFC Economist
	IFC Investment Officer
	IFC Senior Investment Officer
	Junior Program Associate
	Senior Infrastructure Economist
	Social Specialist
	Task Team Leader
	Urban Transport Specialist
February 26-27, 2009	Financial Management Specialist
March 13-20, 2009	Communications Specialist
	Consultant - Traffic Engineer
	Social Specialist
	Urban Transport Specialist
June 8-12, 2009	Communications Specialist
	Financial and Institutional Consultant
	IADB - Operations Analyst
	IADB - Transport Economist
	IADB - Transport Specialist
	IADB -Team Leader
	Junior Program Associate
	Procurement Specialist - Lima
	Senior Environmental Specialist - Lima
	Social Specialist
	Task Team Leader

Annex 6.
Information Brochures Distributed by Protransporte

Luis Castañeda Lossio,

Alcalde de Lima, lo dijo: el Metropolitano es...



MODERNO

Nueva flota de buses con un sistema de pago electrónico.



SEGURO

Sistema de vigilancia, monitoreo y personal de seguridad.



ACCESIBLE

Facilidades de acceso para personas con discapacidad, de tercera edad y mujeres gestantes.



ECOLÓGICO

Buses a gas natural, reduciendo así la contaminación ambiental.



AHORRO DEL TIEMPO DE VIAJE

Exclusiva infraestructura vial que permitirá reducir los tiempos de viaje. El pasajero contará con información real de las frecuencias y horarios.



PROTRANSPORTE
Instituto Metropolitano Protransporte de Lima

www.protransporte.gob.pe



**Unirá 16 distritos,
de Chorrillos a Comas!**



Luis Castañeda Lossio
Alcalde



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

Así funcionará el
Metropolitano

El usuario ingresará al sistema con su tarjeta pasándola por un lector el que descontará automáticamente el costo del pasaje, generando comodidad y rapidez.

Se respetarán las tarifas preferenciales para los pasajes Escolar, Universitario, Policías y Bomberos.



TORNIQUETE DE INGRESO Y SALIDA
Sensor para Tarjeta de pago.

ESTACIONES

Todas contarán con una plataforma de embarque que se encuentra a 90 cm. sobre el nivel del suelo para el fácil y rápido acceso de los usuarios y para que las personas con discapacidad ingresen al bus sin ningún problema.



- 160 pasajeros
- Espacios para personas con discapacidad.
- Carriles de uso exclusivo de transporte. (Ahorro del tiempo de viaje)
- Buses con 4 puertas desplegadas en el lado izquierdo.
- Buses a Gas Natural Vehicular- GNV
- Sistema interconectado con Centro de Control.

RAMPA DE ACCESO
VENTA DE TARJETAS
TORNIQUETE DE ENTRADA Y SALIDA
CARRIL EXCLUSIVO

Luis Castañeda Lossio
Alcalde



RECORRIDO DEL METROPOLITANO

- De Sur a Norte
- Prolongación Paseo de la República
- Av. Escuela Militar
- Av. Bolognesi
- Av. República de Panamá
- Vía Expresa del Paseo de la República
- Plaza Grau / Paseo de los Héroes Navales
- Jr. Lampa y Av. Emancipación
- Av. España y Av. Alfonso Ugarte
- Av. Caquetá
- Av. Tupac Amaru



- 522 Buses nuevos a Gas Natural entre Articulados y Convencionales de 18 m. y 12 m. de longitud.
- Capacidad de 80 y 160 pasajeros.
- Asientos preferenciales para personas con discapacidad, adulto mayor y mujeres gestantes.

- LEYENDA**
- Vía Troncal Exclusiva (26 Km.)
 - Vías Alimentadoras (32 Km.)
 - Estación Central Subterránea
 - 2 Terminales de Transferencia para tránsito entre troncal y alimentadoras.
 - 35 Estaciones intermedias
 - 16 distritos atendidos





etropolitano

Mejor transporte para una mejor calidad de vida.

¿Qué características tendrá el metropolitano?

MÁS RÁPIDO

El **metropolitano** contará con una nueva flota de buses reduciendo los tiempos de viaje sin aumentar los costos.

MÁS SEGURO

El **metropolitano** contará con un moderno sistema de video vigilancia y personal de seguridad.

ECOLÓGICO

El **metropolitano** reducirá la contaminación con el uso del Gas Natural Peruano.

RECORRIDO DEL SISTEMA

De Sur a Norte:

- Prolongación Paseo de la República
- Av. Escuela Militar
- Av. Bolognesi
- Av. República de Panamá
- Vía Expresa del Paseo de la República
- Plaza Grau / Paseo de los Héroes Navales
- Jr. Lampa y Av. Emancipación
- Av. España y Av. Alfonso Ugarte
- Av. Casapía
- Av. Topac Amaru
- Av. Metropolitana
- Av. Universitaria

BUSES

- 600 Buses nuevos.
- Capacidad entre 80 y 160 pasajeros.
- Piso a nivel de la estación (90 cm. de altura).
- Espacios preferentes para personas con discapacidad, adulto mayor y mujeres gestantes.
- Combustible: Gas natural.

ESTACIONES Y TERMINALES

- 1 Estación Central subterránea.
- Tramo Sur: 18 estaciones.
- Tramos Centro y Norte: 17 estaciones.
- Extensión Norte: 11 estaciones.
- 3 Terminales de integración para trasbordo entre troncal y alimentadoras.
- 28 Km. de Ciclovías Alimentadoras.

LEYENDA

- 1 Via Troncal (33 Km.)
- Vías Alimentadoras (28 Km.)
- 1 Estación Central Subterránea
- 3 Terminales
- 46 Estaciones




MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

Porque **MENOS TIEMPO** viajando,
significa **MÁS TIEMPO** con los tuyos.



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

COMUNICADO

Estimados vecinos:

La Municipalidad de Lima viene ejecutando los trabajos de construcción del Corredor Metropolitano en el distrito. Para un mejor desarrollo de estas obras, se recuerda a los vecinos que los horarios coordinados con la Municipalidad de Barranco para el recojo de basura, son desde las 10 pm. hasta las 9 am.

Asimismo, se les recuerda que esta **PROHIBIDO ARROJAR BASURA Y DESMONTE EN LA OBRA**, para evitar la contaminación del medio ambiente, malos olores y enfermedades.

Cualquier información adicional, le agradeceremos se acerque a nuestras oficinas ubicadas en la Av. Francisco Bolognesi 602 - Barranco ó llámenos a los teléfonos 247-9598 y 99839-5412.

Apóyenos a conservar limpia las áreas de obra y el distrito de Barranco. Desde ya agradecemos su colaboración.

CONSORCIO ALTESA + EIVISAC



¡Gracias por dejarnos trabajar!



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

COMUNICADO

Estimados vecinos:

La Municipalidad de Lima viene ejecutando los trabajos de construcción del Corredor Metropolitano en Barranco y Chorrillos. Parte de estos trabajos son el cambio de redes y conexiones domiciliarias en la Av. Bolognesi a cargo de la empresa ALTESA – ELVISAC.

No se deje sorprender por personas inescrupulosas que quiera pretender cobrar por este servicio. Estos trabajos son **GRATUITOS**.

Cualquier información adicional, le agradeceremos se acerque a nuestras oficinas ubicadas en la Av. Francisco Bolognesi 602 - Barranco ó llámenos a los teléfonos 9983-33120 y 9983-95412.

CONSORCIO ALTESA + ELVISAC



¡Gracias por dejarnos trabajar!


etropolitano

OBRAS AV. BOLOGNESI - BARRANCO

CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL CORREDOR SUR TRAMO II - 3ra. ETAPA

PRUEBA
PLAN DE DESVÍOS

11

FEB.



INICIO DE OBRA

13

FEB.

LEYENDA

Zona de Obra	
Desvío Norte - Sur	
Desvío T. Público (S - N)	
Desvío T. Privado (S - N)	
Acceso a viviendas	

¡Gracias por dejarnos trabajar!

Luis Castañeda Lossio

Alcalde



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

AV. BOLOGNESI EN OBRA



NUEVAS PISTAS PARA UN NUEVO TRANSPORTE

Estimado vecino de Barranco, continuando con las obras del METROPOLITANO, el nuevo sistema de transporte de Lima, le informamos que estamos próximos a realizar obras del Corredor Sur Tramo II en la Av. Bolognesi desde la Av. Independencia hasta el Ov. Balta.

Las obras empezarán los primeros días del mes de enero en horario diurno, facilitando los accesos a los hogares y negocios de la zona.

¡Gracias por dejarnos trabajar!



Luis Castañeda Lossio
Alcalde de Lima





PLAN DE DESVÍOS SECTOR AV. ESCUELA MILITAR - CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL CORREDOR SUR TRAMO II -



Continuando con el avance de obras del **metropolitano**, el nuevo sistema de transporte de Lima, presentamos el plan de desvíos del sector de la Av. Escuela Militar como parte del Corredor Sur Tramo II.

Luis Castañeda Lossio
Alcalde

24 OCTUBRE



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

¡Gracias por dejarnos trabajar!



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA



PLAN DE DESVÍOS OBRAS OV. BALTA

CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL CORREDOR SUR TRAMO II BARRANCO

PRUEBA
5 Julio

CIERRE
7 Julio

LEYENDA	
Zona de Obra	
Desvío Norte - Sur	
Desvío Sur - Norte	
Tranqueras	




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MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

PLAN DE DESVÍOS - OBRAS OV. BALTA

CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL CORREDOR SUR TRAMO II - BARRANCO

Estimados Vecinos:

Les informamos que como parte de las obras del Corredor Metropolitano, que se desarrollan en el distrito de Barranco, este jueves 10 de julio iniciaremos la remodelación del Ovalo Balta. Este importante sector del distrito será mejorado y permitirá un flujo rápido entre las avenidas Bolognesi, República de Panamá, Nicolás de Piérola y Progreso.

Agradecemos su comprensión y colaboración para este importante proyecto que contribuirá a mejorar el transporte público de la ciudad.



CIERRE DE VÍAS

10 Julio




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etropolitano

El transporte moderno de Lima

PLAN DE DESVÍOS - OBRAS OV. BALTA





✓ Mayor seguridad ✓ Más orden ✓ Más tranquilidad

MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

ANTES 35 rutas

2010 Sólo 1, el

etropolitano

Para mayor información

Ingresa a nuestra página web:

www.protransporte.gob.pe

!

Reordenamiento de rutas de transporte público en Barranco.

Av. Bolognesi

PROTRANSPORTE



Cronograma de obras en Barranco



Construcción de Estaciones Sur
Mar. - Set. 2009



Remodelación de la Plaza Principal y Calle Pazos
Mar. - Set. 2009



Seguridad Vial y Arborización
May. - Set. 2009



Mejoramiento del Ovalo Balta y Av. República de Panamá
May. - Dic. 2009



Semaforización Inteligente
Jul. - Dic. 2009



Metropolitano
El transporte moderno de Lima



Estimado vecino de Barranco, estamos tomando acción para superar las incomodidades transitorias.




MODERNO


SEGURO


RAPIDO


ECOLÓGICO



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA



MUNICIPALIDAD DE LIMA

Instituto Metropolitano PROTRANSPORTE de Lima
Psje. Acuña 127 - Piso 4
Lima - Perú

www.protransporte.gob.pe





Con la operación del **Metropolitano**, se atenderá exclusivamente el transporte público con buses a GNV en el sentido Norte - Sur - Norte.

Esto significa para Barranco:

- ✓ Menos contaminación
- ✓ Tránsito fluido
- ✓ Orden
- ✓ Seguridad

Superando los inconvenientes

- ✓ Reordenamiento de las rutas de transporte público que pasan por Barranco.
- ✓ Uso de la Av. Bolognesi para el transporte público y privado en el sentido Sur - Norte. Asimismo, el uso de esta avenida desde la Av. 28 de Julio hacia Chorrillos.
- ✓ Descongestión de las principales avenidas del distrito en las próximas semanas.
- ✓ Continuación de las obras de recuperación de vías, señalización, semaforización y arborización.



15

Avenidas reparadas y señalizadas (al mes de marzo 2009)



25

Semáforos instalados (al mes de marzo 2009)



80

Policías e inspectores (Facultades delegadas al distrito)



LEYENDA

→ Transporte público Sentido Norte - Sur

→ Transporte público Sentido Sur - Norte

● Puntos de Semaforización

■ Estaciones

Annex 7.
Requester's Communications to Local Authorities

Letters Sent

DATE	ADDRESSEE	SUBJECT
01-Dec-08	Protransporte [Metropolitan Transportation Institute of Lima;	NEIGHBORHOOD COMPLAINT ABOUT TRAFFIC ON PEDRO SALAZAR
17-Dec-08	CONGRESS	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
17-Dec-08	CONGRESS, LOCAL GOVTS. COMMITTEE	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
17-Dec-08	INC [National Institute of Culture]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
17-Dec-08	MDB [Municipality of Barranco]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
17-Dec-08	MML [Municipality of Metropolitan Lima]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
18-Dec-08	Protransporte	NEIGHBORHOOD COMPLAINT ABOUT HEAVY TRAFFIC ON AVENIDA LIMA
18-Dec-08	Protransporte	NEIGHBORHOOD COMPLAINT ABOUT HEAVY TRAFFIC ON AVENIDA LIMA
18-Dec-08	MINAM [Ministry of the Environment]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
18-Dec-08	MINT [Ministry of the Interior]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
22-Dec-08	MTC [Ministry of Transportation and Communication]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
12-Jan-09	CIP [Board of Engineers of Peru]	PETITION DOCUMENTING INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY DISORDERLY TRAFFIC AFTER THE WORKS
12-Jan-09	MDB	WE REQUEST THE FORMATION OF A TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
26-Jan-09	MDB	NEIGHBORHOOD COMPLAINT ABOUT AVENIDA LIMA
28-Jan-09	MDB, COUNCILLORS, AND ARCHITECTS	REITERATION OF COMPLAINT FILED IN DECEMBER
03-Feb-09	MDB	ANNOUNCEMENT OF FIRST PROTEST MARCH
04-Feb-09	MML	ANNOUNCEMENT OF FIRST PROTEST MARCH
13-Feb-09	MDB	NEIGHBORHOOD COMPLAINT ABOUT TRAFFIC ON AVENIDA LIMA AND LACK OF SAFETY
13-Feb-09	MML	REQUEST TO OPEN BOLOGNESI AND RECONSIDERATION OF WORK
19-Feb-09	MML	REQUEST TO SEE THE TECHNICAL FILE FOR THE METROPOLITANO
19-Feb-09	EMAPE	REQUEST TO SEE THE TECHNICAL FILE FOR THE METROPOLITANO
23-Feb-09	MTC	REQUEST FOR. A COPY OF THE EIA
02-Mar-09	MINAM	REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON WHETHER THE EIA WAS DONE PURSUANT TO THE LAW AND WHETHER IT HAS BEEN APPROVED
04-Mar-09	MINAM	REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF CONAM [National Environmental Council] IN THE APPROVAL OF THE EIA
06-Mar-09	MML	INVITATION TO MML MAYOR LUIS CASTANEDA TO ATTEND NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL
16-Mar-09	MINAM	REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE EIA APPROVALS
16-Apr-09	World Bank	REPORT ON PROTESTS IN BARRANCO AGAINST THE METROPOLITANO
01-Jun-09	World Bank	REQUEST FOR THE MINUTES OF THE JUNE 11 MEETING WITH THE WORLD BANK, THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK; AND THE MML IN WHICH AN OFFER WAS MADE TO ESTABLISH A ROUNDTABLE
25-Jun-09	MML	DELIVERY OF NEIGHBORHOOD TECHNICAL PROPOSAL AND LISTS OF SIGNATURES

DATE	ADDRESSEE	SUBJECT
25-Jun-09	MDB	DELIVERY OF NEIGHBORHOOD TECHNICAL PROPOSAL AND LISTS OF SIGNATURES
30-Jun-09	Protransporte	REITERATION OF THE NEED FOR A ROUNDTABLE
30-Jul-09	Protransporte	RESPONSE TO THE JULY 23 LETTER REITERATING THE NEED FOR A ROUNDTABLE
27-Aug-09	Protransporte	REITERATION OF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A ROUNDTABLE AND GUARANTEE THAT ITS DECISIONS WILL BE BINDING
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Annexes Corresponding to the Approval of the EIA

DATE	ADDRESSEE	SUBJECT
21-Dec-07	MTC	PROTRANSPORTE ASKS MTC TO CERTIFY THE EIAs OF THE COSAC [HIGH-CAPACITY DEDICATED CORRIDOR] PURSUANT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS. THE PROCESS HAS BEEN UNDER WAY SINCE 2006
11-Jan-08	Protransporte	MTC RETURNS THE EIA FOR THE SOUTHERN ZONE TO PROTRANSPORTE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULES AND REGULATIONS AND FOR HAVING INITIATED WORKS PRIOR TO APPROVAL
30-Jul-08	Protransporte	MTC RETURNS THE EIA FOR THE CENTRAL ZONE TO PROTRANSPORTE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULES AND REGULATIONS AND FOR HAVING INITIATED WORKS PRIOR TO APPROVAL

Map 1.
Map of Barranco

