

INDIA

MUMBAI URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT

(LOAN NO. 4665-IN; CREDIT NO. 3662-IN)

**SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MANAGEMENT ACTION PLAN IN RESPONSE TO THE
INSPECTION PANEL'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

September 13, 2013

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ACRONYMS

BEST	Bombay Electricity and Suburban Transport Corporation
BKC	Bandra Kurla Complex
GoM	Government of Maharashtra
GRC	Grievance Redress Committee
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IMP	Independent Monitoring Panel
JVLR	Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road
KNWA	Kismat Nagar Welfare Association
LEAP	Livelihood Enhancement Action Plan
lpcd	Liters per capita per day
MCGM	Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
MHADA	Maharashtra Housing Area and Development Authority
MMRDA	Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
MN	Motilal Nehru
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MUTP	Mumbai Urban Transport Project
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
PAH	Project Affected Household
PAP	Project Affected Person
PIC	Public Information Center
R&R	Resettlement and Rehabilitation
RIP	Resettlement Implementation Plan
ROB	Road-over-Bridge
SATIS	Station Area Traffic Improvement Schemes
SCLR	Santacruz-Chembur Link Road
USD	United States Dollar
USOA	United Shop Owners Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

i. ***This is the sixth report documenting the progress in implementing Management's Action Plan for the India Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) following the Inspection Panel's Investigation and Management's Report and Recommendation.***

ii. Following complaints received from four groups of Requesters in 2004, which mainly questioned the adequacy and quality of resettlement options, income restoration opportunities and resettlement sites, the Inspection Panel (hereafter the Panel) investigated the complaints and submitted its Report to the Board in December 2005. Bank Management in its Report acknowledged the Panel's findings and prepared an Action Plan to improve the quality and outcome of Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) implementation. The Action Plan was included in the Management Report and Recommendation that was discussed and approved by the Board of Directors on March 28, 2006. The Bank has been implementing the Action Plan in collaboration with the Borrower, the Government of Maharashtra (GoM), since March 2006.

iii. ***The Management Action Plan comprised ten key actions, aimed at improving the quality and outcome of R&R activities.*** These included specific measures in the following areas: (1) negotiated resettlement of shopkeepers; (2) income restoration of employees; (3) improved management of post-resettlement activities; (4) environmental management of resettlement sites; (5) institutional arrangements for R&R management; (6) improving R&R quality with updated plans and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation; (7) improving data base management; (8) communication and consultation with the Project Affected Persons (PAPs); (8) streamlining the grievance redress mechanism (GRM); and (x) operationalizing the Resettlement Implementation Manual.

iv. ***As of June 30, 2013, the implementation of the Action Plan has been mostly completed, with 99.81 percent of the 19,394 PAPs – including 100 percent of the residences and 97.86 percent of the shopkeepers – successfully relocated.*** This was substantially achieved before the Project's closing date of June 15, 2011. ***The five remaining residential PAPs have been resettled since the submission of the Fifth Report in November 2011, whereas the resettlement of the remaining 39 shopkeepers has been delayed due to ongoing court litigation.*** Of these 39 shopkeepers, 34 are tenants doing business in court receiver properties; land acquisition is being initiated afresh for five shop owners along Santacruz-Chembur Link Road (SCLR) that had challenged the land acquisition notification in court. Of the 87 affected community structures, only two religious structures have not been relocated yet due to complex local political economy and social sensitivities.

v. ***Key policy and institutional issues were addressed on a priority basis to improve R&R quality in the first year of implementing the Action Plan.*** These included streamlining the Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM), widening relocation options, re-establishing the Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP), redefining NGO roles and

responsibilities, strengthening public information, issuing identity cards to PAPs, offering income assistance to employees, allowing retention of partially affected structures, offering equivalent shop area to legal shop-owners, and notifying the procedure for relocating shops in case of negotiation failure. The Borrower improved its capacity to better manage the resettlement database, relocation negotiations, complaint handling, post-resettlement support, and to operationalize the R&R Implementation Manual.

vi. ***The concerns of the Requesters were successfully addressed.*** The concerns of the first group of Requesters, shopkeepers along SCLR, have been resolved. There were three key groups: Kismat Nagar Welfare Association (KNWA) and two groups of shopkeepers affiliated with the United Shop Owners Association (USOA). KNWA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) and joined a private *in-situ* scheme in 2007; the USOA group of 85 shopkeepers signed a MoU with MMRDA for relocating to a shopping complex in the Bandra Kurla Complex (BKC) in 2010, and the remaining 46 USOA shopkeepers agreed with MMRDA to join the private *in-situ* resettlement scheme of KNWA. All these shopkeepers cleared the affected portions of their shops. The second group of Requesters from Gazi Nagar relocated to a non-MUTP site of their choice. The third group of Requesters from Bharti Nagar was left unaffected by SCLR. The fourth group of Requesters representing shopkeepers affected by the Jogeshwari Road-over-Bridges (ROBs) is not a part of the MUTP R&R process as the ROBs were excluded from the Project during its restructuring in 2008. MMRDA handed over the list of 389 ROB-affected shopkeepers and as many alternative shops to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) for their relocation as per the procedure agreed with Bank.

vii. ***The Borrower's post-resettlement strategy has enabled a progressive improvement in people's lives.*** MMRDA's post-resettlement strategy provided social infrastructure and services, infrastructure maintenance, financial assistance, management training, strengthening the long-term sustainability of the R&R process. Over 10,000 resettled women are engaged in micro-credit activities, including some 250 women running a successful business cooperative, "Sankalp," with business worth USD 200,000, and another 500 supported for livelihood activities. All the resettlement sites have access to transportation, schools, and health services. Most PAP housing societies have assumed management responsibilities and in some places a federation of such housing societies is managing the colonies. MMRDA is preparing to establish additional facilities in resettlement sites including flourmills, schools, community halls, and health facilities with efforts already started at some sites. The handover of the resettlement buildings and sites to the concerned PAP housing societies/federations is ongoing, the preparatory work for which, society registration and training, has been carried out.

viii. ***The Borrower has integrated innovations and lessons learned from MUTP into its overall resettlement practice.*** MUTP is known for notable innovations and lessons in urban resettlement, which include: (1) a transition from a prescriptive to a flexible approach required for negotiated resettlement of residences, business owners, and community properties; (2) customized resettlement solutions (shopping complexes) for those losing their businesses; (3) regular consultations to redress people's complaints and build trust; (4) effective grievance redress systems with independent monitoring to ensure

timely resolution of complaints; (5) post-resettlement strategy to enable PAP cooperatives to manage their own affairs; (6) promoting women's economic empowerment to strengthen livelihoods; and (7) monitoring and evaluation systems to identify and remedy problems and issues. The Innovation Note on Urban Resettlement-MUTP, 2011 attached in the **Annex-3** captures some of these. Earlier, a Guidance Note on Urban Resettlement was prepared following the international workshop on urban resettlement (Bangkok, 2006) and finalized with two national workshops. It is notable that MMRDA has mainstreamed the MUTP R&R Policy to use in its resettlement activities, integrating the innovations cited above into its resettlement practice. It has a Social Development Cell (SDC) led by a Manager, a social scientist, 18 social development assistants, supported by a team of 10 engineers having estate management responsibilities. The SDC has livelihood, human development index, and resettlement management units. MMRDA has re-established the grievance redress mechanisms for its new project, MUTP-2B, funded from its own resources. It has followed up the establishment of three shopping complexes set up for MUTP shopkeepers with five more to resettle non-MUTP shopkeepers.

ix. **Present Status.** MMRDA has resettled all PAPs except for the 39 shopkeepers along SCLR as noted above. Relocating these will require judicial closure on the 34 shops in court receivership, and land acquisition for the other five. Of the two temples remaining, it is hoped that the temple along SCLR will be shifted soon, whereas the one along Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road (JVLR) may take longer in view of strong sensitivities. For sustainable self-management of the resettlement sites, MMRDA is establishing housing society federations, and handover of site management responsibilities to them; these federations will also receive conveyance deeds after completing 10 years of occupation. It is simultaneously working with MCGM to ensure fuller mainstreaming of resettlement sites into the city's urban services network.

x. **Conclusion.** In view of the substantial completion of the Action Plan and Project closure on June 15, 2011, Management proposes to conclude the annual reporting on the Action Plan with this volume. The remaining outstanding issues are mainly dealt with through the judiciary and Management will report back to the Board upon their resolution. Lessons learned and implementation experiences have been documented as part of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR), which rated the social safeguards as *Satisfactory*. The mainstreaming of the resettlement sites into the urban services network remains a challenge and MMRDA is working with MCGM to ensure that all basic services are provided on a sustained basis to the resettlement sites. Management believes that the implementation has reached a stage where the Borrower has developed considerable capacity to address the few remaining issues.

I. BACKGROUND

1. **The Project.** The Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) was approved by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors on June 18, 2002 (Loan No. 4665-IN; Credit No. 3662-IN). The total Project cost was about USD 1.1 billion, of which USD 463.0 million was financed by an IBRD Loan, SDR 57.5 million (USD 92.0 million equivalent) by an IDA Credit, and counterpart financing of USD 568 million by the Government of India. The Project was implemented by several entities and coordinated by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA). The Project was extended four times and was closed on June 15, 2011.

2. MUTP supported the development of an efficient and sustainable transport system in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. In 2008, the Project was restructured to focus attention on a more limited set of key activities. The Project after restructuring included the following components: Rail Transport, including improvement of the suburban rail network and technical assistance; Road-based Transport, including traffic management infrastructure, buses and road widening to facilitate two East-West link roads; and Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R), comprising mainly: construction of housing, and provision of services for R&R of Project-affected families, implemented by MMRDA and financed with an IDA credit.

3. **Requests for Inspection.** The Inspection Panel received four Requests for Inspection submitted on behalf of several residents and shopkeepers in 2004, in two batches. The Requests questioned: (a) adequacy of resettlement options and income restoration opportunities provided in the MUTP R&R Policy, especially for shopkeepers, (b) suitability and quality of resettlement sites, (c) poor housing and living conditions, and (d) access to information, disclosure, consultation, and grievance redress process.

4. **Panel Investigation.** The Inspection Panel undertook an investigation and issued its findings in December 2005. The Panel found areas of non-compliance by the Bank with various aspects of its operational policies concerning environmental assessment (OD 4.01), involuntary resettlement (OD 4.30), investment lending – identification to Board presentation (OP/BP 10.00); economic evaluation (OP/BP 10.04), project supervision (OD/OP/BP 13.05), project appraisal (OMS 2.20) and the Bank policy on disclosure.

5. **Management Report and Action Plan.** Bank Management in its Response prepared an Action Plan to improve the quality and outcome of R&R implementation. The Action Plan was included in the Management Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board on February 27, 2006. The Action Plan focused on implementation issues, including the resettlement procedures for shopkeepers with medium- and large-size shops, restoration of incomes, post-resettlement services, baseline data, grievance redress mechanisms, and the quality of supervision. The Board endorsed Management's Action Plan on March 6, 2006, which was prepared in close consultation with the GoM, and agreed that an update would be provided periodically on progress made in its implementation. The Project was put under partial suspension in March 2006 in the light of R&R concerns. The suspension was lifted on June 29, 2006 upon the Borrower substantially meeting the Bank's conditions to address the outstanding

R&R issues. The Bank has been implementing the Action Plan in collaboration with the Borrower, the GoM, since March 2006. Since then there has been a significant improvement in MMRDA's capacity and the MUTP R&R process, which is now recognized in India and abroad for its innovative approach.

6. This is the sixth report documenting the progress in implementing Management's Action Plan for the MUTP. The Action Plan comprised ten actions, including negotiation with and resettlement of shopkeepers, post-resettlement, consultation, information disclosure and grievance redress process, strengthening Borrower institutional capacity with clear roles and responsibilities, resettlement data management, and implementation procedure. The measures listed in the Action Plan were for the most part completed before the Project's closing date of June 15, 2011.

II. KEY OUTCOMES AND LESSONS

7. ***Implementation of the Action Plan demonstrates sustained improvement in the quality and outcome of R&R measures.*** Since February 2006, when the Management Action Plan was submitted to the Board, MMRDA has resettled 5,109 households (3,695 residences and 1,414 or shops). A total of 99.8 percent (17,572 households and 1,783 shops) have relocated to their alternative houses or shops, have decided to resettle in partially affected structures or have opted to settle under other non-MUTP resettlement/housing schemes. This corresponds to 100 percent of residential Project Affected Persons (PAPs) and 97.86 percent of shopkeepers (including 98.23 percent of medium- and large-size shopkeepers and 97.8 percent of the small shopkeepers). The 17,572 relocated residential households include 120 residents of 4 Maharashtra Housing Area and Development Authority (MHADA) buildings that have opted for private *in-situ* redevelopment schemes, and 260 residential households who have vacated their flats in 13 MHADA buildings along the Santacruz-Chembur Link Road (SCLR). As per the agreement reached with these PAPs, MMRDA is redeveloping their buildings in the same locality with flats almost double the size of their previous ones. Until the buildings are ready for occupation, as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), MMRDA has been providing rental allowance to these PAPs at market price. The 64 residents of 2 MHADA buildings at Netaji Nagar along SCLR have relocated, having signed a similar MoU with MMRDA, which provides them with rental allowance till the new building in a suitable location is ready.

8. Since the submission of the fifth progress report in December 2011, MMRDA has relocated six residences from along SCLR and one shop along Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road (JVLR), and has inched closer to a resolution of pending oklegal issues affecting the relocation of the remaining 39 shopkeepers. These include 34 commercial tenants doing business in disputed properties and awaiting Court Orders to relocate, and five shop owners that refused negotiations and challenged relocation, for whom land acquisition procedures are being re-initiated. The United Shop Owners Association (USOA) group of 85 shopkeepers, which earlier opted for a shopping complex at Motilal Nehru (MN) Nagar, BKC is about to permanently relocate; the breakaway USOA group of 46 shopkeepers and the Kismat Nagar Welfare Association (KNWA) group of 54 shopkeepers have joined a private *in-situ* scheme. Whereas the large/ medium-size

shopkeepers have cleared their affected portions and continue to do business in their existing premises, the fully affected smaller shopkeepers have relocated to new shops at MN Nagar. MMRDA has been able to relocate one more mosque at Panchsheel Nagar in the last year, but the relocation of the remaining two temples has been delayed. The construction of a temple along SCLR is underway, but the relocation of the temple along JVLR remains contentious in view of strong local sensitivities.

9. Key achievements are listed below in Table 1 (details provided in Annex 1).

Table 1: Status of Resettlement (June 10, 2013)

Unit Type	Totals (Base line)	Revised Totals (Baseline)	Resettled (as of 01/31/06)	Resettled (as of 12/31/06)	Resettled (as of 09/01/07)	Resettled (as of 02/01/09)	Resettled (as of 02/01/10)	Resettled (as of 10/10/11)	Resettled as of 05/05/13	Remaining cases
Households	17,378	17,572	13,877	15,315	15,784	16,580	17,134	17,566	17,572	0
		100.0%	79.0%	87.2%	89.8%	94.4%	97.5%	99.97%	100%	0%
Shops:	2,469	1,822	369	752	1,104	1,437	1,490	1,782	1,783	39
		100.0%	20.3%	41.3%	60.6%	78.9%	81.8%	97.8%	97.86%	2.14%
of which > 225 sq.ft.	800	566	N/A	84	227	419	419	555	556	10
		100.0%	N/A	14.84%	40.11%	74.03%	74.03%	98.06%	98.23%	1.67%
Total:	19,847	19,394	14,246	16,067	16,888	18,017	18,624	19,348	19,354	39
		100.0%	73.46%	82.85%	87.08%	92.90%	96.03%	99.76%	99.8%	0.19%

10. *MMRDA's post-resettlement support strategy originally planned for MUTP PAPs has been expanded consistently to cover all resettlement sites, enabling their sustainable self-management by PAP societies.* A total of 352 PAP housing societies have been registered so far, including 185 or 98.4 percent of society buildings occupied by MUTP PAPs as of June 10, 2013. Transfer of common facilities (society offices, welfare and women's centers) has been completed for all 185 registered societies with maintenance grants provided to 181 of them. Identity cards were issued all 18,547 Project Affected Households (PAHs) in the squatter category, who were eligible to receive it. The Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP), re-established in 2006, monitored the R&R process and helped resolve issues and major complaints during implementation with regular resettlement site visits and public interactions. The Livelihood Cell of MMRDA has been implementing the livelihood support program for economic empowerment of poor resettled women groups.

11. **Progress in providing post-relocation financial assistance to the PAP cooperative societies has been significant.** Building maintenance funds in an amount equivalent to INR 346.92 million have been transferred to 181, or 98 percent, of the registered societies compared to 46 in 2006. Outstanding interest on maintenance funds in an amount equivalent to INR 93.18 million has been paid to 164 registered societies (interest not paid to 14 societies whose water bills were borne by MMRDA) compared to 46 in 2006; and community management funds in an amount equivalent to INR 17.5 million has been handed over to 184 of 185 registered societies. Joint accounts have been opened for 179 societies, who can draw interest on the principal amounts.

12. **The living conditions in resettlement sites have improved with provisioning of key social services.** These include schools, health care facilities, community centers, internal roads, streetlights, water supply, transport services, drainage, and sewerage facilities. MMRDA extended transitional support to the resettled people to enable them to access various public services. Child care centers, 39 schools, education facilities run by Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (universal literacy campaign), and private schools in and around the R&R sites benefit over 9,500 school age children. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) runs a health center at Anik in rooms provided by MMRDA; a maternity care cum health center is under construction at Mankhurd; and a community hall at Majaj has been constructed. Internal street lights have been provided with the agreement that the resident federations will bear the recurring costs. MMRDA has drawn up plans to provide additional social facilities in resettlement sites in collaboration with MCGM, which will set up additional health facilities, schools, whereas MMRDA will set up the new flourmills and a few community centers.

13. **MMRDA has mainstreamed application of the MUTP R&R policy to resettlement activities beyond the Project.** MMRDA has applied the MUTP R&R entitlements framework to all its resettlement projects beyond the Bank intervention, and has expanded the post-resettlement support strategy to all the resettlement sites irrespective of funding sources. During MUTP implementation, MMRDA relied largely on the social mobilization skills of NGOs hired for impact survey and relocation facilitation. In the course of time, it has strengthened its own Social Development Cell (SDC) with a social scientist and 18 social development assistants in place. MMRDA has systematized the management of resettlement sites with a team of 10 estate engineers assigned repair and maintenance duties. The SDC includes specialized units to deal with issues of Livelihoods, Human Development Index, Relocation, Society Management, etc. MMRDA followed up the Bank's emphasis on separate resettlement solutions for the shopkeepers with setting up five shopping complexes to relocate shopkeepers in addition to the two established during MUTP. It has also re-established the grievance redress mechanisms to deal with complaints, along the lines of the GRM set up for MUTP. These steps have played a critical part in bringing parity in the government's approach to resettlement, and ensuring equitable development outcomes of R&R practices. A few key lessons learned from MUTP that are slowly being integrated into resettlement practice in Mumbai and elsewhere are listed below.

14. ***The initial findings of the final MUTP Resettlement Impact Assessment Study indicate an overall improvement in the living conditions of the resettled people.*** About 80 percent of residents felt the resettlement process was relevant and sufficient with 88.5 percent of residents and 98 percent of shopkeepers feeling satisfied with the delivery of entitlements. Eighty percent of residents recognized the assistance provided by MMRDA in establishing housing cooperative societies; 73 percent appreciated MMRDA's assistance in maintaining and repairing their buildings. As for basic services, 79 percent of residents were satisfied with water supply, 93 percent were happy with power supply, 71 percent were satisfied with street light, 90 percent were satisfied with garbage collection and disposal facilities in their buildings, and 64 percent of residents were satisfied with garbage collection from their sites. Similarly, whereas 83 percent of residents were fine with hygiene conditions of their buildings, 63.5 percent felt the same

about their sites. Sixty-eight percent of people said they have better access to schools, hospitals, markets and shops. Seventy percent of residents observed an improvement in the quality of life for the whole family. They spent less on medicines, their children attended school regularly due to good health, and scored better at studies. Ninety-two percent felt more settled because of owning a flat; 84 percent said their children felt safer; 94 percent did not fear any evictions; 93 percent were not worried about their house collapsing during storms; 82 percent felt female members of their family had more privacy; 76 percent agreed they spent less money on house repairs; 86 percent of people mentioned that they have held community celebrations together and this gave them a new identity. Ninety-two percent now felt like inviting people to their home, whereas about 72 percent claimed their social circle had expanded.

15. *The MUTP implementation experience offers useful lessons for urban resettlement efforts within and outside the country.* MUTP was implemented in a challenging urban environment characterized by a complex interplay of economic, demographic and political forces in a mega city of some 20 million people. Mumbai is the headquarter of several banks and corporates, boasts of a vibrant film industry, and an expanding real estate market, a city also having to deal with infrastructure and housing deficit, traffic jams and vast slums. Undertaking an MUTP-like major infrastructure project in Mumbai involved dealing with complex legal-institutional dynamics and a political economy where several administrative agencies, regulatory institutions, and political players influenced decision-making. Resettlement planning and execution in such a setting was a challenging task, with slum-dwellers initially resisting relocation due to fears over loss of shelter, income, and local social networks. The challenge was even harder in vis a vis the relocation of legal residence- and business-owners, and large commercial squatters along road corridors where civil works were proposed. Local politicians, community/trade leaders, realtors, people's representatives, and the affected people -- each group had their own interests to pursue. This was an urban setting where prescriptive policy solutions and rigid institutional arrangements, however well thought out, would not work without adaptive course corrections during implementation. This was the key lesson learnt from one of the largest urban resettlement experiments tried anywhere. The several course corrections made in MUTP following the Request for investigation have been discussed in the previous paragraphs. In pursuit of such adaptation, several innovations were tried, which can be categorized in five areas: (a) stakeholder consultations, (b) post resettlement sustainability, (c) livelihood and income restoration, (d) focus on women and children, and (e) grievance redress and transparency. The Innovation Note on MUTP (Annex-3) captures these innovations and lessons learned in detail, some of which are summarized below.

- Transition from an administrative “compensation” approach towards a “win-win” negotiated approach by the Government minimized opposition from several PAP groups. In some cases, the Government went beyond policy alternatives to resolve contentious resettlement issues.
- Introducing entitlements and market-based solutions contributed to MUTP’s success. Provision of free alternative housing with title has had an empowering effect on the PAPs, who have acquired a new social status, and gained wider access to employment

in the formal sector. The market solution of offering “transfer of development rights” (TDR) as a tradable benefit in lieu of land compensation provided greater options to the legal owners to replace their losses.

- Effective consultations and communication with PAPs helped resolve several issues, including checking misinformation, building trust, and negotiating R&R options.
- An effective grievance redress mechanism (GRM) allowed the timely resolution of entitlement-related complaints, reducing transaction costs for both affected people and authorities. The IMP enhanced trust and accountability by monitoring the R&R process with field visits and resolving people’s complaints.
- Assessing NGO capacity and understanding their approach is key to engaging them effectively in resettlement activities to avoid task overload and inefficiencies. MUTP showed that even NGOs with significant experience may need capacity strengthening.
- A lack of adequate synchronization of resettlement activities with civil works caused significant time and cost overruns in the case of MUTP. Prior to commencement of civil works, substantial land acquisition and resettlement should always be completed.
- Interagency coordination issues posed a serious challenge to smooth implementation of urban projects. The delays faced by MMRDA in finalizing designs for SCLR overbridges with Indian Railways and the ongoing negotiations between MMRDA and MCGM regarding fuller integration of resettlement sites into the urban services network illustrate this point.
- Periodic impact assessment helped to measure the adequacy and effectiveness of resettlement solutions, and to undertake course correction if required to fill gaps, if any. Following the Impact Evaluation of 2008, MMRDA took several remedial measures to improve the quality of post-resettlement support strategy.
- The MUTP experience showed the use of transit resettlement should be avoided to minimize uncertainties with regard to permanent resettlement, and to avoid risks associated with people living in low quality temporary facilities.
- At the permanent resettlement sites, common amenities should be integrated in the overall layout and design, including essential common facilities to be developed prior to relocation of the affected people.
- Estate management should be integrated in R&R planning and implementation to ensure smooth transition. The Bank has summarized these lessons in an Innovation Note on Urban Resettlement for wider dissemination among the practitioners of urban resettlement.

III. ACTION PLAN STATUS

16. The status of issues under the Board-approved Action Plan is summarized below and is discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs in this section.

Table 2: Final Update of Implementing the Action Plan

No	Action	No. of sub-actions	Compl-eted	Comments
1	Negotiation with and Resettlement of Shopkeepers along SCLR and other subprojects	2	2	Substantially completed. Negotiations and resettlement complete except for 39 of 1,822 shopkeepers affected. 34 shops with court cases, and five involving land acquisition remain to be relocated.
2	Publicizing RR Policy, listing and issuing ID cards to employees for offering assistance for jobs	3	3	Completed.
3	Post-Resettlement (registration and training of housing societies, social services, transfer of maintenance funds and conveyance deeds, disseminating building maintenance manuals, improving water supply and transport, services and undertaking R&R impact assessment study)	10	9	Transfer of conveyance deeds will be carried out upon completion of 10 years of occupation and formation of site level housing society federations.
4	Environmental management of R&R sites including building repairs, dissemination of maintenance norms, environmental management plans, and waste management	4	3	MMRDA is pursuing with MCGM integration of resettlement sites into urban services network of the city.
5	Institutional Arrangements for R&R (staff capacity, clarity on NGO role, and training)	3	3	Completed. MMRDA has expanded its team for sustainable R&R management. .
6	Improving R&R process (Implementation Manual, data management, Resettlement Plan for SCLR, updating baseline surveys for JVLR; R&R progress reporting, ID cards to PAPs, relocating Community Assets, Reestablishing Independent Monitoring Panel	10	10	Substantially completed. Of 87 community assets only 2 remain to be relocated. ROB and SATIS schemes were excluded in 2008.
7	Improving Database Management (procuring Oracle software and programming)	2	2	Completed.
8	Improving Communication and Consultation with PAPs, managing Public Information Centers, enhancing Bank oversight of and technical support for communication and consultation	3	3	MMRDA participated in R&R workshops and trainings conducted by the Bank in 2013.
9	Streamlining grievance redress mechanism (GRM) with provision of staff support, dissemination of brochure on GRM, Bank oversight of grievance redress process	3	3	Completed. GRM process completed for over 3,000 applicants.
10	Operationalization of the Implementation Manual (IM)	3	3	Completed. R&R IM prepared, disclosed & operationalized.

Action 1: Negotiations with each eligible shopkeeper will be held on the basis of options listed in the Action Plan when applicable. Agreements reached will be recorded and implemented.

Status: Completed

17. The resettlement of shopkeepers affected by MUTP was 97.86 percent completed by Project closure in June 2011, including all shops along the JVLR and SCLR, among them several landowners with large/medium shops, and excluding the remaining 34 shops with disputed ownership and 5 shops with pending land acquisition. The negotiations with three groups of Kismat Nagar shopkeepers along SCLR – protracted and challenging – were concluded in 2010. The USOA group of 85 shopkeepers signed a MoU with MMRDA to relocate to a shopping complex at MN Nagar, close to their location. The KNWA group signed a MoU with MMRDA for a private *in-situ* resettlement scheme in 2007. The breakaway USOA group of 46 shopkeepers joined the private redevelopment scheme of KNWA. These shopkeepers cleared their affected portions for civil works.

18. Of the 566 large shopkeepers (whose premises are larger than 225 square feet), 556 or 98.23 percent were relocated, including those having opted for redevelopment schemes. Of the remaining 10 large shopkeepers, five are in the court receiver category due to title dispute and for another five the land acquisition process has been started along SCLR, which will continue with minor modifications. Relocation of the 34 shopkeepers in litigation along SCLR (of which 5 are large shopkeepers) is awaiting High Court orders.

Action 2: MMRDA will publicize policy provisions related to making available up to one year of income on a one-time basis to those affected employees who are not reemployed a result of Project resettlement and will process the requests as and when received.

Status: Completed

19. The provision of assistance to the affected employees was explained in the R&R Implementation Manual and disclosed in the Public Information Center (PIC) and uploaded on MMRDA's website for public reference. Affected employees were issued ID cards so that onetime income assistance for a year could be given if anyone reported loss of work for three months. No request for assistance from employees was received by MMRDA until Project closure, as the city's dynamic labor market offered alternative employment, whereas some employees retained their jobs.

Action 3: MMRDA will improve its resettlement implementation mechanisms through various measures such as: (a) registration process for PAP cooperative societies and cooperative management plan; (b) undertaking construction of additional social services at R&R sites; (c) transferring maintenance funds from the Slum Rehabilitation Authority to PAP cooperative societies; (d) transferring conveyance deeds from MMRDA to the cooperative societies; (e) providing building maintenance manuals and brochures for supporting proper management of cooperative societies; (f) taking steps to improve water supply at resettlement sites; (g) improving transport connectivity at resettlement sites; and (h) undertaking impact assessments to determine the improvements in the living standards and proposing remedial measures for any improvement required as a result of assessment findings.

Status: Completed except transfer of conveyance deeds.

20. Registration of PAP Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Management. PAP housing society registration has been completed for 185, or 98.4 percent of the 188 occupied buildings; registration of the three remaining societies is delayed due to partial occupancy and differences amongst PAPs. MMRDA has transferred common facilities (society office, child welfare, and women's welfare center) to all the registered societies.

21. MMRDA has continued the housing cooperative management action plan as a part of the post-resettlement support strategy prepared by the consultant after the latter completed its assignment in June 2008. MMRDA has completed management training for 181 registered societies, and plans to undertake retraining in the coming months. The societies periodically elect their management committees, manage their own accounts and collect household contributions to meet recurring expenses, such as common electricity and water bills, cleaning, and remuneration for teachers at child care centers. MMRDA provided transitional networking and facilitation support to the resettled PAP societies in accessing various services including health care, education, electricity, solid waste management, public distribution systems, and citizen (voter) identity cards.

22. Construction of Additional Social Services at R&R Sites. Key social services provided in the resettlement sites include schools, a health care/community center, internal roads and streetlights, water supply and transport services, and storm water drainage. Schools have been established at Anik and Mankhurd including a large primary school at Mankhurd. In addition, one private school at Mankhurd and two private schools at Anik managed by charities provide education. Child care centers in the resettlement buildings, 39 schools, education centers run by Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (universal literacy campaign) and the private schools managed by charities in and around the R&R sites benefit over 9,500 resettled children. MCGM has started to run a health center at Anik in rooms provided by MMRDA; and a maternity care cum health center is under construction at Mankhurd. MMRDA has provided a community hall at Majaj with facility to run a health center. Internal street lights have been provided at resettlement sites with the resident federations bearing the recurring costs. Some resettlement sites have asked for additional facilities such as boundary wall, extension of street lights, and sewerage, which are being provided. MMRDA has drawn up plans to provide additional social facilities in resettlement sites including 22 flourmills, schools, community centers

and health care facilities. Some of these facilities will be provided by MMRDA and the rest provided by MCGM.

23. **Transferring Maintenance Fund Interest and Conveyance Deeds.** Building maintenance funds in an amount equivalent to about INR 346.92 million have been transferred to 181, or 98 percent, of the 185 registered societies. Transfer of arrear interest in an amount equivalent to INR 93.18 million on maintenance funds has been updated for 164 societies. Interest was not paid to 14 societies at Majas whose water bills were paid for years by MMRDA. Community management funds in an amount equivalent to INR 17.5 million have been transferred to 184 of 185 registered societies. Joint accounts have been opened for 179 societies, who can directly draw interest gained on the principal maintenance amount. MMRDA will transfer conveyance deeds to the cooperative housing society federations once they are established and upon completion of 10 years of building occupancy.

24. **Providing Building Maintenance Manuals and Brochures to Societies.** MMRDA has distributed maintenance manuals and brochures on society management to all the registered cooperative society committees. Additional information, education, and communication materials on society management and cohesive living developed by the post-resettlement consultant are disseminated to the housing cooperative societies to further strengthen self-management of assets and facilities. MMRDA is planning to organize follow up awareness raising camps in major resettlement sites as a part of its sustainability strategy in the coming months.

25. **Steps to Improve Water Supply at Resettlement Sites.** The water supply situation has considerably improved in the resettlement sites (since 2006 when an acute problem was observed). A few buildings at Anik do report deficient supply during the summer when the city experiences water scarcity. MMRDA in coordination with MCGM has largely addressed the water supply issue with measures to enhance water pressure at Anik and Mankhurd sites, including construction of separate water pumping stations and elevated water reservoirs at two locations near Anik. Water supply in resettlement sites is comparable to other parts of Mumbai.

26. **Improving Transport Connectivity at Resettlement Sites.** Since February 2006, there has been significant improvement in transport connectivity with the resettlement sites. Access to and availability of bus service from the resettlement colonies is comparable to that of other areas of Mumbai. Major bus routes are within 1-2 km of the Mankhurd and Anik resettlement colonies. The provision of bus services is periodically updated based on passenger load assessment by BEST, the agency responsible for providing bus services.

27. **Independent Impact Assessments Show Improvements in Living Standards and Remedial Measures.** MMRDA carried out three independent resettlement impact assessment studies in 2003, 2007-8, and 2013 respectively. While the first two studies were undertaken by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, the final assessment is being

done by Nirmala Niketan (School of Social Work), Mumbai. The 2008 Study^a showed 80 percent PAP satisfaction with resettlement buildings; 50 percent increase in average monthly household incomes and 80 percent job retention among relocated PAPs; the purchase of additional household assets; and an enhanced sense of social security. The study also noted the loss of supplementary incomes by women earlier employed in mixed communities, building repair issues, etc. MMRDA took several remedial measures, including establishment of a Livelihood Cell; repair works in several resettlement buildings; and allotment of shopping kiosks/work sheds to poor PAPs. The final independent R&R Impact Assessment Study commissioned by MMRDA with terms of reference agreed with the Bank is hoped to be complete in 2013. See paragraph 14 above for the initial findings, which are satisfactory.

28. **Strengthening Livelihoods.** Since 2008, MMRDA has taken several measures to strengthen income restoration and livelihood activities with special focus on poor resettled women and youth. It established a Livelihood Cell in 2008 to promote “income generating activities” among women’s groups. The Livelihood Cell took various initiatives to economically empower women across all resettlement sites with establishment of a women’s business cooperative “Sankalp” to undertake micro-enterprise activities.^b The livelihood cell piloted a Livelihood Enhancement Action Plan (LEAP) in two phases to help vulnerable women PAPs with income opportunities. This involved establishing and training 64 Self-Help Groups and eight Livelihood Groups, which enabled about 1,000 women to secure sustainable monthly incomes and improve their living standards. As employment without skills development could lead to stagnation and loss of interest in work, the Livelihood Cell implemented a revised LEAP-II for 500 women, which emphasized building women’s entrepreneurial skills through training, marketing and credit access. “Sankalp” has had a positive demonstrative influence on other resettled women. In various resettlement sites, over 10,000 women are enrolled in different group-based income activities through Self-Help Groups, 90 percent of these being supported by the NGO SPARC-Mahila Milan. At Anik, the CAP Foundation^c implemented a job skill training program for the resettled youth. In 2007, the post-resettlement consultant organized job fairs for the youth to link their skills sets with the labor market.

29. **Maintenance and Repairs.** The 2007-8 impact assessment study observed that many resettled PAPs, who earlier lived in slums and paid no levies towards water use and house occupancy, found the payment of property taxes, water and electricity bills a burden. Responding to this, MMRDA ensured concessions in property and water charges levied (through adoption of the telescoping assessment method, where levies are increased gradually) in order to enable the resettled families to adapt to their new conditions. MMRDA facilitated the participation of people living in resettlement sites in

^a MMRDA had earlier undertaken an impact assessment through independent consultants in 2003 (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai) focusing on people resettled in the initial phase with a survey of 2,116 sample households (20 percent) and 36 focus group discussions. The study results were similar to those recorded in 2008.

^b These activities include making and selling greeting cards, office stationery, and traditional earthen lamps; food processing; buying and selling sarees, etc. While the women’s groups in Anik and Mankhurd are producing handmade consumer items, the women’s group at Kanjurmarg has set up a small bakery.

^c MMRDA and the Corporate Social Responsibility wing of the Tata Consultancy Services engaged the CAP Foundation to teach English and computer skills to resettled youth.

the state assembly elections by ensuring that they were issued voter identity cards. The majority of building repairs have been completed and MMRDA has prepared an action plan to complete the remaining repair works before a formal exit. The repair works are related to water proofing of terrace and overhead water tanks, replacement of cement drainage pipes with PVC pipes, addressing dead wall seepage, repair of lifts and other fixtures. New buildings left unoccupied for long periods report maximum problems due to lack of regular maintenance. Some of the repair works demanded by the people in several sites are recurring in nature, caused due to misuse or inadequate maintenance. In November 2011, the Bank team held meetings in several sites to review progress and observed that MMRDA was completing the final round of repairs with the agreement that henceforth the concerned societies would assume maintenance responsibilities.

Action 4: MMRDA will assist cooperative societies to maintain public assets and take measures for solid waste management in resettlement sites.

Status: Complete except for full integration of R&R sites into MCGM network.

30. As a part of the post-resettlement support strategy MMRDA has ensured registration of 98.4 percent of PAP housing societies, extended technical and financial assistance, and trained them to responsibly manage their assets and surroundings. Over 50 percent of the registered societies have started managing affairs of their buildings effectively, pending a formal handover of self-management responsibilities.^d MMRDA has followed a uniform approach in providing post-resettlement support to the MUTP and non-MUTP societies. So far 352 societies have been registered including 185 MUTP-PAP societies. MMRDA has started the process of formal handover of management responsibilities to the housing cooperatives and their federations that fulfill the exit indicators, which include: (a) integration of resettlement sites into urban services network with street lights, waste management, sewerage, and drainage maintenance; (b) formation of a federation of PAP societies; and (c) resolution of urgent civil works related problems posing hazard risks.

31. MMRDA prepared and implemented an action plan to improve environmental management at the resettlement sites with the help of a professional consultant. This involved implementation of a list of site-specific actions for improving environment, health and hygiene (EHH) in MUTP colonies, which was implemented by MMRDA with the completion of major structural repair works. MMRDA has replaced the drainpipes in the buildings and ensured one-time cleaning of storm drains. To improve waste management, some garbage bins were supplied to the PAP housing societies and

^d The achievement of overall exit indicators is as follows: (a) society registration completed for 185 buildings; (b) transfer of common facilities completed for 185 buildings; (c) transfer of community management funds (CMF) completed for 184 societies; (d) transfer of building maintenance grants transferred to 181 societies; (e) payment of arrear interest on maintenance funds completed for 164 societies; (f) regular payment of water and electricity bills (bills should not be outstanding for over 6 months) updated for 101 societies; (g) completion of urgent repair works to minimize adverse safety implications completed for most buildings reporting problems; (h) completion of the yearly statutory audit of society accounts completed by 181 societies; (i) democratic management of the PAP cooperative societies (at least one election held to choose the management committee) done by 181 societies; and (j) housing society members trained in management skills in case of 181 societies.

arrangements made with MCGM for removal of solid waste from the R&R sites. MMRDA has also prepared overall environmental management plans for all MUTP sites for the PAP societies to implement.

32. The sustainability of resettlement sites depends on their integration into the urban services network. MMRDA is pursuing the matter with MCGM, which is providing basic urban services including waste collection from pick-up points outside R&R sites. MMRDA is setting up federations of housing cooperatives, some of whom (Nirlon, Nesco, Asgaonkar) have assumed site management responsibilities.

Action 5: MMRDA will strengthen its institutional arrangements for day to day management, assess NGOs' capacity and roles and prepare and implement a training program for sensitization and skills improvement of staff, NGOs and others involved in implementation.

Status: Completed

33. MMRDA has substantially built its capacity and gained experience to better manage R&R responsibilities. It has established a Social Development Cell and appointed additional staff, including a Social Development Specialist, 18 Community Development Assistants, a Deputy Registrar of Societies, and a Special Land Acquisition Officer. The SDC includes technical units such as a Livelihood Cell, Human Development Index cell, Water Supply cell, etc. MMRDA has deployed a team of 10 engineers led by a Deputy Chief Engineer to provide maintenance and estate management support to the resettlement sites. MMRDA's earlier measures to streamline roles and responsibilities of NGOs, consultants, and its own staff were sustained throughout the Project period. Enhanced capacity helped MMRDA to engage and resolve resettlement issues with residence owners, large shopkeepers, and trustees of religious structures, and address post-resettlement challenges. In recognition of its capacity and experience, the GoM has designated MMRDA as the nodal agency for managing R&R for several new infrastructure projects in Mumbai including Metro, Monorail, MUTP-2A, etc.

Action 6: MMRDA will improve its R&R process through measures such as: (a) finalizing the R&R implementation manual to define the procedures; (b) expediting the finalization of outstanding RIPs; (c) expediting the issuance of identity cards and payment of shifting allowances; (d) assessing the magnitude of relocation of community assets and synchronizing their relocation with the civil works timetable; and (e) the GoM filling the position of IMP Chairman and clarifying the IMP's role.

Status: Completed

34. ***Finalizing the R&R Implementation Manual to Define Procedures.*** The R&R Implementation Manual updated and finalized with Bank comments was disclosed at the PIC and on MMRDA's website.

35. ***Expediting the Finalization of Outstanding Resettlement Implementation Plans (RIPs).*** All RIPs were prepared and implemented for activities included in the Project in compliance with the agreed R&R policy.

36. ***Expediting Issuance of Identity Cards and Payment of Shifting Allowances.*** MMRDA has issued identity cards to all the 18,547 resettled squatter PAHs eligible to receive this. This figure in percent terms may be higher as ID cards are not issued to legal property owners, those who have opted for non-MUTP resettlement solutions, or who retain partially affected shops/residences.

37. ***Assessing Magnitude of Community Asset Relocation and Synchronizing with Civil Works Timetable.*** MMRDA relocated all the Project-affected community and religious structures except for two temples: one along SCLR and one along JVLR. While relocating these have been challenging, MMRDA was able to relocate the rest through negotiations. In some cases it provided alternative apartments, or shops to help relocate some of these (prayer halls, libraries, small schools); it had to relocate host communities^e to clear up land for reconstructing four mosques, two temples, a social welfare center, and two electric pylons along SCLR. Similarly, MMRDA also resettled host communities along JVLR to relocate one temple, a Sikh shrine and a cremation ground. In cases where such structures could not be removed, alternative engineering options were explored.

38. ***Position of IMP Chairman Filled by GoM and Clarification of IMP's Role.*** The IMP played an important role in monitoring living conditions in the resettlement sites through field visits and in facilitating MMRDA's consultations with the PAPs. From April 2006 to October 2011, the IMP held 35 meetings and went on 16 field visits for monitoring the resettlement process.

Action 7: Improving data base management.

Status: Completed

39. MMRDA streamlined and maintained a database using the Visual Basic platform for recording and tracking relocation data for decision making and monitoring. A sophisticated R&R database on the Oracle platform was piloted for secure data management, which could not be operationalized due to delays and complexity associated with its usage. MMRDA continues to operate with its Visual Basic database.

^e A host community is the community located in an area selected to relocate a structure affected by the road work. In order to demolish and reconstruct such a structure at an alternative location, land has to be found. MMRDA identifies and resettles willing slums dwellers, referred to as host community here, to clear up land for relocating religious/community structures. In such cases the host community itself is relocated as part of MUTP.

Action 8: MMRDA will engage in communications with Project-affected Persons and improve documentation.

Status: Action Completed

40. MMRDA's efforts to improve communications with the PAPs included four key measures: (a) proactive disclosure of relevant information on its website, (b) managing Public Information Centers, (c) holding regular consultations with various groups and individuals; and (d) engaging a specialist agency to improve public information through the print and electronic media. Specific weekday hours are earmarked for face to face meetings with PAPs by the Chief R&R, in addition to special meetings held with specific PAP groups, including the more challenging apartment owners, large shopkeepers, and trustees of religious structures. The Chief-R&R and his team also meet PAPs on an almost daily basis. All relevant Project-related information was made available at MMRDA's PIC and on its website.

Action 9: Improve grievance redress process.

Status: Completed

41. The procedure for registering complaints with the streamlined GRM comprising single member independent Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs) at the field and senior level (FLGRC and SLGRC) was notified in April 2006. The grievance cases registered pertained to entitlements (claims for alternative houses or shops). The final deadline for registering any grievance was May 15, 2009. The GRCs heard and resolved all cases by October 10, 2011. Complainants whose claims were declined by the GRCs could seek legal remedy in court. The FLGRC heard and resolved 3,704 cases, of which 1,169 received favorable verdicts. The SLGRC heard and resolved 902 cases, of which 294 were deemed eligible to receive R&R entitlements. Parallel to the GRC process, MMRDA has established a system for hearing and addressing a wide range of R&R related complaints, including regarding post-resettlement issues, on specific weekdays set aside for this purpose. PAPs could also approach the IMP seeking a resolution of their grievances pertaining to group or policy issues. The IMP played a significant role in resolving grievances of the first and second group of Requesters (USOA shopkeepers and Gazi Nagar residents from SCLR). The 2008 impact assessment study recorded a high degree of PAP satisfaction with the grievance redress process. MMRDA re-established the GRM with new members after the completion of MUTP.

Action 10: Operationalization of the Implementation Manual.

Status: Completed

42. This action was completed during implementation. The Implementation Manual was finalized, taking into account the Bank's comments, and was disclosed at the PIC and on the MMRDA website. The manual was used to administer the entitlements and apply relevant procedures.

IV. CONCLUSION

43. **Resettlement.** Management notes that MMRDA's approach to resettlement management is now characterized by a willingness to explore innovative solutions and an ability to successfully pursue and conclude resettlement negotiations even with difficult PAP groups such as large shopkeepers, residence and shop owners, and trustees of religious and community structures. MMRDA is in the process of carrying out the agreed redevelopment schemes for the resident families of the relocated MHADA buildings, expected to be complete in a year. It has successfully concluded negotiations with SCLR shopkeepers, whose proposed redevelopment scheme it has recommended to the state government. Further, it is pursuing the legal course to complete relocation for the remaining 34 disputed commercial properties and five shop owners for whom land acquisition has restarted following court orders. MMRDA is in the process of concluding the relocation of the two remaining temples. Management is confident that MMRDA will be able to address successfully these few remaining resettlement challenges.

44. **Post-resettlement.** MMRDA's overall post-resettlement activities have been notable, despite delays in exercising the exit strategy. The progress MMRDA has achieved in registering and training 98.4 percent of PAP cooperatives and enabling them to responsibly self-manage their affairs after program exit gives confidence that the post-resettlement strategy can be concluded in a sustainable manner. MMRDA has adopted the post-resettlement strategy for all resettlement sites established to house those displaced by MUTP as well as non-MUTP projects, which is reflective of its ownership of the post-R&R strategy adopted for MUTP. Highlights of this strategy include: institution and capacity building for cooperative housing management; economic empowerment of poor resettled women; provision of key social services in resettlement sites; and substantial progress in repair of works in buildings reporting problems. The majority of societies meet key indicators for program exit. So far management responsibilities for three sites have been handed over to the concerned housing federations.

45. The mainstreaming of the resettlement sites fully into the urban services network remains to be finalized, though MCGM is already providing basic services. MMRDA is pursuing the matter with MCGM regarding long-term sustainability of the services provision. Overall, the quality of compliance in R&R implementation has significantly improved and it appears that the Borrower is well placed to address the few remaining issues and move forward without further Bank oversight in this regard. The Bank, however, continues to engage with MMRDA to help it improve its resettlement

management quality with knowledge sharing, training and exposure support. In the MUTP Implementation Completion Report (ICR), which was reviewed by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), the Resettlement Component was rated as Satisfactory in view of the quality and outcome. In light of the substantial completion of the Action Plan and Project closure on June 15, 2011, Management proposes to conclude the annual reporting on the Action Plan with this volume. The remaining outstanding issues are mainly dealt with through the judiciary and Management will report back to the Board upon their resolution, as was done with similar cases.

ANNEX 1: KEY RESETTLEMENT IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

No	Action	Target	Revised Target	Apr-May 2005 (Panel Visit)	Feb 2006 (Mgmt Response)	Dec 2006 (First Progress Report)	Sep 2007 (Second Progress Report)	Jan 2009 (Third Progress Report)	Jan 2010 (Fourth Progress Report)	Oct 2011 (Fifth Progress Report)	July 2013 (Sixth and Final Report)
1	No. of households shifted to permanent houses	17,378	17,572	12,396 (71%)	13,877 (80%)	15,315 (88%)	15,784 (91%)	16,580 (95%)	17,134 (98%)	17,566 (99.97%)	17,572 (100%)
2	No. of affected shopkeepers provided permanent alternative shops < 225 sq.ft. (small) > 225 sq.ft. (medium and large)	2,469	1,822	249 (15.6%)	369 (23%)	752 (41.2%)	1,104 (60.6%)	1,437 (98.9%)	1,490 (81.8%)	1,782 (97.8%)	1783 (97.86%)
		1,669	1,256	NA	NA	668 (53.8%)	877 (69.8%)	1,018 (81%)	1,071 (85.27%)	1227 (97.7%)	1227 (97.7%)
		800	566	NA	NA	84 (14.84%)	227 (40.11%)	419 (74.03%)	419 (74.03%)	555 (98.06%)	556 (98.23%)
3	No. of households issued identity cards	19,847	19,394	1,685 (8%)	5,616 (29%)	6,319 (32.5%)	15,011 (77.4%)	17,467 (90%)	18,432 (95% of resettled PAHs)	18,547 (100% of resettled squatter PAHs)	NA
4	Disclosure of beneficiaries list on the website	19,847	19,491	Nil	10,910 (55%)	15,627 (78%)	16,447 (82%)	17,467 (90%)	18,202 (94% of total and 87% of resettled PAHs)	18,547 (100 of resettled PAHs lacking formal title)	NA
5	No. of cooperative housing societies (CHS) registered	200*	188	47 (27%)‡	48 (28%)‡	58 (33%)‡	85 (49%)‡	157 (90%)‡	174 (93%)	182 (97%)	185 (98.4%)
6	No. of maintenance funds (Interest) transferred to CHS	200*	188	23 (13%)‡	23 (13%)‡	46 (26%)‡	46 (26%)‡	52 (30%)‡	157 of 174 registered (90%)	162 of 182 (86%)	164
7	No. of CHS provided Building Maintenance Funds	200*	188	47 (27%)‡	47 (27%)‡	47 (27%)‡	47 (27%)‡	125 (71%)‡	155 of 174 registered (89%)	172 of 182 registered (94.5%)	181 (98% registered CHS)
8	No. of PAPs/ CHS received Community Management Funds	2000	NA	NA	244 PAPs (12%)	244 PAPs (12%)	244 PAPs (12%)	CMF given to CHS	CMF given to CHS	CMF given to 172 CHS	184 (99.4% registered CHS)

No	Action	Target	Revised Target	Apr-May 2005 (Panel Visit)	Feb 2006 (Mgmt Response)	Dec 2006 (First Progress Report)	Sep 2007 (Second Progress Report)	Jan 2009 (Third Progress Report)	Jan 2010 (Fourth Progress Report)	Oct 2011 (Fifth Progress Report)	July 2013 (Sixth and Final Report)
9	Transfer of common facilities (pre-school, society office and welfare Centre) to cooperative societies)	600 (for 200 societies)	540	Nil	Nil	114 (18%)	423 (70%)	445 (82%)	For 179 societies received (100 % of the registered societies)	183 societies (100 % of the registered societies)	185 (100% of registered CHS)
10	Issue of building maintenance manuals to cooperative societies	152	157	Nil	Nil	100 (66%)	100 (66%)	157	174	182	185
11	No. of community assets reconstructed	87*	75	NA	16 (18%)	18 (21%)	50 (58%)	60	69	69	70
12	Water supply – Mankhurd (sample buildings) – lpcd	90	90	69	60-65	70-125	90-150 27 buildings get 90-95 lpcd; 2 get 121 and 150 lpcd respectively	71-171 lpcd	NA	71-88 lpcd	NA
13	Water supply – Anik (sample buildings) lpcd	90	90	25	30	70-125	60-129 6 buildings get 60-85 lpcd; 27 buildings get 90-129 lpcd	57-197 58% of 33 buildings received more than 90 lpcd	NA	NA	NA

Note 1: The number of shopkeepers remaining to be resettled has been reduced due to total target revised after assessing the actual shopkeepers (40) remaining to be resettled.

Note 2: The figures in parentheses indicate percentages.

Building maintenance manuals not prepared for initial 48 buildings purchased directly from Maharashtra Housing Board.

* Revised target. A total of 188 buildings were occupied by Project closure.

‡ This represents the percentage of then fully occupied buildings where residents could register their housing cooperative societies.

**ANNEX 2: WORLD BANK SUPERVISION MISSIONS,
SINCE MARCH 2006**

March 9 – 14, 2006

Task Team Leader
Senior Procurement Specialist
Financial Management Specialist
Manager, Procurement
Senior Financial Management Specialist
Senior Finance Officer
Senior Social Development Specialist
Manager, Financial Management
Lead Social Development Specialist

April 12 – 21, 2006

Task Team Leader
Senior Environment Specialist
Architect
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Lead Urban Specialist
Social Development Consultant
Senior Country Program Manager
Senior Social Specialist

May 2 – 5, 2006

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist
Transport Specialist
Traffic Management Specialist

June 5 – 6, 2006

Task Team Leader
Safeguards Advisor
Country Director
Social Development Consultant
Senior Social Specialist

June 28, 2006

Task Team Leader
Social Development Consultant

July 25 – 28, 2006

Task Team Leader
Environmental Specialist
Transport Specialist
Transport Specialist
Social Development Consultant
Senior Social Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Environmental Specialist

August 14, 2006

Acting Country Director
Social Development Consultant
Senior Social Specialist

August 17 – 25, 2006

Task Team Leader

Senior Procurement Specialist
Transport Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Transport Specialist
Transport Specialist
Financial Management Specialist
Social Development Consultant
Traffic Management Specialist
Rail Transport Specialist
Public Relations Specialist
Environmental Specialist

September 25 – 26, 2006

Social Development Consultant
Senior Social Specialist

November 22 – 24 and 26 – 29, 2006

Task Team Leader
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Senior Social Specialist
Social Development Consultant
Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist

January 16 – 25, 2007

Task Team Leader
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Lead Urban Specialist
Transport Specialist
Financial Specialist
Senior Technical Advisor for Safeguards
Social Development Consultant
External Relations
Senior Social Specialist
Senior Environmental Specialist
Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist
Railway Specialist (consultant)
Financial Analyst
Environment Consultant

February 2, 2007

Task Team Leader
Civil Engineer
Railway Specialist (consultant)

March 7, 2007

Task Team Leader
Sector Manager, Transport
Social Development Consultant

April 16 – 19, 2007

Senior Transport Specialist
Social Development Consultant

April 25 – 27, 2007

Social Development Consultant
Senior Social Development Specialist

June 6 – 7, 2007

Task Team Leader
Social Development Consultant

July 6 – 20, 2007

Task Team Leader
Environmental Specialist
Procurement Specialist
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Lead Urban Specialist
Transport Specialist
Financial Specialist
Social Development Consultant
External Relations
Senior Social Specialist
Senior Environmental Specialist
Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist
Railway Specialist (consultant)
Financial Analyst
ATC Specialist
Environment Consultant
ICT Specialist

August 20 – 22, 2007

Task Team Leader
Country Director
Economist
Social Development Consultant
Water Resource Specialist
External Affairs Consultant

September 26 – 28, 2007

Task Team Leader
Senior Transport Specialist
Social Development Consultant

November 20 – 21, 2007

Task Team Leader
Social Development Consultant

December 16 – 18, 2007

Task Team Leader
Social Development Consultant

January 7–17, 2008 / January 23–February 4, 2008

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Procurement Specialist
Transport Specialist
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Transport Sector Manager
Social Safeguards Specialist (consultant)
Financial Specialist
Financial Specialist
Social Development Consultant
External Relations
Senior Social Specialist
Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist
Railway Specialist (consultant)
Financial Analyst
ATC Specialist
Environment Consultant

ICT Specialist

April 6 – 10, 2008

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist
Rail Transport Specialist
Rail Transport Specialist

May 14 – 15, 2008

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist

May 22 – 23, 2008

Task Team Leader
Social Development Consultant

July 11 – 12, 2008

Task Team Leader
Safeguards Regional Adviser
Social Safeguards Specialist, (consultant)
Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Social Development Consultant
Senior Social Specialist

July 23 – August 5, 2008

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist
Procurement Specialist
Financial Specialist
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Transport Specialist
Financial Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Social Development Consultant
External Relations
Senior Social Specialist
Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist
Railway Specialist (consultant)
Financial Analyst
Environment Consultant
ICT Specialist

September 15 – 16, 2008

Transport Specialist
Social Development Consultant

November 23 – November 26, 2008

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist
Financial Management Consultant
Transport Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Social Development Consultant

January 28 – February 6, 2009

Task Team Leader
Transport Specialist
Procurement Specialist
Regional Safeguards Advisor
Transport Specialist

Transport Specialist
Financial Specialist
Environmental Specialist
Social Development Specialist
External Relations
Senior Social Specialist
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Annex 3: MUTP Innovation Note



INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

URBAN RESETTLEMENT Mumbai Urban Transport Project

7



Resettlement and Rehabilitation in a Large Metropolis

The Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) commenced in 2002 to improve transport services in India's premier megacity. It involved urban resettlement on an unparalleled scale. Over 100,000 people living along roads and railways tracks were to be resettled to improve rail and road transport services. While resettling people is difficult anywhere, it appeared almost intractable in the complex socio-political environment of Mumbai, a linear city that lies along a narrow north-south peninsula and is one of the most densely populated urban areas in the world.

Almost ninety-five percent of the affected people did not have legal title to the land they occupied. Affected structures included an assortment of residences, businesses, religious and community facilities, schools, dispensaries, nurseries, and so on. Getting people from diverse social and economic backgrounds to accept homogenous resettlement options was not easy. Even more challenging was finding alternative resettlement sites in land-scarce Mumbai and mobilizing the resources to develop these.

The unprecedented scale and complexity of the process called for innovative solutions. To solve both land and financial constraints, the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) - the agency responsible

for the project's Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) activities - enlisted private participation. It offered private developers 'development rights' and cash incentives to construct new resettlement sites in the less-dense northern suburbs of the city.

Recognizing people's concerns regarding involuntary resettlement, the MMRDA altered its approach from one that narrowly focused on compensating people for their losses towards one that sought to arrive at a 'win-win' solution for all. This resulted in wider consultation and negotiation with the affected people, with the help of NGOs.

The agency's willingness to adapt and explore alternative solutions, often going beyond the scope of the R&R policy, enabled it to come up with innovative resettlement options that were more agreeable to the affected people. This was a critical factor in helping to reduce the number of complaints. It cut down the costs and delays involved in litigation and speeded up the implementation process.

In addition, proactive information disclosure, a transparent grievance redressal mechanism, and an independent panel of eminent citizens who regularly monitored the resettlement sites and listened to people's concerns played

an important role in resolving grievances and building people's confidence in the resettlement process.

Going beyond the provision of brick and mortar resettlement sites, the MMRDA helped the resettled people to adapt to their new environments. Resettlement colonies were provided with schools, day-care centres, and women's centres. People's livelihood options were expanded through skills training for the youth and micro-credit for women.

An independent study has found that the provision of formal housing to resettled families has raised their social status and improved their

employability and creditworthiness. It has also given them, especially the women, a greater sense of security in their new homes.

The project has become a worldwide example of urban resettlement on a mega scale. Mumbai's suburban rail services, which cater to over 7 million passengers a day, have witnessed a greater frequency of trains and lower levels of congestion. The MMRDA has now been identified as the nodal agency for urban resettlement in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The lessons learnt from the project have equipped the MMRDA to effectively deal with the resettlement challenges of future infrastructure projects in the city.



Known for its economic dynamism, traffic jams and vast slums, Mumbai, India's financial capital, is home to some 20 million people. Affordable housing is a challenge, pushing poor migrants to settle in slums. Seven million people live in 3,000 slums across the city, encroaching public lands. These slums often obstruct vital infrastructure such as roads, railway tracks, airports, storm-water drains, stations, markets, etc. Resettling slum-dwellers is often the biggest hurdle to expanding much-needed infrastructure, more so in very densely populated city like Mumbai where finding land for resettlement is particularly difficult.

In 2002, the Government of Maharashtra and the World Bank began implementing the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP, \$555 million) to improve transport services in the city. Public transport is the lifeline of Mumbai. Every day over 7 million commuters use the suburban rail services while the buses carry another 4.5 million. In fact, Mumbai's western suburban rail corridor carries the highest passenger traffic in the world. The project

aimed to increase the speed and length of suburban trains and widen east-west roads to ease congestion and improve connectivity. It also aimed to modernize traffic management and planning to enable the smoother flow of traffic and improve safety. Several project activities required large-scale resettlement of families, commercial establishments, public facilities, as well as cultural and religious structures.

Slums often obstruct vital infrastructure such as roads and railway tracks



Public transport is the lifeline of Mumbai making it essential to increase the speed and length of suburban trains and widen key east-west roads



The MUTP was the first attempt in India to resettle a large number of urban dwellers. In view of the magnitude of the task, resettlement was initially planned as a separate project. However, it was retained as an element of the larger transportation project to better align resettlement activities with the implementation of civil works.

Resettling complex slum clusters

The complexity of the resettlement challenge was evidenced by its sheer size: about 100,000 people had to be relocated—over 17,500 residential households, some 1,800 shops, more than 100 community and cultural properties including temples, mosques, ‘madrasas’, Buddhist and Sikh shrines, churches, as well as a site designated as a Jewish cemetery. There were also a number of community and child welfare centres and dozens of public toilet blocks. There were decades-old slums on railway lands, some sprawling precariously close to the railway tracks, and settlements occupying prime public and private lands beside key east-west roads. The homes to be relocated were equally varied: there were legal homeowners living in multi-storey buildings, ‘pagdi’ holders¹ who claimed ownership, tenants and lessees, as well as squatters without formal title. Businesses similarly ranged from petty vendors to well-established shops, plus a whole host of manufacturing and service activities, such as recycling units, factories, warehouses, auto repair workshops, fuel stations, restaurants, nurseries, and

dairy farms. Almost ninety-five percent of these households and businesses did not have legal title. If this were not enough, the project required relocation of a host of utilities including underground water and electricity pipelines, telephone cables, drains, and a few large transmission towers.

Moving organically evolved slums in Mumbai is like moving unique worlds. Successive waves of migrants had settled in distinct groups along caste, religious and regional lines, sharing living space, basic amenities, and places of worship, despite marked diversities of incomes, age, and aspirations. The people in each slum cluster had their own leaders and political affiliations that they hoped would protect them from eviction. Both slum residents and shopkeepers were organized and vocal.

Almost ninety five percent of the people to be resettled did not have legal title to the land or buildings they occupied



¹ Under Mumbai's 'pagdi' system, properties are purchased by tenants at lower-than-market prices but legal ownership remains with the landlords. Tenants must contribute towards the upkeep of the property and pay a monthly rent - mostly just nominal sums. In return, they are protected from arbitrary evictions and exorbitant rents. If tenants want to sell the properties, they must share the profits with the owner.

Moving people from horizontal to vertical settlements

Relocating people from horizontal settlements to high-rise buildings posed additional challenges. People accustomed to living in close communities in mixed-use neighbourhoods which offered both housing and informal job opportunities were to be shifted into multi-storey buildings in homogenous resettlement townships away from their places of work. They would have to live as members of registered housing societies and pay for all basic services such as water and electricity, in addition to paying property taxes, and fees for the maintenance of their buildings. They would also have to manage their surroundings including internal roads, drains, and common lighting facilities. Moreover, religious and community structures could not be resettled in high-rise buildings and required alternative sites for their re-establishment. Relocating multi-storey residential buildings was even more contentious, for

the residents, who had legal titles, would not move unless they were first provided with comparable housing at similar locations. An even bigger challenge was relocating large businesses that earned good incomes beside major roads and railway stations, given their justified fears of losing business if they moved.

Finding land and finances

Resettling over 100,000 people required finding several resettlement sites in land-scarce Mumbai as well as mobilizing the huge financial resources needed to construct new townships. Free housing and shops of 225 sq. ft. each were to be provided to all those who had lost land and assets, including to land owners and tenants, as well as to squatters, in accordance with the Government of Maharashtra's R&R Policy for the project. Affected shopkeepers and landowners were also allowed to buy additional floor area up to 525 sq. ft in proportion to their loss.

Widening east-west roads meant relocating landowners, large shops, and religious and community structures



Proactive consultations helped arrive at acceptable resettlement solutions



Given the scale and complexity of the resettlement process, several preparatory measures were taken. These included consultations with the affected people, studies to understand the project's impacts, steps to address the social and economic needs of the affected people, the drawing up of resettlement action plans, and the establishment of mechanisms and capacity for implementation. The government did all that was required to successfully plan and implement the resettlement activities: it established a resettlement cell at MMRDA, hired NGOs, carried out census surveys, prepared resettlement plans, and established public information centres as well as a grievance redressal mechanisms (GRM). Despite these efforts, the challenges on the ground proved enormous and serious grievances emerged, requiring flexibility and innovative measures in dealing with them.

1. Incentives to Private Developers

Recognizing the need for huge financial resources to build the resettlement sites, the state government encouraged private participation by offering additional 'transfer of development rights' (TDR)

or 'floor space index' (FSI) to private developers willing to resettle slum dwellers at their own cost. (Box 1) Landowners in the affected areas were also offered TDR or additional floor space in lieu of cash compensation for the land they had lost; they could utilize these to build properties elsewhere. Private interest in resettlement increased as the developers learnt to convert TDR/FSI into profitable investments in the Mumbai real estate market. Some 30 resettlement colonies were developed in this manner by the MMRDA; of these, 13 were earmarked for people affected by the MUTP. Most resettlement colonies housed over 1,000 households with the two larger ones at Anik and Mankhurd housing over 5,000 households each.

2. Consultations and Negotiations

R&R activities hit roadblocks when it came to resettling households and commercial establishments affected by the widening of the two major east-west road corridors, the Santa Cruz Link Road (SCLR) and the Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road (JVLR). Unlike the people living along the railway tracks who were waiting to be rescued from their harsh living

BOX 1 Transfer of Development Rights

Transfer of Development Rights, or TDR, is a certificate from the city administration that the owner of a property gets for developing public utilities such as parks, schools and hospitals. Under the TDR policy, land owners are compensated in kind if they surrender some of their land to the government for purposes such as widening a road, creating a park or rehabilitating slum dwellers. These rights can be sold to other builders or can be used for development by the land owner her/himself in lieu of the plot that has been surrendered. TDRs cannot be exercised within the Mumbai city limits. If a property has been designated as a park in the city's master plan, and the owner of that property develops the park and hands it over to the city administration, the administration will issue a TDR certificate that allows the owner to build on an equivalent area in one of the suburbs. Most TDRs are generated from the redevelopment of slums, initiated by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and MMRDA. In the case of slum resettlement, developers are offered additional TDR/FSI between 1.5 to 2.5 times the floor area created, which they can use to develop other properties at a profit. One sq. ft. of TDR can cost about Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 3,000 (US\$50-60) in Mumbai, depending on the location. TDRs or FSI can be used at the same location or further north of the area where the land was acquired or given out for public purposes (land values decline as one moves away from the southern tip of the Mumbai peninsula).

conditions, those affected by road construction were a heterogeneous group that included landowners, lease holders, large commercial units, and religious structures. Tied to their locations with established incomes and social networks, they resisted relocation with all their might, and especially resented being equated with slum dwellers. It proved particularly difficult to engage with the large shopkeepers, who put up stiff opposition with the backing of local leaders. Misperceptions, lack of trust, and the fear of forcible relocation kept large shopkeepers and landowners away from meetings and negotiations with MMRDA. The failure to establish a dialogue increased MMRDA's impatience with the project-affected people, leading to a hardening of positions on both sides. This adversarial relationship, marked by ideological tensions, stalled the relocation process. The people affected by the project complained to the World Bank's Inspection Panel, questioning the adequacy of R&R options for shopkeepers, the suitability and quality of resettlement sites, the quality of information disclosure and consultation,

With running water and toilets, the new 225 square foot apartments are a huge improvement on makeshift slum dwellings



and the grievance redressal processes. The Inspection Panel took up the case and issued a report in December 2005; the Government of Maharashtra and the World Bank then prepared a remedial action plan.

Exploring alternative solutions

Among the key remedial measures taken were consultation and negotiation with the affected residents and shopkeepers. MMRDA broke the ice by proactively holding consultations to discuss resettlement options with resident and shopkeeper associations, and the managing committees of religious structures. During these consultations, which were documented, MMRDA explored alternative resettlement solutions, often going beyond the scope of the R&R policy. Additional resettlement sites were offered, lengthy land acquisition procedures were bypassed through deals with landowners, and in-situ resettlement was recommended for the large shopkeepers. The MMRDA also managed to relocate multi-storey apartments through redevelopment

360 shopkeepers and landowners were offered space in the upmarket Powai Shopping Plaza



near the same sites and to relocate religious structures through negotiations with local communities.

Resettling high-value shops in upmarket areas

The consultations also enabled MMRDA to negotiate alternative resettlement options with the large and medium shopkeepers who were unwilling to shift in apprehension of loss of business. MMRDA signed MoUs with three shopkeeper groups affected by the construction of the SCLR to resettle them at the same sites or in the vicinity. After these negotiations, the shopkeepers made way for road works to be carried out by removing the affected portions of their shops, even before the resettlement sites were completed. Similarly, some 360 shopkeepers and landowners affected by the JVLR were offered alternative space at the upmarket Powai Shopping Plaza; in the case of land owners, the space offered was equivalent in size to the area they had lost. The Powai Plaza, developed by a private builder through the grant of TDR, is a good example of finding an upmarket resettlement solution for high-value shops through private participation.

Offering apartment owners larger flats at a cost

Consultations also helped find a solution for the residents of the 20 Maharashtra Housing Area Development Authority (MHADA) apartment buildings that needed to be relocated. The flat owners

had refused to take part in the baseline census survey and demanded alternative land or redevelopment at the same site. MMRDA held a series of negotiations with MHADA residents to resolve the issue, at the same time initiating legal proceedings to acquire their properties. An agreement was finally reached for a redevelopment scheme that offered flats that were almost twice the size as the ones the residents had lost, with rental allowance for temporary accommodation paid to them in advance until the new buildings were ready. Some 440 households residing in 19 MHADA buildings were thus relocated. The residents of the last building were provided two apartments each at a resettlement site reserved for landowners.

The MMRDA's willingness to remove bottlenecks by modifying its policy and procedures to accommodate people's needs and demands played a key role in the success of the relocation. Several modifications in policies and procedures were established including for: (i) resettling large shops doing business for decades on very high-value land near the Bandra-Kurla Complex, which refused to relocate to the resettlement sites fearing loss of income; (ii) enabling partially-impacted shops and residences to retain the unaffected portions of their buildings; (iii) dealing with land-owning shopkeepers; and (iv) dealing with cases where negotiations had broken down (Box 2).

BOX 2 Procedure for dealing with a breakdown in negotiations

In order to keep the relocation process on track, a procedure was established to deal with shopkeepers that refused consultation and resisted resettlement. The procedure included mapping shopkeepers according to business categories, offering two suitable resettlement options, and notifying the shopkeepers to respond within 10 working days. If the shopkeepers did not respond, MMRDA would assign the most suitable option and issue an allotment letter, along with a notice approved by IMP, requesting the shopkeeper to: (a) accept the allotment; (b) request any changes within available options; or (c) appeal to the field-level Grievance Redressal Committee, if there was any grievance with the allotment. Finally, if the shopkeeper did not respond within five days of receiving the allotment letter, MMRDA would clear the site 48 hours after delivering a relocation notice.

3. Post-resettlement Support

Physical relocation is only the beginning of a long and arduous process of rehabilitation. Resettling people living in horizontally spread-out slums into multi-storey buildings is never easy. Without adequate support, the resettlement buildings run the risk of turning into vertical slums. Initially, the MUPP resettlement sites deteriorated after people were first shifted there. While NGOs provided crucial support to the newly relocated people, inadequate maintenance of common facilities such as open spaces, lighting, lifts, internal roads and drainage posed a challenge. Moreover, transport services, schools, hospitals and civic services such as waste management were inadequate.

Recognizing the need for good management of resettlement sites, MMRDA prepared a post-resettlement support strategy with the help of professional consultants and established a post-resettlement cell to address maintenance and

management issues. Residents were mobilized to pass a resolution and apply for registering a co-operative housing society in each building. Once registered, MMRDA provided the housing societies with community management funds at Rs.1,000 per household and building maintenance funds at Rs. 20,000 per household; management committees were trained in leadership and financial management; residents were made aware of the importance of building maintenance; and federations of housing societies were organized so that they could take charge of the overall management of the resettlement colonies.

Society management offices, day-care centres, and women's centres were provided in all the resettlement colonies, while common facilities such as schools, flour mills, community halls, and health centres were provided according to the assessed needs of the community. Estate officers were appointed to carry out building repairs and monitor maintenance. A program completion strategy with exit indicators

As residents of new housing societies, former slum dwellers have seen a rise in their social status and employability

Resettled slum-dwellers will legally own their own homes if they retain the property for ten years



was formulated, with management responsibilities to be handed over to the housing societies once these indicators were met. The exit indicators include: registration of societies, capacity building, transferring maintenance funds for financial sustainability, necessary repairs, and federating housing societies.

4. Livelihoods, Schools and Training

Instead of preparing a gender action plan, the project integrated gender considerations into the overall implementation process. The baseline survey was designed to generate gender-disaggregated data. This helped identify households headed by women and other vulnerable families who would be eligible for special treatment while offering alternative housing. Slots were also reserved for women in the management committees of the resettlement buildings. Moreover, each resettlement building had space for women's activities as well as a children's center, where pre-school learning opportunities and

Each resettlement building allocated space for a children's centre



day-care facilities make it possible for the women to engage in productive activities.

New livelihood opportunities for women

After a Resettlement Impact Assessment Study carried out in 2007-08 by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), the MMRDA took several measures to improve the quality of the post-resettlement process, including the establishment of a livelihood cell to promote income-generating activities for women at all the resettlement sites. While a first phase focused on the establishment of women's self-help groups, a second phase laid emphasis on skill development, training, marketing and access to credit for the women. A women's industrial cooperative called SANKALP was formed to undertake a range of economic activities including the supply of office stationery, the sale of vegetables, providing catering and housekeeping services, and conducting seasonal trade in a variety of consumer goods such as sarees, festival ware, processed food, etc.

Additional primary schools were established at large resettlement colonies



To ensure safe neighbourhoods, some women have formed community police groups, with NGO support. The 11-member community police committees have seven women members, all of whom have been issued ID cards by the police department as 'social police officers'. They focus on the resolution of domestic violence, marital conflicts, and financial disputes among the resettled people, especially when women are affected.

Schools for children

At the time of relocation, MMRDA provided a free bus service so that the children did not have to change school midway through the academic year because of the relocation. Where needed, as at large resettlement colonies such as Mankhurd and Anik, additional primary schools were established, and a secondary school was built at Mankhurd. MMRDA also provided the infrastructure for one private school at Mankhurd and two private schools at Anik that are managed by charities.

Young people were offered training in computer and English language skills



Job training for youth

In 2008, MMRDA organized an 'opportunities fair' to link educated youth with various employment opportunities. Youth groups were also trained in English language communication, etiquette and computer skills to improve their employability.

While these livelihood support activities may not have fully addressed the economic needs of all affected households, they opened a door to a range of income-generating activities for both women and young people.

5. Transparency, Monitoring and Grievance Redressal

The remedial actions taken by MMRDA after 2005 included the refurbishment of a three-tiered Grievance Redressal Mechanism (GRM). The GRM consisted of a field-level grievance redressal committee to consider individual grievances, a senior-level grievance redressal committee to consider appeals against the decisions of the field-level committee,

A women's cooperative has opened up new livelihood opportunities for women



and an Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP) comprising eminent citizens empowered to consider group complaints and policy-related issues. The earlier GRM was dismantled as it included officers of the project implementing agency and therefore was not considered autonomous by the people. The new grievance redressal committees were fully independent with clear procedures for hearings and appeals. The “house allotment letters” informed project-affected people about the GRM procedure, which allowed a person to file a complaint and furnish evidence to substantiate his/her case within five working days. The IMP played a key role in resolving group interests or policy matters. Complainants not satisfied with the GRM retained the option to seek recourse in court, and 50 court cases were filed regarding R&R issues. In addition, MMRDA earmarked specific weekdays for addressing grievances related to issues other than entitlements, including post-resettlement issues. Moreover, MMRDA regularly sent its engineers to resettlement sites to hear peoples’ grievances and take remedial action.

Independent monitoring

The IMP was a key element of the implementation oversight process. Established by the Government of Maharashtra, it comprised a former additional chief secretary as its Chairman, a senior advocate, a senior journalist, a former vice chancellor of a university in Mumbai and a noted academic as its members. As a matter of practice, the IMP periodically visited R&R sites with officials, interacted with the people to understand their concerns, and recommended remedial actions for MMRDA to address. The IMP played a meaningful role in facilitating dialogue with the SCLR shopkeepers regarding their demand

for private resettlement at the site itself. The 2007-08 Resettlement Impact Assessment recorded the commendable role played by the IMP in monitoring the resettlement process and addressing people’s concerns.

Transparency

MMRDA’s communication strategy emphasized transparency. Accordingly, resettlement action plans, summaries of implementation plans, and lists of people eligible for compensation were posted on the MMRDA website. Other documents posted online included the R&R implementation manual, the GRM brochure, resettlement procedures in case of failure of negotiations with shopkeepers, procedures for partially affected structures, etc. MMRDA also ran Public Information Centres at the project sites, in the resettlement colonies, as well as at its office. The application of the 2005 Right to Information Act further strengthened transparency and accountability practices.

Women feel a greater sense of security in their new homes



The project's approach to resettlement and its mid-course corrections paid off. By the time the project closed in June 2011 - about seven years after the relocation process began - all but six residential households and 40 shopkeepers had been resettled. All religious structures, with the exception of three, had been relocated. Legal proceedings had been initiated for the few remaining cases.

- A total of about 100,000 people (including 17,566 residences and 1,782 shops) were resettled, including both legal owners and squatters. Squatters will gain formal title to their new homes and shops once they have retained these properties for ten years (to prevent them from selling them right after relocation).
- 95 percent of the cooperative housing societies have been registered, and their members have been trained to responsibly manage their own affairs. The resettled people have slowly accepted the change and gained confidence in managing their own affairs.
- The independent Resettlement Impact Assessment study (TISS, 2008) showed that the provision of formal housing to resettled families has significantly empowered them. Their social status has risen, they feel a greater sense of security in their new homes, and their employability and creditworthiness has improved - all factors that have helped to integrate them into the formal economy.
- Women have benefitted from a variety of new livelihood opportunities at the resettlement sites. Their sphere of activity has expanded beyond the resettlement colonies with catering services and corporate canteens now being run in different parts of the city. Within two years, the group's cumulative turnover exceeded Rs. 1 crore (about \$200,000).
- Some 10,000 women living in different resettlement colonies enrolled in micro-credit activities through self-help groups formed by NGOs. This enabled the women to generate additional income for their families and contribute towards the education of their children, creating a positive impact on other poor women in the resettlement colonies (Resettlement Impact Study).
- The women's community police groups have played a key role in rebuilding lost social capital and in resolving conflicts and differences in the resettlement buildings and colonies. According to the Resettlement Impact Study, the resettled women have also expressed greater satisfaction with their new homes compared to the men, because of their greater sense of privacy, safety and security.
- Some 9,500 resettled children have benefitted from the 39 schools and education centers in and around the rehabilitation sites. These schools are run by the government's primary education program, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, as well as by charitable organizations.
- Consultations carried out by MMRDA with the project-affected people resulted in fewer complaints. Over 3,700 cases were resolved by the field-level grievance redressal committee. The 2007-08 R&R Impact Assessment Study recorded people's high appreciation of the role of the grievance redressal mechanism. The fact that only about 50 court cases were filed by people who were not satisfied with the resettlement options provided bears testimony to the success of the approach adopted.

Many useful lessons have emerged from the project's experience in urban resettlement.

A change of approach, from one that focused narrowly on compensating people for their losses towards one that sought to arrive at a 'win-win' solution through negotiation, helped deal with the challenges. To achieve this, resettlement policies and plans needed to be treated as living documents that could be rapidly adapted to changing demands and evolving contexts.

Offering landowners TDRs as a tradable benefit in lieu of compensation provided them with wider options for relocation, making the resettlement process more acceptable to them.

Consultation and communication with the affected people throughout the project cycle, along with the transparent provision of information on eligibility and entitlements, reduced misinformation and enhanced the people's trust and confidence in the resettlement process.

A robust and transparent grievance redressal mechanism through independent and recognized committees helped resolve complaints, won people's confidence, and reduced the costs and delays associated with litigation. Moreover, the establishment of an Independent Monitoring Panel and oversight committees helped resolve critical issues, reducing the number of complaints substantially.

Training NGOs, even those with significant experience, is important for managing large-scale resettlement.

Synchronizing R&R with civil works important for timely completion of project works. In fact,

the commencement of civil works without serious progress in land acquisition and resettlement can result in massive time and cost overruns. And interagency coordination is critical to prevent inordinate delays in project implementation.

Independent reviews of the resettlement process helped to measure the effectiveness of actions taken, identify gaps, and formulate remedial measures. For instance, in large resettlement townships, common amenities such as schools, dispensaries, and other facilities should be developed prior to the relocation of people. Moreover, estate management should be integrated into the resettlement process to enable communities to manage the resettlement sites themselves.

The MMRDA has now been identified as the nodal agency for urban resettlement in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The lessons learned from the MUTP experience have enabled MMRDA to deal with the resettlement challenges of infrastructure projects with better preparedness.

The project has become a worldwide example of urban resettlement on a mega scale



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